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"How does nature speak to our concern? That is the question" (Henry Bugbee, 
"Wilderness in America" 11).
"When it is granted to m an to hear the songs of the herbs - how every herb 
speaks its song to God w ithout any alien will or thought - how beautiful and 
sweet it is to hear their singing. And therefore it is very good to serve God in 
their m idst in solitary walks over the field among the plants of the earth and to 
pour out one's speech before God in truthfulness. All the speech of the field then 
goes into your speech and heightens its power. With every breath you drink the 
air of paradise, and when you return home, the w orld is renewed in your sight" 
(anonym ous Hasidic saying, quoted in Martin Buber, Ecstatic Confessions 149).
"There are forces in the woods, forces in the world, that lay claim to you, that lay 
a hand  on your shoulder so gently that you do not even feel it: not at first. All of 
the smallest elements - the direction of a breeze one day, a single sentence that a 
friend m ight speak to you, a raven flying across the m eadow and circling back 




This paper attem pts to describe and in terpret the sense and m eaning of 
our actual, lived relations w ith the nonhum an beings and things of the 
natural w orld. In our everyday lives we enter into all m anner of relations 
w ith nature .1 We eat nature’s creatures; we w ear them; we study them; we 
dam  them ; we even write papers on them. In general, we use nature in all 
sorts of ways, even aesthetically and spiritually. And yet, on occasion, we also 
encounter the beings and things of nature in ways that do not fit these 
categories of analysis, m anipulation and use. A rushing m ountain stream  or 
a pair of soaring buzzards may also speak to us, not of their use, their physical 
and chemical composition, their role in the ecology of the place, but simply 
and eloquently of themselves - as this stream or these buzzards, in all their 
uniqueness, beauty and depth. In turn, we may hear their voices, not in 
term s of our interests, our conceptual frameworks, our sciences, bu t simply, 
directly and im m ediately as this particular stream, that pair of buzzards; and 
their speech resonates w ithin us in a way calling forth - evoking - a spirit of 
affirm ation, w onder and joy. These relational m om ents are charged w ith 
m eaning - and responsibility. We feel called upon to answ er for them.
A ddress and response; call and answer. At the m ost fundam ental 
level, a t a level beyond and beneath mere speech, a dialogue has occurred. In 
such m om ents, we find ourselves as participants in m eaningful and  destinate 
dialogues, and, likewise, we come to know  these other - and  fellow - 
creatures w hom  we m eet as genuine partners in those dialogues.2
1
2
I w ish to begin this paper simply by bearing witness to the experiential 
reality  of such m om ents of dialogue through a few firsthand accounts. Such 
testim ony, how ever inadequate it m ay be, will provide the necessary 
experiential ground upon which this project m ust rest. Once this 
groundw ork is established, I will describe the structural pattern  or eidos of 
such relations and attem pt to interpret their significance for the w ay we live 
in, and respond to, the natural w orld around us. I will present this eidetic 
description and interpretation in terms of a philosophy of dialogue, drawing 
heavily, although not exclusively, upon the thought of M artin Buber.
The reason for choosing Buber's thought as m y prim ary interpretive 
tool in  this project is a simple and, I believe, m ethodologically consistent one: 
Buber’s description of our relationality in terms of I-Thou and I-It relations 
and his understanding of the ethical force of the I-Thou dialogue speak more 
truly and directly to my own experience than any other account of our 
relationality that I have come across. And, perhaps even m ore im portantly 
for the purposes of this paper, Buber’s witness to the reality of I-Thou 
dialogue occurring betw een hum ans and nonhum an, natural beings and 
things has not only verified m y own experience bu t also provided m e w ith a 
vocabulary w ith which to begin to understand and speak about these 
experiences.
To me, this resonance of Buber's words w ith one's ow n experience 
seem s crucial if one truly hopes to hear and understand w hat he is, rather
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idiosyncratically, at times, attem pting to say. As Jacob B. Agus writes, "If we 
are to understand  the uniqueness of the I-Thou relation, we m ust heed 
Buber's appeal to find an echo of his w ords in our ow n life" (Quoted in 
D iam ond 23). Adm ittedly, w ithout such an "echo," Buber's w ork and all that 
follows in  this essay m ay appear as nothing more than m ystification, double 
talk, or just bad science.3
And yet, if we rem ain open to the possibilities of which Buber speaks, I 
believe that we can hear that echo of his w ords in our lives. And so, I begin 
this paper by bearing witness to the experiential reality of my own dialogical, 
I-Thou encounters w ith the beings and things of nature. That my personal 
accounts of such events may at first seem trivial a n d /o r  parochial and that I 
lack the capacity to do them  justice in speaking of them  here should not 
dim inish their crucial im portance for this project; as m entioned earlier, they 
furnish the necessary experiential ground upon which the entire project 
depends.
Two events, in particular, come to m ind m ost clearly in this context. 
The first occurred several years ago at the end of a long day of walking in the 
Mission M ountains. Coming dow n a steep incline as the sun ’s last rays cut 
across a stand of mixed conifers, I was stopped dead in my tracks by the deep, 
black eyes of a pine m arten standing alert on a branch directly ahead of me. 
Startled by our m utual discovery, we momentarily stared at each other - 
frozen in each other's presence - until perhaps the blink of an eye or a noise 
from  som ew here else (I never knew the reason) broke the gaze, and the
4
m arten scrambled across the branch and disappeared into the deep grow th of 
the pine.
The other event that comes to m ind for its strongly dialogical flavor is 
one that has occurred repeatedly, although always w ith slight variations. In 
these instances I am walking the streets of Missoula in the early m orning on 
cold and unusually  clear winter days. As I cross several of the streets running 
diagonally across town, I am afforded a clear and unobstructed view of Lolo 
Peak rising up  in the distance. Lit by the sun from the east, the dazzling white 
sum m it shines against the intense blue backdrop of a cloudless sky and the 
bluish-black foreground of the wooded ridges below. Even at such a distance 
the peak offers itself as an imm ediate and compelling presence, causing me to 
tu rn  again and again to the southwest as it gives itself afresh in subtle changes 
of angle, texture, and shading.
Far from extraordinary, these two encounters stand out m ost clearly in 
m y m ind, although they are hardly isolated occurrences. Just as clearly and 
forcefully, I rem ember the motionless osprey perched in a cottonwood snag 
across the Bitterroot River, a certain m eadow high up  Blodgett Canyon, a 
charging (bluffing?) bull moose in the Pintler Range, an alpine ridge below 
Stuart Peak covered in wildflowers, a certain stretch of the Blackfoot River on 
a scorching hot sum m er day, and a young bull elk along the ridgeline of 
Hogback Peak in the Sapphire M ountains. For me, these and other 
encounters w ith the natural beings and things of w estern M ontana are not 
m erely fond remembrances; they provide the "immediate dat[a] of
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consciousness" - to borrow  Erazim Kohak’s phenom enological term  - upon  
w hich the following discussion rests ("I, Thou, and It" 51).
But not only these. The writings of naturalists, poets, novelists, and 
even some philosophers (although the latter case is quite rare given the 
rather abstract and theoretical nature of m uch of the philosophical enterprise) 
are full of accounts of similar encounters, presented w ith m uch greater pow er 
and  evocative force than mine. These eloquent testim onials also provide me 
w ith  the experiential foundation, albeit once rem oved, upon w hich to build 
m y position. O ut of m any excellent examples, I have chosen four to present 
here because of their explicitly dialogical character. The first comes from  the 
opening lines of Rachel Carson's The Sense of W onder, w here she w rites,
One storm y autum n night when my nephew  Roger w as about 
twenty m onths old I w rapped him in a blanket and  carried him  
dow n to the beach in the rainy darkness. O ut there, just at the 
edge of where-w e-couldn’t-see, big waves w ere thundering  in, 
dim ly seen white shapes that boomed and shouted and  threw  
great handfuls of froth at us. Together we laughed for pure  joy - 
he a baby m eeting for the first time the w ild tum ult of Oceanus, I 
w ith the salt of half a lifetime of sea love in me. But I think we 
felt the same spine-tingling response to the vast, roaring  ocean 
and the wild night around us (8-9).
Or, consider John M uir’s words as he tells of his first encounter w ith a stand 
of giant sequoias.
...I climbed the high rock called W amellow by the Indians. Here 
I obtained telling views of the fertile forest-filled basin of the 
upper Fresno. Innum erable spires of the noble Yellow Pine were 
displayed rising above one another on the braided slopes, and yet 
nobler Sugar Pines w ith superb arms outstretched in  the rich 
autum n light, while away toward the southw est, on the verge of 
the glowing horizon, I discovered the majestic dom e-like crowns
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of Big Trees towering high over all, singly and in close grove 
congregations. There is som ething w onderfully attractive in this 
king tree, even when beheld from afar, that draw s us to it w ith 
indescribable enthusiasm ; its superior height and m assive 
sm oothly rounded outlines proclaim ing its character in any 
company; and when one of the oldest attains full stature on 
some com m anding ridge it seems the very god of the woods 
(208-209).
The next example occurs on a much smaller scale than the first two, b u t the 
encounter is no less im m ediate and engaging. In his poem  "The Heron," 
W endell Berry writes,
And I go on until I see crouched
on a dead branch sticking out of the w ater
a heron - so still that I believe
he is a bit of drift hung dead above the water.
A nd then I see the articulation of feather 
and living form, a brilliance I receive 
beyond my power to make, as he 
receives in his great patience 
the river's providence. And then I see 
that I am seen, adm itted, m y silence 
accepted in his silence. Still as I keep,
I m ight be a tree for all the fear he shows.
Suddenly I know I have passed across 
to a shore where I do not live (113-114).
Finally, perhaps m y favorite literary account of such an encounter is William 
Faulkner's depiction of that first and fateful m eeting betw een young Isaac 
McCaslin and the great bear, Old Ben, in Go Down, M oses.
Then he [Isaac] saw the bear. It did not emerge, appear: it was just 
there, immobile, fixed in the green and windless noon's hot dappling, 
not as big as he had dream ed it but as big as he had expected, bigger, 
dim ensionless against the dappled obscurity, looking at him. Then it 
moved. It crossed the glade w ithout haste, walking for an instant into 
the sun's full glare and out of it, and stopped again and looked back at 
him  across one shoulder. Then it was gone. It d id n ’t w alk into the
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woods. It faded, sank back into the wilderness w ithout m otion as he 
had watched a fish, a huge old bass, sink back into the dark  depths of its 
pool and vanish w ithout even any m ovem ent of its fins (209).
In these brief passages/C arson, Muir, Berry and Faulkner speak of their 
m eetings w ith the beings and things of nature in a way that seems explicitly 
dialogical, and, through their words, they bear witness to the m eaning and 
dep th  of such encounters.4 No less telling, however, are M uir’s accounts of 
his first view  of the Sierra Nevadas (100-101), or a night spent gazing 
w ondrously  at the auroras in Alaska (305-307), or his cheerful encounters 
w ith  the w ater ouzels of Yosemite (147-161); or Aldo Leopold's reflections on 
the revelatory force held in the green eyes of a dying wolf (138-139). Similarly, 
one can hear the pow er of an engaging and joy-filled dialogue w ith nature in 
T horeau’s loving description of the ponds, particularly W alden Pond, near 
Concord (173-200) or in his account of a game of hide-and-seek w ith a loon 
(233-236); or in Henry Bugbee's description of certain m ornings at M iner's 
Bend on the Gualala River (Inward M orning 86-87) or in his brief account of 
colorful aspens and larches "crying out" in the wild Canadian Rockies 
(Inw ard M orning 139-140). Finally, it seems to me that m ost of Edw ard 
A bbey’s Desert Solitaire could serve as a powerful testimony of one m an's 
intense and intim ate dialogue w ith a particular place - the canyon country of 
southeastern  Utah - in all its various instantiations.
In my own experience and in my reading of the witness of others, 
hum an beings, on occasion, encounter the beings and things of nature in a 
unique and  im portant way that, to me, seems most accurately and naturally  
described as a dialogue - a genuine and reciprocal meeting occurring betw een
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an I and a Thou. In the few preceding accounts to which I have referred, I 
have attem pted to bear witness to the experiential reality of such encounters.
These narrative descriptions, then, will serve as the phenom enological 
'baseline d a ta ’ for my theorizing in this paper. However, they should serve 
not only as the foundation but also as the litmus test for the conceptual 
'concoction' that follows. Throughout this paper I have tried to rem ain 
faithful to the spirit of these relational events (as well as their w ritten 
articulation) w ithout distorting or m isinterpreting them. The success or 
failure of w hat follows depends primarily upon the extent to w hich m y 
conceptualizing remains true to - or betrays - these original encounters as they 
actually grace and inform our lives.
II.
Moving from the particular I-Thou dialogues described above, w e can 
generalize w ith Kohak and say, "Yet while the argum ent is inevitably 
complex, the basic thesis is simple. It is that things initially present 
them selves in imm ediate experience not as objects but as fellow beings, 
capable of functioning both as it and as thou " ("I, Thou, and It" 36). Quite 
sim ply, things such as m ountain peaks and herons can and do enter into I- 
Thou relations w ith us, and it is wholly legitimate to describe our deep and 
engaging dialogues w ith them in such terms. P u t negatively, nonhum an 
beings and things are not exclusively defined in terms of It.
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I agree that this thesis is simple and hardly remarkable. A nd yet, it 
represents a major breakthrough in overcoming w hat Kohak describes as the 
"noem atic prejudice” so prevalent w ithin much of m odern W estern thought 
("I, Thou, and It" 45).5 This prejudice involves the a priori lim iting of the 
possible partners for meaningful I-Thou dialogue to one type of noem a or 
relata (the 'poles' of a relational event): hum an beings. According to this 
view , only hum an beings can really become Thous for us. N onhum an beings 
are, by their very nature, always Its, objects of subjective experience and use, 
and  never Thous, fellow participants in meaningful and destinate dialogue.
Overcom ing this noematic prejudice requires a radical shift of focus. 
Instead of focusing our attention on the noema, we need to focus on the 
relation itself, describing it in noetic - not noematic - terms. In other words, 
in attem pting to describe and interpret our relationality as accurately as 
possible, we m ust always begin w ith the relational events themselves. 
Through such noetic analysis, the fundam ental distinction that emerges is 
not betw een the types of relata we meet but between the types of relations we 
enter.
For M artin Buber, there are two basic types of relations: I-Thou and I-It. 
W hile the form er refers to a reciprocal dialogue characterized by presentness, 
im m ediacy and integrity, the latter describes the subject's m ediated and 
fragm entary perception of an object in terms of experience and use. However, 
although Buber posits two basic types of relations, this does not m ean that, a 
p rio ri, some things are Thous and others are Its independent of our relations
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w ith them. Any being or thing can be encountered as a Thou or experienced 
as an It. Just as a wildflower can become my Thou, so, too, a telephone 
solicitor can - and usually does - become an It for me. W hat m atters here is 
not the type of relata, bu t the type of relation.
For Buber, it is the relation that is primary. As he writes in I and Thou, 
"In the beginning is the relation" (69). U pon this ontological prem ise, all else 
follows; being is constituted and defined in relation. Even "The self," as 
Emm anuel Levinas writes, "is not a substance bu t a relation. It can only exist 
as an T addressing itself to a 'Thou,' or grasping an 'It"' (136-137). There can 
be no thing-in-itself except as it is abstracted from  the relationality of actual 
being-with-others; being, for Buber, is being-in-relation.6
In general, then, our being is constituted in terms of our relatedness, 
which, for Buber, takes on one of two basic forms - I-Thou or I-It. However, it 
is only through participation in the engaging dialogue occurring betw een an I 
and a Thou that we approach authentic being. For Buber, it is the interval 
betw een I and Thou, das Zwischen (the between), that is the bearer and locus 
of actual and m eaningful existence. According to Buber, "We do not find 
m eaning lying in things nor do we pu t it into things, but betw een us and 
things it can happen" (Between 36). This between, however, does not exist 
'out there ' independently  of us; neither is it som ething we can conjure up  at 
will. It is the interstice that opens up  (graciously) and  into which we step 
(actively, willfully) in each I-Thou encounter; or, as Gabriel Marcel describes
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it, it is a "creative milieu" - a matrix of m eaning and m eaningful being rising 
up betw een the I and the Thou (45).
In addition, the between of I-Thou relations is also the bearer of divine 
presence. According to Robert W ood, "It [The between] is the place w here the 
Transcendent is present in the world" (111). In so far as we enter into 
authentic I-Thou dialogue and actualize the between, we m ake the w orld a 
holy place; the world becomes sacrament. A lthough som etim es accused of 
pantheism , Buber's position m ight be more accurately (although som ew hat 
laboriously) described as a panentheistic pansacram entalism , in w hich the 
w orld exists in God, whose presence among us is actualized in so far as we 
"let God in." In Hasidism  and M odern Man Buber presents this idea by 
retelling and in terpreting the following Hasidic tale.
"Where is the dwelling place of God?"
This was the question with which the Rabbi of Kotzk surprised a 
num ber of learned men who happened to be visiting him.
They laughed at him: "What a thing to ask! Is not the whole w orld full 
of His glory?"
Then he answ ered his own question:
"God dwells w herever m an lets Him in."
This is the ultim ate purpose: to let God in. But we can let H im  in only 
w here we really stand, where we live, where we live a true life. If we 
m aintain holy intercourse with the little w orld entrusted to us, if we 
help the holy spiritual substance to accomplish itself in that section of 
Creation in which we are living, then we are establishing, in this our 
place, a dwelling for the Divine Presence (175-176).
According to Buber, although the world is full of God's presence ( after all, the 
w orld exists in God), God is present among us - betw een us - only in so far as 
we actualize God's presence in our lives.
1 2
This understanding of the world as potential sacram ent is at the core of 
the H asidic notion of "hallowing the everyday" that so captivated Buber's 
attention. For the Hasid (as presented in Buber's works on H asidism ) and for 
Buber, the distinction is not between the holy and the profane bu t between 
w hat is holy and w hat is not yet hallowed; there is no time or place that 
cannot be m ade holy. As Buber writes, "At each place, in each hour, in each 
act, in each speech the holy can blossom forth" (Hasidism  and M odern Man 
31). But, in order for the holy to "blossom forth," w e m ust enter essential, I- 
Thou dialogue - holy intercourse - with the other w ith w hom  we presently 
have to do. O ur priestly capacity and calling to m ake the w orld a sacram ent - 
a holy place - depends upon our capacity to say Thou to the creatures whom  
we meet.
In all cases, w hat is decisive for Buber is the m eeting betw een an I and a 
Thou, regardless of w hether the Thou is a hum an being, a fish, or a boulder. 
H ow ever, this does not m ean that the relata are unim portant or 
interchangeable w ith one another. For meaningful and decisive dialogue to 
occur, the I m ust be attentive and open to the irreducible uniqueness of the 
particular other whom  it meets as Thou. As such, there is no generalizable 
class of relata - nonhum an, non-sentient, non-animal, non-living, etc. - that 
is, a priori, excluded from participation in genuine, m eaningful and  holy 
relations. According to Buber, "The limits of the possibility of dialogue are 
the lim its of [our] awareness" (Between 10).
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A nd yet, w hat I have outlined so far m ay offer us no m ore than w hat 
Marcel rather disparagingly refers to as a "pure mysticism of presence" unless 
it is accom panied by "the proper ethical bearing" (Introduction to Bugbee, 
Inw ard M orning 24). W hat is crucially im portant here is not sim ply that we 
can and, occasionally, do enter into dialogue w ith the beings and things of 
nature (although this, in itself, is indeed quite rem arkable), bu t that such 
dialogical events carry great ethical significance. These I-Thou encounters call 
us forth to em body their meaning in our active - ethical - response to the 
beings and things who address us in our daily lives. As Maurice Friedm an 
writes, "Only he w ho knows the presence of the Thou is capable of decision" 
("Bases" 176).
How ever, according to Buber and others, we don't learn anything 
about the Thou in our encounter w ith it; our knowledge of the Thou is not 
on the order of an empirical or objective 'knowing about.' Instead, it is an 
im m ediate and participatory knowing similar in meaning to the old hebraic 
notion of 'to know ' - 'to touch' or 'to intercourse with' the being of the 
o ther.7 We receive it as a contentless knowledge that cannot be reduced to 
objective, abstract terms. And yet, despite this lack of content, the know ledge 
received in the present and unm ediated address of the Thou - received as 
such - conveys a depth  and meaning upon which we may legitim ately ground 
our ethical response.
1 4
W ithin the fram ework of a philosophy of dialogue, ethics is 
understood prim arily in terms of responsibility, taken in the dialogical and 
etymological sense of the word: responding to the address of another. 
According to Friedman, "Responsibility, for Buber, m eans responding - 
hearing the unreduced claim of each particular hour in all its crudeness and 
disharm ony and answering it out of the dep th’s of one's being" (Life of 
D ialogue 93-94). In order to hear and respond to the claim of the moment, 
how ever, we m ust be fully present as attentive listeners - open and receptive 
to the voice of the other as it addresses us in all its uniqueness and 
irreducibility. Only then can we receive the m eaning present in the address 
of the other in all its em powering and imperative force.
W ithin each present moment, decisively received, we are not only 
addressed by the other whom  we meet, but we are also confronted w ith the 
very m eaning and purpose of our created being. For Buber, we are not 
"contingently thrown" into an absurd existence; rather, w e are created beings, 
sent forth into a m eaningful world - a creation. And this creatureliness 
involves a task - a vocation; we are forever called to become more fully the 
unique creatures we are created to be. As Buber puts it, "Every m an's 
forem ost task is the actualization of his unique, unprecedented and never- 
recurring potentialities" (Hasidism and M odern M an 140). H ow ever, this is 
no t some internal m atter of 'self-expression' or 'self-realization.' As 
Friedm an notes, "We have to realize our uniqueness in response to the 
world" (Touchstones 153). It is only in and through engaged participation in 
our co-creaturely existence - in the existence we share with our fellow
15
creatures in the ongoing event of creation - that we become m ore fully the 
persons we are created to be. In turn, as we become increasingly aware of our 
ow n unique potentiality, we become ever more able to respond to our fellow 
creatures in an ethically decisive m anner, deciding and acting from  out of the 
depths of who we are and who we are called to become in each new  m om ent 
of choice. Thus, the ethical situation claims us in a twofold m anner; w e are 
called forth by the address of the other whom  we meet, and we are directed 
from  within, so to speak, by our awareness of the task for which we have been 
created.
In addition to the call of the other and the call of our creaturely task, we 
receive yet a third call present in the depths of the I-Thou encounter: the 
address of our sponsoring and abiding Creator.8 According to Buber, "God 
speaks to m an in the things and beings He sends him in life; m an answ ers 
through his action in relation to just these things and beings" (Origin and 
M eaning of Hasidism  94). God the Creator addresses us in the events and 
situations of our creaturely lives and beckons and guides us to incarnate the 
m eaning of this divine address in the world of concrete actions. Therefore, as 
we attend to and receive the threefold call present in the m om ent of dialogue 
we are both em pow ered and charged to respond in an ethical m anner. Along 
w ith  the gracious advent of dialogue also comes a compelling im perative, a 
com m and, w hich we receive, not in terms of a generalizable "One should," 
bu t as a unique and experiential "Thou shalt."
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As such, it is w ithin the context of our participation in dialogue that we 
come to know  w hat we m ust do and who we m ust become; w e come to know 
w hat is necessary. As Henry Bugbee develops the idea in Inw ard M orning. 
necessary action can only be understood w ithin the fram ework of authentic 
dialogue. Concerning Bugbee's notion of necessity, Marcel writes,
[H]e [Bugbee] derives the fundam ental point that no satisfactory 
account can be given of necessity, that it cannot even be acknowledged, 
if things are approached from a purely spectatorial standpoint. The 
necessary can only become intelligible from a standpoint in which we 
no longer abstract from our involvem ent in reality. The necessary is 
appreciated as such only in that fundam ental engagem ent w ith things 
in their uniqueness. ... Therefore necessity is properly construed as an 
experiential category and not an empirical one (Introduction to Bugbee, 
Inw ard M orning 28).
As we participate in authentic dialogue - "that fundam ental engagem ent w ith 
things in their uniqueness" - we come to know what is required of us, and 
our actions become inspirited and directed with the force of necessity. Of 
course, this also means that we cannot say w hat is necessary in advance of our 
participation in the situation dem anding our response. In this sense, the old 
truism  seems to hold: you really had to be there. And although an 
experiential, dialogical ethic of responsibility is deeply contextual, it is 
anything but relativistic. Through our participation in dialogue we come to 
know  w hat the situation dem ands of us, not as a universal or general "One 
should," bu t as a powerful, personal imperative: "I must."
But w hat good is such an experiential ethic of responsibility? It offers 
no generalizable guidelines about how  one ought to act; it cannot prescribe 
any course of action; it offers no solutions to hypothetical ethical scenarios. In
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a w ord, it relieves none of the difficulties and ambiguities of living the moral 
life. Instead, w hat such an ethic requires is presentness and openness to the 
other - be it a river, a water ouzel or a hum an being - acknowledged in its 
irreducibility, richness and depth. Although not sufficient in and of itself, it 
is only through such presentness, from which no being or thing can be, a 
priori, excluded, that we can truly come to know  the other and find the 
strength  and m eaning upon which we can ground our ethical response.
A nd yet, this m uch seems generally true: while we know  nothing 
about the particular being or thing whom we meet in dialogue, through our 
encounter we come to know it as not only other but also as kin, eliciting both 
our respect and compassion. According to Bugbee, "[I]t is in coming to know 
fellow creatures as such that our respect for them  can obtain as w arranted and 
upheld" ("Wilderness" 12-13). To know another being truly and deeply  is to 
know  that being as worthy of the respect and concern due one's kin. As for 
w hat each situation dem ands of us, we cannot say apart from our 
involvem ent in that particular situation. However, if our response to that 
dem and is to be genuine (and genuinely ethical), it m ust actualize and 
em body the respect engendered in the I-Thou dialogue w ith our fellow 
creature. Yet even this is no general or abstract notion of respect; rather, it is a 
living respect born of actual participation in particular dialogical m oments.
In and through our involvem ent in, and reflection upon, such relations, we 
catch a glimpse of the experiential ground of our capacity for respect and, in 
turn, respectful action; it is at such a point that ethical discourse - including 
environm ental ethics - m ust begin.
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III.
It is m y intent to establish such a starting point in the first half of this 
paper, which will consist of Chapters One and Two. In Chapter One I will 
present a detailed description of the basic tenets of a philosophy of dialogue. I 
will begin by suggesting the fundam entally dialogical character of existence 
and proceed to examine our relationality in terms of Buber’s famous 
distinction betw een I-Thou and I-It relations. Along w ith presenting the basic 
differences betw een these two types of relations, I will also show how  both are 
necessary for living a whole and active life and for actualizing the m eaning of 
I-Thou relations in our everyday lives.
In Chapter Two I will attem pt to outline a dialogical ethic of 
responsibility. I will suggest that the address of the situation, received in its 
m eaning and depth, makes claims upon us and calls us forth to respond in a 
decisive and ethical manner. However, this address not only places dem ands 
upon us; it also empowers and directs us as we move to em body its m eaning 
in our decisions and actions. Here I will begin by following Buber's 
understanding  of the threefold call present in the address of the m oment, 
exam ining, in some detail, the imperative quality of the call of our fellow 
creature, the call of our creaturely task, and the call of the Creator. I will also 
show  that these three elements of the address of the m om ent do not speak to 
us in isolation from one another; they ring unisonously as the claim of the 
particular and concrete situation - in toto- to which we m ust respond. And, 
in so far as we ground our responsibility upon the m eaning received in this
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address, we m ay find the capacity to act with decisiveness, integrity and 
com m itm ent - or, to use Bugbee's terms, necessity and certainty. Finally, I 
will conclude by showing how, for both Buber and Bugbee (whose ideas I will 
draw  upon heavily in this chapter) genuine ethical responsibility defies 
generalization, prescription or even verification in any objective sense; for 
both thinkers, responsibility cannot be abstracted from the irreducibly 
concrete and im m ediate m eaning present in the ever new  and changing 
situations in which we find ourselves called upon to respond.
In the second half of this paper I will examine the relevance of this 
philosophy of dialogue and its correlative ethic of responsiblity - as presented 
in Chapters One and Two - for particular questions concerning our relations 
w ith  the nonhum an beings and things of nature. In other w ords, I will be 
trying to establish their relevance and importance within the discourse of 
environm ental philosophy and, more specifically, environm ental ethics and 
w ilderness preservation. However, Chapters One and Two are not intended 
to contain m erely general background inform ation for the environm ental 
m atters discussed in Chapters Three and Four. The reader m ust rem ember 
that the descriptions and interpretations of our relationality presented in the 
first half of the paper are presented in noetic or relational terms; they are not 
lim ited to any particular type of noema or relata. Therefore, once we bracket 
the noem a tic prejudice, which, a priori, excludes the nonhum an beings and 
things of nature from consideration as partners in I-Thou dialogue, the ethic 
of responsibility outlined in Chapter Two already includes an implicit 
env ironm ental ethic.
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In Chapters Three and Four I wish to point out, both generally and 
quite specifically, some of the w ider implications of the ideas presented above 
w ithin  the realm  of environm ental concerns. I will begin C hapter Three by 
arguing for, and then presenting, three basic premises concerning the 
possibility, actuality and m eaning of our I-Thou dialogues w ith the 
nonhum an beings and things of nature. Then, after subm itting these 
prem ises to critical scrutiny, I will move on to suggest how  these dialogical 
events inform  our ethical responsibility w ith respect to - and for - nonhum an 
creatures. And here I will proceed both generally and quite specifically. After 
outlining this dynam ic rhythm  of dialogue and responsibility in theoretical 
terms, I will conclude this chapter by showing, via two brief and  exploratory 
narratives of ethical concern, how this rhythmic interplay m ay actually 
inform  our decisions and actions regarding nonhum an creatures.
Chapter Four concludes the paper by examining the specific issue of 
w ilderness preservation. Here I wish to explore the unique character of 
w ilderness as a place where, having suspended or at least tacitly questioned 
our proprietary  and usury claims, we are especially receptive to the pow erful 
and  eloquent voice of nature as it speaks to us. Drawing on the ideas of 
Bugbee, Buber and Kohak as well as the poetry of W endell Berry, I will 
suggest that the unusually strong and evocative presence of w ilderness, as 
both an  'anti-resource' and a 'home of dialogue,' engenders w ithin us a spirit 
of prayer and play that encourages and fosters our participation in dialogue 
w ith our nonhum an fellow creatures. Furthermore, I will argue that such a
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spirit provides the tonic (in Kohak's phenom enology, both the "conceptual" 
and "practical" brackets) that can hold in check the technological ethos 
described in C hapter Three and elicit the respect required to ground our 
ethical responsibility. A nd here, I will conclude by bearing witness to my 
"certainty" that the truly compassionate and respectful response to the 
address of w ild nature lies in preserving the few rem aining tracts of 
w ilderness left on this continent.
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EXPLANATORY NOTES
1 - At the outset, I w ould prefer to define "nature” as m atter-of-factly as 
possible. For now, I m ean by "nature" the order of things and beings whose 
existence is not derivative of hum an handiw ork a n d /o r  artifice. A dm ittedly, 
such a vague definition is beseiged w ith obvious problem s and shortcomings, 
m ade all the more complicated by hum anity’s ubiquitous im pact and  
presence on the planet (see Bill McKibben’s The End of N atu re), genetic 
engineering, the selective breeding and dom estication of plants and animals, 
etc. All are interesting topics, but all beyond the im m ediate scope of this 
paper.
M ore to the point, however, is the fact that hum an beings are also 
included w ithin such a broad definition of nature. We, too, are sponsored and 
anim ated by a source outside ourselves; that is, we are not self-created, self- 
creating beings. Therefore, m y intent in speaking specifically about the 
"nonhum an beings and things of the natural world" is not to establish an 
absolute distinction between "man [sic] and nature" bu t to include these 
beings and things in the category of "persons” (in the m ost inclusive sense) 
w ith  w hom  we can enter into dialogue. I w ould argue that this entire paper 
is an attem pt at inclusiveness, not exclusiveness; I w ant to suggest that 
nonhum an "creatures" (Actually, "creation" is the w ord I w ould prefer to use 
instead of "nature," but it is so open to m isinterpretation that I think it is 
better to w ait before introducing that term; over the course of the paper, 
how ever, creation will become a central idea.) w arrant our ethical 
consideration, not as mere resources, but as independent and eloquent 
partners in dialogue.
A t the same time, saying all this does nothing to com prom ise the 
irreducible and non-negotiable otherness of nonhum an beings and things 
like buzzards and m ountain streams. And yet, it is an otherness that, 
precisely because it is other, we can m eet in dialogue. In this case, then, 
alterity does not necessarily im ply contrariety or objective over-againstness. 
T hrough our participation in dialogue, we m eet and 'know ' the other in an 
intim ate and meaningful way that stands in contrast to our subjective 
'know ing about' the other as an object of representation and analysis. Our 
experiential and imm ediate knowledge of the other received in dialogue does 
nothing to dim inish or compromise the radical otherness of the other; it 
rem ains as ineffable and m ysterious as before.
Finally, I cannot help but think that talking about "man and nature" or 
"man as nature" is all som ewhat besides the point. Such broad strokes not
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only set up  som ewhat arbitrary distinctions, but they do a great injustice to all 
the distinct and  unique terms that are sum m arily and m onolithically lum ped 
together. Consider the non-negotiable otherness of our fellow hum an beings 
- an otherness that can sometimes overwhelm  us w ith its awesom e and 
devastating force when, for instance, seen in the vacant eyes of a street drunk 
or a m other's weary smile, or heard in a young child 'barking' your nam e for 
the first tim e or the inconsolable voice of Robert Johnson or George Jones, or 
felt in a lover's touch or in the embrace of a friend you thought you 'd  never 
see again. O ur interhum an relations, as well, are m ade possible and 
m eaningful by our irrefutable otherness; and although this otherness m ore 
often than not begets estrangement and alienation, it opens up  the possibility 
of tru ly  sacram ental, holy intercourse; m eaningful relationality seems 
inextricably bound up with the fact of non-negotiable otherness.
2 - To be sure, "dialogue," as I am using it throughout this paper, does not 
refer to the w ritten or spoken exchange of words, so, in a sense, I suppose I am 
using it metaphorically. As Erazim Kohak presents it, the purpose of a 
m etaphor is not to describe and define a content, but rather it is an attem pt to 
evoke the sense of lived experience; as such, this evocation is, to a certain 
degree, dependent upon an experiential resonance w ithin the listener. For 
Kohak’s discussion of metaphor, see The Embers and the Stars, pp.52-56. To 
speak of our m eaningful relations as dialogues, then, is an attem pt to evoke 
the sense and m eaning of those relations; to me, the language of dialogue 
seems to be the m ost essentially accurate description of such events. W hether 
or not such im agery resonates w ith my readers may be another issue.
3 - For such an out-of-hand dismissal of Buber's ideas and their place in 
environm ental ethics, see John Kultgen's article entitled "Saving You for 
Real People." I will take up with his argum ents in the second half of this 
paper.
4 - And, in the case of Carson, M uir and Berry, it is not only their w ords that 
bear witness to the m eaning received in such encounters; over the course of 
their respective lifetimes, they actively struggled to preserve, protect and heal 
those things in nature that spoke to them m ost pow erfully and eloquently. 
Perhaps this, m ore than any rigorous ethical discourse, bears w itness to the 
com pelling im perative force received in and through our dialogical 
encounters w ith the nonhum an beings and things of nature as well as the 
sense of vocation that comes over m any years of intimacy and commitment.
5 - Kohak describes this "noematic prejudice" in his article "I, Thou and It: A 
C ontribution to the Phenom enology of Being-in-the-World." H e focuses his 
argum ent on a critique of the implicitly interpretive categories H eidegger and
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Sartre employ to 'describe' the various types of relations w e enter w ith both 
nonhum an things and our fellow hum ans; according to Kohak, although 
both philosophers set out to describe relations, their descriptions of those 
relations are prejudiced by the relata involved in them. Therefore, they end 
up  offering noematic, not noetic, accounts of these relational forms - hence 
K ohak’s term: "noematic prejudice."
6 - As Levinas correctly points out in the article referred to above, Buber's 
understanding  of being as being-with-others or being-in-relation is wholly 
"consistent w ith contem porary views," such as those of H usserl, Bergson and 
Heidegger. It is beyond the scope of this paper to survey the various schools 
of phenom enology and defend my choice of Buber’s ideas as m y prim ary 
interpretive tool for this paper; for me, the resonance of his w ords w ith my 
ow n experience may be sufficient enough reason. Regarding Heidegger, 
how ever, the issue of Kohak's "noematic prejudice" comes up  again. Things, 
for him, are excluded from possible participation in Mitdnsein ; they cannot 
become fellow subjects and partners in authentic and reciprocal relations. 
Instead, they are relegated to relations of Mitsein, as either zuhande , the 
objects of m anipulation, or vorhande , the objects of speculation. In neither 
case are things granted the status of independent co-participants in a genuine 
dialogical relation. Buber's acknowledgment and defense of this possibility, 
therefore, stands as unique and, for me, preferable.
7 - The old hebrew sense of 'to know' seems especially fitting here. In his 
reading of "Wilderness in America" several years ago at the University of 
M ontana Philosophy Forum, Henry Bugbee also m ade use of this notion in 
several side comments over the course of the reading. A nd although it may 
be an archaic usage, such a category of knowledge has some currency within 
contem porary philosophy. Again, it is Levinas who places Buber's theory of 
know ledge squarely amongst his contemporaries, citing those ontological 
ideas that suggest that we cannot know about or have access to knowledge 
about being in any objectifiable sense; what we 'know' of being is of a 
different order of knowledge altogether. For Buber, such knowledge is 
accessible through the I-Thou encounter, although in m oving from  the 
encounter to articulation we are unable to represent that know ledge in any 
objective way; in the m ost basic sense, it is ineffable.
8 - Obviously, my presentation of this rhythm  of dialogue and ethical 
responsibility is a religious, even theistic, one. For this I need neither 
apologize nor rationalize. And while I find M artin Buber's (as well as Erazim 
Kohak's) thought explicitly and inescapably religious, and hear in the works 
of H enry Bugbee a deeply religious - though non-theistic - sensibility, my 
prim ary  reason for offering this religious account of the rhythm  of dialogue
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and responsibility is far more basic: the world presents itself to me in 
religious terms and as a religious place - a place pervaded by Mystery, where 
grace and faith may reveal or w ithhold themselves and where the Divine 
Presence may, at times, flash like lightning in a sum m er sky or glow and 
quiver like those fleeting luminescences on open w ater (both come and gone 
in the instant of their apprehension)- So, yes, my account of the rhythm ic 
interplay betw een dialogue and responsibility will be a religious one; for me, 
to do otherwise w ould be both disingenuous and dishonest. A nd yet, the 
indefinite article in my project's title - the "a" - should not be overlooked. 
This essay is not intended to exhaust the ways we m ight describe and 
in terpret our participation in relational events that sponsor m eaning and 
m eaningful action in our lives. Others m ay very well offer such descriptions 
and  interpretations w ithout recourse to religious language; for me, however, 
that isn 't an option.
BASIC TENETS OF A PHILOSOPHY OF DIALOGUE
In attem pting to outline a philosophy of dialogue, it m akes sense to 
begin at the beginning, and for Martin Buber, the m ost em inent philosopher 
of dialogue, "In the beginning is the relation" (I and Thou 69). Every aspect of 
Buber's philosophy of dialogue is based upon his acknowledgm ent of the 
ontological prim acy of our relationality. Our existence is constituted and 
defined in term s of our involvem ent in an infinitely complex netw ork of 
relational events. Quite simply, "To be is to be related: everything in the 
w orld  is being-with-others" (Wood 66). Of course, this insight is hardly  
unique to Buber or, for that m atter, to the philosophy of dialogue in general. 
Beginning w ith Husserl and Heidegger, the entire school of thought loosely 
referred to as phenom enology (of which it seems to me the philosophy of 
dialogue is an especially rich and experientially grounded subspecies) is 
rooted in the awareness of our existential situation as one of being-in-relation 
w ith other beings.
W hat seems unique to the philosophers of dialogue, how ever, is their 
em phasis on the vocative character of the relational events that m ake up  our 
lives. According to Buber, "Living means being addressed. ... W hat occurs to 
m e addresses me" (Between 10 & 12). The beings and things w hom  w e m eet 
in our daily lives ’say’ something to us; by their very presence and w ith their 
very being, they speak to us and call us forth.
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In turn, "We are as respondents" (Bugbee, "Loneliness, Solitude" 5). 
O ur fellow beings address us in a way that calls forth - evokes - our response. 
We are responsible - answerable. In one way or another, we are called to 
answ er for the situation, the relational event, in w hich w e find ourselves.
Therefore, our lives can be understood in term s of our involvem ent in 
relational events in which we are addressed in a way that calls forth our 
response. According to H enry Bugbee, "'Appel et reponse ' [Address and 
response] is the basic mode of our participation in being w ith other beings" 
("Lv Exigence " 6). In so far as we respond genuinely to the address of our 
fellow beings, decisively received, our lives take on the character of a 
dialogue; we participate in being as partners in dialogue.
It is this experientially grounded awareness of the fundam entally 
dialogical character of our existence that serves as the foundation for the 
thought of Buber, Bugbee and other philosophers of dialogue such as Gabriel 
Marcel. In general, our being is constituted in terms of our being-in-relation, 
bu t it is only actualized - m ade fully real - as it takes on the character of a 
dialogue. Through our participation in such dialogical events we come to 
know  our co-existents in an intim ate and meaningful way, and we find the 
capacity to actualize the m eaning received in the encounter in com m itted and 
decisive action. As engaged and responsive partners in dialogue, we are able 
to share in that degree of fullness, integrity and m eaning which is open and 
available to us in our finite, creaturely existence.
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Oftentimes, however, our relations w ith the other beings w ho cross 
our paths do not assume the character of a dialogue. These beings seem to 
have nothing to say to us; we do not find ourselves addressed by them. Or, 
perhaps we hold back in our response; we answer the call of the other and the 
claim of the m om ent in a half-hearted, distracted, or self-preoccupied way. In 
such cases, and for whatever reasons, we do not meet our fellow beings in 
genuine dialogue. We fail to actualize the potential fullness and m eaning of 
our existence, and we find ourselves incapable of conclusive decision or 
action.
It seems, then, that our relations with others take on alternate forms, 
and although our lives may be essentially and potentially dialogical in nature, 
they are not always necessarily and actually so. Thus, the key question for a 
philosophy of dialogue is the one Bugbee asks when he writes, "How is it that 
beings m ay come to 'speak' to us in a decisive m anner - coordinately w ith our 
coming to receive them  in a decisively responsive way? And how  is it, too, 
that this m ay not come to pass" ("Le Recueillement " 3)?
Chapter One of this paper is my attem pt to point tow ard an answ er to 
this question. In doing so, I will rely upon Martin Buber’s understanding of 
our relationality in terms of his distinction between I-Thou and I-It relations 
as m y prim ary, although not exclusive, interpretive tool. I will begin by 
describing the "basic attitude" - orientation, m ovem ent or posture m ight be 
better here - necessary, although not sufficient, for the gracious advent of 
genuine I-Thou dialogue in our lives. I will then describe the contrary
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"attitude," which fosters a way of taking up  w ith things defined exclusively in 
term s of I-It. After outlining these general dispositions, I will describe the 
qualities and characteristics of both I-Thou and I-It relations and distinguish 
betw een the different types of knowledge received in these two relational 
forms. I will then conclude by examining how I-Thou and I-It relations 
com plem ent and balance each other in m eaningful and active existence.
M artin Buber opens his book I and Thou w ith the following lines:
The w orld is twofold for m an in accordance w ith his twofold attitude. 
The attitude of man is twofold in accordance with the two basic words 
he can speak.
The basic words are not single words but w ord pairs.
One basic w ord is the w ord pair I-You.
The other basic word is the word pair I-I t;...
Basic w ords are spoken with one's being. ...
W hoever speaks one of the basic words enters into the w ord  and stands 
in it" (53-54).1
For Buber, the w ord pairs I-Thou and I-It describe the two prim ary ways we 
take up  w ith reality in our everyday lives. As relational w ord pairs they are 
not intended to be 'objective' descriptions of the way things are in and of 
them selves (for Buber, nothing is in and of itself). We cannot say, "This is a 
Thou," or "That is an It." Rather, I-Thou and I-It are noetic and 
anthropological descriptions of the way we hum ans may relate to our fellow 
beings.2 As Buber explains in his essay entitled "Religion and Philosophy,"
For m an the existent is either face-to-face being or passive object. The 
essence of m an arises from this twofold relation to the existent. These 
are not two external phenom ena but the two basic m odes of existing 
w ith being. ... Because they are the two basic modes of existing w ith
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being, they are the two basic modes of our existence in general - I-Thou
and I-It" (Eclipse of God 44).
W hether we exist in the "basic mode" I-Thou or the "basic mode" I-It depends 
in large part (although not exclusively) upon the "basic word" we speak; as 
both Smith and Kaufman translate it, it depends on our "attitude." And yet, 
such a translation is misleading if it suggests a merely m ental or intellectual 
position that we can m anipulate and change as a m atter of conscious and 
willful choice. We cannot simply say "From now on, I choose to speak the 
basic w ord I-Thou." Rather, such 'speech' arises out of the depths of our very 
being. It is rooted in a basic disposition or fundam ental posture that informs 
our w ay of taking up with things at the most prim ary level - at the level of 
faith .3 In fact, for Buber this is the very m eaning of "real faith," which he 
defines as "presenting ourselves and receiving" (Between 12). O ur capacity to 
say Thou to the beings we encounter is grounded in a faith that seems bound 
up  w ith that deeply rooted affirmation which informs our way of being-in- 
relation at the most prim al level. Henry Bugbee testifies to the prim acy of 
such a faith posture for our participation in dialogue when he writes, "If we 
have looked upon the m ountains time and again, and they have called upon 
us, and we have responded, let us remember that we have looked upon them  
with the eye of faith" (Inward M orning 116).
As we speak the basic word I-Thou out of the depths of faith, we move 
tow ard  (but not actually into) dialogue with the beings and things who cross 
our paths. In saying Thou, we present ourselves to the other in a spirit of 
openness and attentive listening, which Marcel refers to as disponibilite,
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availability.4 Unless we make ourselves available and receptive to the voice 
of the other, it is unlikely that we will be able to hear its address. As Buber 
suggests, "You say that often you hear nothing? Well, we have to be attentive 
w ith the unreserved effort of our being" (Between 76). Participation in actual 
I-Thou dialogue depends (from 'our side' of the relation, anyway) upon our 
capacity to attend to and hear the voice of the other as it addresses us.
In turn, through such participation in actual encounters we come to 
realize the fundam entally dialogical character of our existence; we come to 
recognize our situation as one in which we are always and forever being 
addressed by, and called to answer for, the relational events of our lives. In 
his essay entitled "Dialogue," Buber refers to this recognition as "becoming 
aware," which he distinguishes from "observing" and "looking on." "But in 
each instance a w ord dem anding an answer has happened to me. We m ay 
term  this way of perception becoming aivare " (Between 10). Such awareness 
is essentially twofold. We become aware of the dialogical nature of our 
existential situation, in general, and we become increasingly aware of the 
"signs of address" given in the particular relational events that m ake up our 
daily lives. For Buber,
The signs of address are not something extraordinary, som ething that 
steps out of the order of things, they are just w hat goes on time and 
again, just what goes on in any case, nothing is added  by the address. 
The waves of the aether roar on always, but for m ost of the time we 
have turned off our receivers (Between 11).
These signs are simply the call of the other and the claim of the m om ent 
received and acknowledged, personally and decisively, in our everyday
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relations with our fellow beings. For the most part, however, we rem ain 
caught up within ourselves - our thoughts, purposes, concepts and  values - 
and  cannot hear the signs present in the address of the other. According to 
Bugbee, we have "noisy souls," and, "In a noisy soul this call is utterly  
ignored" (Inward M orning 221). For both Buber and Bugbee, our failure to 
actualize meaningful and decisive dialogue - I-Thou dialogue - testifies, above 
all, to our inability to make ourselves available and open to the signs of 
address given in the call of our fellow creatures. In order truly to hear, we 
m ust still the noise within; we m ust turn the receivers 'back on' and listen 
attentively to the signs which address us in the relational events of our lives.
Such a posture of availability and attentiveness, while not of itself 
sufficient cause for the actualization of dialogue, is surely necessary. As we 
take up  w ith our fellow beings in such a m anner we step tow ard them  and 
tow ard that 'place' that Buber refers to as 'the between." As Maurice 
Friedm an explains, "Only w hen one really listens - when one becomes 
personally aware of the 'signs of address' that address one not only in the 
w ords of bu t in the very m eeting w ith the other - does one attain to that 
sphere of the 'between' that Buber holds to be the 'really real.’" (Introduction 
to Buber, Between xv). In saying Thou to the other whom  we m eet we move 
tow ard  das Zioi.sch.en, the between. As m entioned in the Introduction of this 
paper, the between is the 'place' where I-Thou dialogue is actualized; as such, 
it is the bearer and locus of meaningful being - reality. According to Buber, 
this is not merely a psychological or conceptual construct; rather,
It [the between] is something ontic. ... [T]he dialogical situation can be
adequately grasped only in an ontological way. But it is not to be
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grasped on the basis of the ontic of personal existence, or of that of two 
personal existences, but of that which has its being betw een them , and 
transcends both. ... On the far side of the subjective, on this side of the 
objective, on the narrow  ridge, where 1 and Thou m eet, there is the 
realm  of "between" (Between 204).
Buber's em phasis on the between - the "narrow ridge" - allows him  to move 
outside the usual understanding of relationality (and knowledge, as I will 
discuss later in this chapter) in terms of typical subject-object distinctions.5 
For Buber, reality cannot be described, let alone understood, purely in terms 
of the subject's experience of objective phenomena; actual being occurs 
betw een an I and a Thou and is reconstituted again and again in each I-Thou 
encounter. Emmanuel Levinas succinctly describes Buber's ontology of the 
betw een in the following passage:
The [I-Thou] Relation cannot be identified with a "subjective" event 
because the I does not represent the Thou but meets it. The meeting, 
m oreover, is to be distinguished from the silent dialogue the m ind has 
w ith itself; the I-Thou meeting does not take place in the subject but in 
the realm  of being. However, we m ust avoid an interpretation of the 
m eeting as something objectively apprehended by the I, for the 
ontological realm is not a block universe but an occurrence. The 
interval between I and Thou, the Zwischen, is the locus w here being is 
being realized (139).
As we m ake ourselves available to the other and encounter it as a Thou in 
dialogue, we step into the between and participate in the actuality of 
m eaningful being. Only then do we find a m easure of authenticity and 
integrity  in our lives. As Buber puts it, "All real living is meeting." (I and 
T hou, trans. Smith, l l ) .6
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Thus, the possibility of meaningful being is open to us in  so far as we 
step into the between and enter I-Thou dialogue w ith the other beings and 
things w hom  we meet in our lives. However, for such an encounter to occur, 
we m ust be willing to go- out to meet the other in a spirit of availability and 
openness grounded in a fundam ental posture of faith, Buber sum m arily 
describes this entire m ovem ent as Hindwendung , which he defines sim ply 
as "turning tow ards the other" (Between 22). Elaborating slightly, Robert 
W ood calls Hindwendung "a swing outw ard toward the O ther, tow ard  the 
Between" (102). For Buber, this movement describes, in general terms, a way 
of taking up  with our fellow beings characteristic of the life of dialogue.
As we enact this basic movement of the life of dialogue, our concern 
and attention is not focused upon ourselves and our interests bu t upon the 
other beings whom  we encounter. To the degree our hearing is conditioned 
by the 'filters' of self-interest, we will be unable to hear the voice of the other 
as other - as it speaks to us out of the depths of its uniqueness, independence 
and integrity. In such cases, we remain within ourselves and do not step out 
tow ard the between; we fail to actualize the possibility of dialogue in our 
lives. For authentic dialogue to grace our lives, we m ust focus our attention 
upon  the other who speaks to us. In discussing Marcel's notion of 
disponibilite , which, like Buber's Hindwendung  , is a double m ovem ent in 
which we turn tow ard the other from our rootedness in a fundam ental 
posture, Bugbee writes,
The disposition in question stands in definite contrariety to self- 
centeredness and the whole set of interests on which self-centeredness 
symbiotically feeds. 'L' Eire disponible' [The available being] is
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discovered to others as available to them and he is open to the 
opportunities which life brings ("Le Recueillement " 9).
A lthough contrary to self-centeredness and self-interest, such an orientation 
or m ovem ent is not one of self-negation. W ithin a philosophy of dialogue, 
the integrity and presence of the self (the I) are essential to the very structure 
and form of the dialogue (I-Thou). That is, both I and Thou are necessary for 
the actualization of the relation occurring between them. W hat is crucial 
from  the I's side, however, is that the I turns tow ard the other and attends to 
the voice of the other as it addresses the I.
To speak of this movement in yet another way, we m ay again follow 
Bugbee and say that while we remain attentive to and intently interested in 
the other w ith whom  we have to do, our interest is rendered disinterested.
To m eet another being in a mode of disinterested interest m eans that our 
interest in that being, although keen, is not conditioned by our private self- 
interest or interests. However, merely because such interests are suspended, 
that does not m ean that we cease to care. According to Bugbee, "On the 
contrary, we have tended to suppose that disinterestedness is only possible for 
a person whose interest is profound; the very opposite of superficial, or 
casual, or optional" ("The Moment" 4). Therefore, our disinterested interest 
is m arked by an intense and deep interest; however, w hat we are intent upon 
is not our own self-interest, but the voice of the other addressing us.
For Bugbee, such disinterested interest is akin to respect. "[Ojur regard 
for anything approaches respect in so far as our interest in that thing becomes
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inspirited in a way qualifying our mode of interest as d isinterested” ("The 
Moment" 3). We respect the other whom we meet to the degree we take up 
w ith  it in its own right and on its own terms, w ithout reducing it to a m eans 
through which we may fulfill our own intentions. To respect som eone or 
som ething is to let it speak to us of itself and to listen attentively and openly 
to that speech as it truly addresses us. However, we m ust rem em ber that such 
respect is only actualized in and through our active participation in dialogue. 
As Kohak rightly points out, our respect for others is not a passive sein-lassen 
(letting be), "but rather the active respect for the dem ands of the other" ("I, 
Thou, and It” 67). As we actively move toward and enter into dialogue w ith 
others in the m anner of respect and openness, we are, in turn, called to active 
response through which that respect finds embodiment. Thus, this respect 
not only conditions our participation in dialogue, but it is, in turn, also 
further engendered within the dialogical events themselves.
In sharp contrast to Hindzvendung , which I have characterized as a 
turning toward the other (and, consequently, toward the between) in a spirit 
of attentive listening, availability and respect, Buber sets a second "basic 
m ovem ent”: Ruckbiegung . Just as Hindwendung is the basic m ovem ent of 
the life of dialogue, so Ruckbiegung is the basic m ovem ent of the life of 
m onologue. Like Hindwendung  , Ruckbiegung also involves a turning 
tow ards, bu t in this case it is a turning towards the self, w hich Maurice 
Friedm an translates as "reflexion."7
I term  it reflexion when a m an w ithdraw s from accepting w ith his 
essential being another person in his particularity - a particularity 
which is by no means to be circumscribed by the circle of his own self 
and though it substantially touches and moves his soul is in no way
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im m anent in it - and lets the other exist only as his ow n experience, 
only as a "part of myself." For then dialogue becomes a fiction (Buber, 
Between 23-24)8
In the I-Thou dialogue, the I moves out into the between and acknowledges 
the other in all its unique and irreducible otherness; however, in the 
'fictitous' dialogue referred to above, which may be described m ore accurately 
as a m onologue or soliloquoy, the I w ithdraw s or rem ains w ithin  itself, and 
the other is reduced to a mere object of the I's experience. In other words, the 
other is reduced to an It. As opposed to the I-Thou relation in which the I 
meets or encounters the other, the I-It relation is defined in term s of 
subjective experience and use. In I and Thou Buber writes, "The w orld as 
experience belongs to the basic word I-It. I perceive something. I feel 
som ething. I imagine something. I want something. I sense something. I 
think something. ... All this and its like is the basis of the realm  of It" (54).
For Buber, the I-It experience occurs within the I, while the I-Thou encounter 
occurs between the I and the Thou. Several pages later he writes, "Those who 
experience do not participate in the world. For the experience is 'in them' 
and not between them and the world" (56). Instead of going out to m eet the 
other in dialogue, the I of I-It remains closed in upon itself and its 
experiences. As Malcolm Diamond puts it, ”[T]he 'I' holds back" (21). Such a 
posture is directly opposed to the openness and attentiveness necessary for 
hearing the address of the other as it speaks to us. To draw  upon language 
used above, we could say that the I of reflexion has not become aware of the 
signs of address as they speak to it; the receivers are turned off. In the mode 
of reflexion we no longer find ourselves addressed by the other beings whom  
we meet. O ur lives lose their vocative character, and the w orld becomes no
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m ore than an assemblage of voiceless objects, passive and plastic, which can 
be taken up with, used and m anipulated according to our interests and 
purposes. As objects, the beings and things who cross our paths no longer 
speak to us in their own right; their speech (or, more accurately, our hearing 
of their speech) is conditioned and m ediated by our self-centered categories of 
utility and intention. They exist for us and our purposes. As dead  tools or 
m ere resources, the others we experience cannot w arrant or engender our 
respect, and our relations with them will bear witness to this.
According to Buber, then, we take up with our fellow beings in one of 
two basic ways, according to the basic w ord we speak and the basic m ovem ent 
w e enact. To be sure, unless we turn toward the other from out of a 
disposition of attentiveness, availablility and respect - unless we say Thou to 
the other - we cannot possibly enter into 1-Thou dialogue. And yet, such an 
orientation is not, of itself, the I-Thou relation; a disposition is not a dialogue. 
Real dialogue is based upon reciprocity. According to Buber, "One should not 
try  to dilute the meaning of relation: relation is reciprocity" (I and Thou 58). 
A nd again, a few pages later, he writes, "Relation is reciprocity. My You acts 
on m e as I act on it. ... Inscrutably involved we live in currents of universal 
reciprocity" (67). By definition, I-Thou relations are reciprocal and m utual 
encounters in which both the I and the Thou play active roles.
In the I-Thou relation, the Thou is not simply a passive object; it is an 
active co-participant in dialogue, addressing and responding to the I. In
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describing Buber's understanding of reciprocity in the I-Thou encounter, Emil 
Fackenheim  writes,
This relation [I-Thou] is, above all, mutual. The other is for me, but I 
am also for the other. I do something to the other, but the other also 
does som ething to me. This happens in the relation of dialogue, which 
is a relation of address and response-to-address. The other addresses 
me and responds to my address; that is, even if the other happens to be 
a lifeless and speechless object, it is treated as one treats a person"
(279).9
The I-Thou relation is fundam entally reciprocal and dialogical; it is a relation 
of m utual address and m utual response, with both partners actively 
invo lved .
Because of this, even our Thou-saying disposition is, of itself, 
insufficient for the actualization of a reciprocal dialogue. A nd if som ething 
akin to faith (only partially informed by conscious will) is a necessary pre­
condition of our capacity to say Thou, then an element of grace is also 
required for the consum m ation and fulfillment of the actual dialogical 
encounter. According to Buber,
The You encounters me by grace - it cannot be found by seeking. But 
that I speak the basic word to it is a deed of my whole being, is m y 
essential deed.
The You encounters me. but I enter into a direct relationship to it.
Thus the relationship is election and electing, passive and active at 
once (I and Thou 62).
For Buber, I-Thou dialogues grace our lives in unforeseeable and 
unprocurable ways. Even our m ost sincere Thou-saying cannot guarantee the 
actualization of I-Thou encounters in our lives. And yet, in so far as we say
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Thou and openly attend to the other in the givenness of the situation in 
w hich we find ourselves, we make ourselves available to receive the gift of 
existence as it is given to us - here and now. In saying Thou we recognize and 
affirm  our existence (and, correspondingly, the face-to-face existents w ith 
w hom  we share our existence) as a gift, one which we are free either to accept 
or reject in each moment it is granted us.
In contrast to the two-sided reciprocity of the I-Thou dialogue, I-It 
relations are decidely one-sided and monological. As stated earlier, the I of I- 
It does not step forth to receive the address of the other but rem ains enclosed 
w ithin its subjectivity and experiences the other merely as an object of 
speculation, m anipulation and use. W ithin the exclusive fram ew ork of I-It 
experience, the other is taken up with as a passive and inert object, and any 
discussion of vocative and reciprocal relations with it w ould indeed sound 
absurd. As an It, the other can neither speak to us in its ow n right nor can it 
offer any real response. In so far as we take up with others as m ere objects, Its, 
we rem ain closed to the gift of the other, and we lead solitary lives in a world 
of deadening silence, devoid of grace.
In addition to reciprocity, the I-Thou dialogue is also characterized by 
presentness. When we encounter another being as a Thou, we are totally and 
exclusively engaged in the present moment. In fact, it is only in our I-Thou 
relations that we find ourselves dwelling in the present. According to Buber,
The present - not that which is like a point and m erely designates 
w hatever our thoughts m ay posit as the end of "elapsed" time, the 
fiction of the fixed lapse, but the actual and fulfilled present - exists
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only insofar as presentness, encounter, and relation exist. Only as the
You becomes present does presence come into being" (I and Thou 63).
For Buber, living in the present means entering into I-Thou relations w ith 
the others whom  we meet in each present situation. Of course, for this to 
occur, we m ust be present ourselves - receptive and attentive to the address of 
the other as it speaks to us in that particular moment. As Buber suggests, "He 
w ho is not present perceives no Presence" (Eclipse of God 126).10 Unless we 
are fully present in the m om ent of relation, we cannot truly say Thou to the 
particular other with whom  we have to do; consequently, our relation with 
the other does not take on the character of a dialogue, and we fail to make the 
m om ent fully and actually present. In other words, if we are not present, 
then the present m oment passes us by. According to Buber, then, the "one 
thing needful" for living the life of dialogue, is "the total acceptance of the 
present" (I and Thou 126).
In the I-It relation, on the other hand, the I does not attend to - is absent 
from! - the present situation. As such, the I does not encounter the face-to- 
face presence of the other, and the present moment slips into the past. 
According to Buber, when we confront the other as an It, as the object of our 
inner experience and according to our categories of m anipulation and use, we 
are living in the past. "[Ijnsofar as a hum an being m akes do w ith the things 
that he experiences and uses, he lives in the past, and his m om ent has no 
presence. He has nothing but objects; but objects consist in having been" 
(Buber, I and Thou 63-64). As an object of our experience, the other is taken 
ou t of the present m om ent and re-presented in terms of our conceptual
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constructs of space and time, species and genera, cause and effect, and the like. 
This process, to be sure, is extremely useful to us; it allow us to com prehend, 
organize and, to some extent, even control our im m ediate environm ent. 
H ow ever, in doing so we remove ourselves from the lived present and dwell 
in the past.
A third general characteristic of the I-Thou relation is immediacy. In 
dialogue, we encounter the very being of the Thou in a direct and 
unm ediated way. For the m ost part, Buber describes this attribute of the I- 
Thou relation in negative terms. "The relation to the You is unm ediated. 
N othing conceptual intervenes between I and You, no prior knowledge and 
no imagination. ... No purpose intervenes between I and  You, no greed and 
no anticipation; ...Every means is an obstacle. Only where all means have 
disintegrated encounter occurs" (Buber, 1 and Thou 62-63). In the m om ent of 
authentic dialogue, we encounter the other, not in terms of our conceptual 
categories and m ental constructs, our purposes and projects, but in direct 
response to the unfiltered and undistorted voice of the other as it speaks to 
us, on this particular occasion, out of its irreducible and uncanny otherness. 
We encounter the very being of the other - a sheer, ineffable presence.
In the I-It relation, however, w hat we confront is not the other as a 
presence but as an image - our projected image of it. Here, our m eeting with 
and, therefore, our knowledge about the other is conditioned by the 
conceptual fram ework that we impose upon it and into which w e attem pt to 
m ake it fit. That is, we 'hear' (in as much as we can be said to hear at all in
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the I-It relation) and interpret the address of the other in term s of the 
subjective (and objective - both, as they are commonly understood, belong to 
the w orld of It) categories we bring with us to the relational event. These 
categories act as the conceptual and even emotional filters through which we 
screen our experience as we try to understand, order and m anipulate our 
w orld. And again, although extremely useful, our categories, w hether they be 
of science or poetry, act as a barrier between ourselves and others that prevent 
us from receiving their call as they speak of themselves from out of their very 
being. Only in those gracious moments when this barrier is suspended (it 
w ould be neither possible nor desirable to do away with our image-forming 
constructs altogether) can dialogue occur, not w ithin one's m ind, bu t between 
an I and a Thou.
In addition to reciprocity, presence and immediacy, the I-Thou 
dialogue is also characterized by the quality of wholeness. According to 
W ood, "In the I-Thou relation the undivided self meets the undivided 
Other" (41). In saying Thou we go out to meet the other w ithout reservation, 
giving fully and completely of ourselves; in turn, it is only through our 
participation in such actual encounters that we come to realize wholeness 
and  integrity in our lives. In his essay "What Is Man?," Buber writes, "Man 
can become whole not in virtue of a relation to himself bu t only in virtue of a 
relation to another self. This other self may be just as lim ited and 
conditioned as he is; in being together the unlim ited and the unconditioned 
is experienced" (Between 168). Of course, this personal wholeness is not 
som ething we have once and for all; like the I-Thou dialogues themselves,
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such integrity is fleeting and evanescent. And yet, as our lives become more 
and m ore inform ed by our participation in meaningful dialogue w ith our 
fellow beings, we become more fully who we are m eant to be; we come to 
realize a degree of integrity in our lives.11
In contrast to the wholeness of I-Thou dialogue, our participation in I- 
It relations is partial and fragmentary. In turn, the It we experience is 
sim ilarly fragm ented, divided into analyzable components, classes and 
functions. Speaking of our I-It experiences, Wood writes, "Each object is 
located w ithin a hum anly constructed frame of reference relative to other 
objects and is broken up into various perceptible and interpretable parts" (40). 
Again, such analysis and dissection is very useful in m aking sense of and 
ordering the w orld in which we live. However, in doing so we do not 
encounter the other in its fullness, integrity and irreducibility - in all its 
"undivided” otherness; and so, participation in actual dialogue is denied us. 
For, as Friedm an explains, "Dialogue is ... the response of one's whole being 
to the otherness of the other, that otherness that is com prehended only when 
I open myself to him  in the present and in the concrete situation and 
respond" (Introduction to Buber, Between xvii).
But w hat good are these reciprocal, present, imm ediate and whole 
encounters w ith our fellow beings? As suggested above, the knowledge we 
receive in I-Thou dialogue defies representation, interpretation and analysis. 
According to Buber, our uncanny I-Thou encounters are devoid of content,
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and, in them , we learn nothing about the others w hom  we meet. 
Furtherm ore, although we may move in the direction of such encounters, we 
cannot procure them through an act of will or ’have’ them  on our own 
terms. In turn, through our participation in them we accomplish nothing; 
they serve no purpose. As Buber writes, "The purpose of the relation is the 
relation itself - touching the You. For as soon as we touch a You, we are 
touched by a breath of eternal life" (I and Thou 112).
A lthough we learn nothing about the other w hom  we m eet as a 
partner in dialogue, in so far as we "touch a You," we come to know that 
particular other in a deep and decisive way, and our lives are graced with 
tru th  and m eaning - "finality," to use Bugbee's term .12 According to Buber's 
epistemology, our 'knowing' takes one of two basic forms, according to the 
type of relation - I-Thou or I-It - from which it arises. Generally, our I-It 
know ledge is a 'knowing about,’ in which we know the other superficially 
and abstractly, as a subject knows an object of study and inquiry, in terms of its 
qualities, characteristics and attributes. On the other hand, the knowledge 
received in our I-Thou dialogues is similar to the Hebraic m eaning of 'to 
know :’ to touch or to intercourse with the being of the other. For Buber, it is 
this latter knowing, our deep and intimate knowledge of the other in all its 
otherness, through which we may glimpse the truth, "which can never be 
possessed and yet may be com prehended in an existentially real relation” 
(Buber, Between 82). We come to know truth and m eaning in our lives only 
through our committed and whole-hearted participation in dialogue - or 
w hat Bugbee calls "sacramental participation in being w ith beings"
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("L'Exigence " 15). For both Buber and Bugbee, the truth is not som ething we 
'have,' not a mental possession; rather, it is som ething we m ay encounter - or 
not encounter.
Buber describes the experiential and participatory know ledge we 
receive in our I-Thou encounters as a contentless "force." In I and Thou he 
writes, "They [I-Thou relations] leave no content that could be preserved, but 
their force enters into the creation and into m an's knowledge, and the 
radiation of its force penetrates the ordered world and thaw s it again and 
again" (82). In the I-Thou dialogue we do not gain any know ledge about the 
other that is susceptible to analysis and representation in thought or speech; 
the m eeting is, in the fullest sense, ineffable. As Levinas explains,
Buber describes a sphere of being which cannot be told because it is a 
living dialogue between individuals who are not related as objective 
contents to one another: one individual has nothing to say about the 
other. The sensitivity of the I-Thou relation lies in its com pletely 
formal nature. To apprehend the other as a content is tan tam ount to 
relating oneself to him as an object and is to enter into an I-It relation 
instead (143).
A nd yet, despite the lack of content and our inability to say anything about the 
other, through our participation in I-Thou dialogue we come to know  the 
other in an im m ediate and decisive way. This knowledge, however, is not so 
m uch a know ledge about the other as it is a knoweldge of the other. In 
describing this experiential, contentless knowledge, Buber employs the 
biblical sense of 'to know' - to touch or to intercourse w ith the other - as in 
"Adam knew Eve" or "God knew Hosea." In his book Good and Evil. Buber 
w rites,
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[T]he original meaning of the Hebrew verb 'to recognise, to know ', in 
distinction from W estern languages, belongs not to the sphere of 
reflection but to that of contact. The decisive event for 'know ing' in 
biblical Hebrew is not that one looks at an object, but that one comes 
into touch w ith it. This basic difference is developed in the realm  of a 
relation of the soul to other beings, where the fact of m utuality changes 
everything. At the centre is not a perceiving of one another, bu t the 
contact of being, intercourse" (56).
Through participation in dialogue we come to know the other - touch the
other - at the m ost intimate and fundam ental level, at the level of being.
In such prim al encounters we come face-to-face w ith the other in all its 
otherness and recognized as such. We come to know the other as other. 
According to Buber,
The actual other who meets me meets me in such a way that my soul 
comes in contact with his as with something that it is not and that it 
cannot become. My soul does not and cannot include the other, and 
yet can nonetheless approach the other in this most real contact. This 
other, w hat is more, is and remains over against the self, no m atter 
w hat completeness the self may attain, as the other. ... All beings 
existing over against me who become "included" in m y self are 
possessed by it in this inclusion as an It. Only then when, having 
become aware of the unincludable otherness of a being, I renounce all 
claim to incorporating it in my soul, does it truly become Thou for me 
(Eclipse of God 88-89).
This know ledge of the other - as other - is not som ething we can possess; nor 
is it som ething we can fit into our systems of thought or include as part of 
ourselves. Through our dialogical encounters we come to know  the other as 
an independent partner in dialogue (not-I yet also not-It), an irreducibly and 
radically other being whom  we cannot appropriate or possess but whom  we 
can m eet - and, therefore, know - in moments of dialogue.
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It is through this knowing intercourse with others that we recognize 
their inexhaustible meaning and worth as fellow creatures w arranting our 
respect. In turn, we come to know our own lives and situations as eminently 
m eaningful. For Buber, and for Bugbee, we can only know such m eaning 
through our full and committed participation in the situations in which we 
find ourselves; when examined objectively as a detached observer and not as 
a participant, our fellow beings and our existential situation appear absurd 
and meaningless. As Bugbee writes,
Perhaps the existence of things, the standing out of the distinct, can 
only m ake sense, as we stand forth ourselves, as we are m ade to stand 
forth. In ecstnsis (literally a 'being m ade to stand forth') the m eaning 
of the existent becomes clear, and the infinite im portance of existent 
things becomes clear. ... This is to say that there can be no conclusive 
m eaning to our situation so long as it is abstractly considered” (Inw ard 
M orning 106 & 126).
Through our whole-hearted participation in existence - through our 
"standing forth" - we come to know existence, instantiated in our own and 
fellow existents', as meaningful. Only through the knowledge received and 
engendered in dialogue w ith our fellow beings is such m eaning accessible to 
us. And yet, like the dialogical encounters themselves, we cannot go out 
looking for and striving after such meaning. It daw ns upon our lives as a gift, 
which is open to acceptance or refusal; we can only make ourselves ready to 
receive it and answer for it with our actions. In his essay "Religion and 
Philosophy" Buber writes,
M eaning is to be experienced in living action and suffering itself, in the 
unreduced immediacy of the moment. Of course, he w ho aims at the 
experiencing of experience will necessarily miss the m eaning, for he
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destroys the spontaneity of the mystery. Only he reaches the m eaning 
who stands firm, w ithout holding back or reservation, before the 
whole might of reality and answers it in a living way. ... The reply of 
the people of Israel on Sinai, "We will do it, we will hear it," expresses 
the decisive with naive and unsurpassable pregnancy. The m eaning is 
found through the engagement of one’s own person; it only reveals 
itself as one takes part in its revelation" (Eclipse of God 35-36).
M eaning is accessible and open to us in the here and now  of our everyday 
lives. In fact, it is only through our unreserved participation in the here and 
now  that such meaning is granted to us - in hearing and responding to the 
claims of the moment as it addresses us in the manifold situations of our 
lives. As participants in dialogue we know the other in an intim ate and 
decisive way, and correspondingly, we come to know m eaning in our lives as 
well.
All of this is not to say that our knowledge about others - our I-It 
knowledge - is unnecessary or unim portant. Quite the opposite, it w ould be 
impossible for us to live and act w ithout it. Only by examining our 
experience in terms of space and time, cause and effect, species and genera and 
similar categories of analysis and interpretation could we m ake any sense out 
of the w orld in which we live. Scientific and technical knowledge about 
things - w hat may be called objective knowledge - is useful and im portant. 
However, it is a detached knowing that, by definition, abstracts from  our 
know ledge of things encountered in their depth  and meaning; the m eaning 
of our co-participation in existence with our fellow beings is not accessible to 
empirical investigation or so-called objective knowledge. In his essay "On 
Starting w ith Love" Bugbee writes,
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N ow  objectivity is a stance in which we abstract from the evocative 
way in which the beings we represent to ourselves are present as 
holding concrete meaning for us. It is a kind of deliberate detachm ent 
from the m utuality of existence, though a sense of that m utuality  w ith 
the beings we are thus considering may well persist, and is further 
implicitly presum ed in the address of thinking and speaking w ith  
other persons, or as in the presence of other persons, w ith reference to 
w hat is thrown into objective aspect. Still, the explicit rendering of 
m eaning coordinate with the stance in objectivity abstracts from  the 
m utuality of existence between oneself and the beings thus being taken 
into account. Likewise abstraction is m ade from the concern bu t for 
which we could not be called upon by anything to render w hat is called 
for with respect to it, even if that be in giving an objective account of it 
(7).
From the position of an objective investigator, we m ay accumulate a great 
deal of good and useful knowledge about the world in which we live. In our 
attem pts to reduce suffering and prom ote justice and healing, such 
inform ation may indeed come in very handy. Yet, by itself, it is a 
directionless and, ironically, meaningless knowledge. Only as it is informed 
by our knowledge of others as inexhaustibly meaningful and w orthy of 
respect - a knowledge engendered in our imm ediate and intim ate intercourse 
w ith them  - does our empirical, objective - I-It - knowledge become valuable. 
Respect and m eaning dawn upon us through participation in engaged and 
destinate dialogue with our fellow beings.
Throughout this chapter I have attem pted to describe our relationality, 
for the m ost part, in terms of Martin Buber's distinction betw een I-Thou and 
I-It relations. Up to this point I have contrasted the fundam ental postures or 
m ovem ents w ith which we enter into I-Thou and I-It relations, the generic
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traits and characteristics of these two types of relations, and the kinds of 
know ledge we receive through our participation - or non-participation, as the 
case m ay be - in these relations. Now, however, I w ould like to close this 
chapter by examining how I-Thou and I-It relations com plem ent one another 
in building up  an integrated and active life.
According to Buber, full and meaningful hum an existence is 
characterized by an ongoing m ovem ent between I-Thou and I-It relations. As 
he w rites in I and Thou. "Mortal life is by its very nature an oscillation 
betw een You and It" (101). And earlier, he states, "The individual You must 
■* become an It when the event of relation has run its course. The individual It 
can become a You by entering into the event of relation" (84). A life of pure 
I-Thou relation is neither possible or desirable; our dialogical I-Thou 
encounters are fleeting and evanescent, brief m oments of sheer reciprocity, 
presence and immediacy. On the other hand, while it is all too possible to 
live in a world defined exclusively in terms of I-It, such a life lacks meaning, 
authenticity and the neccesary experiential ground of decisive action. Neither 
I-Thou or I-It, taken in isolation from the other, can sustain us in meaningful 
and active existence. As Friedman explains, "[Ijt is not I-Thou or I-It which is 
the basic choice but the healthy alternation between I-Thou and I-It" (Preface 
to Life of Dialogue x).
This "healthy alternation," however, is no random  bouncing back and 
forth. As discussed earlier, the knowledge about things we gain from I-It 
experiences is very useful in comprehending, analyzing and m anipulating
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our world; such subjective-objective knowledge provides us w ith an orderly 
and fairly reliable vision of the world - a world that 'makes sense' and in 
w hich we can live. However, this knowledge about things cannot provide 
m eaning for our lives or direction for our actions. As Buber em phatically 
concludes, "And in all seriousness of truth, listen: w ithout It a hum an being 
cannot live. But whoever lives only w ith that is not hum an" (I and  Thou 
85). So, although both I-Thou and I-It relations are necessary, it is always the 
form er that m ust inform the latter and serve as the signpost. According to 
Buber,
Both [I-Thou and I-It] together build up hum an existence; it is only a 
question of which of the two is at any time the architect and which is 
the assistant. Rather, it is a question of w hether the I-Thou relation 
rem ains the architect, for it is self-evident that it cannot be em ployed as 
assistant. If it does not command, then it is already disappearing 
(Eclipse of God 128).
Through our participation in dialogue with our fellow beings our lives are 
graced w ith m eaning and we find ourselves em pow ered to act in a decisive 
way. If our lives and actions are to approach authenticity, they m ust always 
be grounded in the deep and decisive knowledge received in and  through our 
participation in such dialogue, even in those times when we experience the 
others whom  we m eet as Its; the Thou-saying spirit m ust perm eate our lives 
and inform  our m anner of taking up with things in an enduring  way.
Furtherm ore, in the address of the other received in the m om ent of 
dialogue, we find ourselves called forth to respond and, consequently, to 
em body that response in the world of action. And yet, in actualizing our 
response and acting upon it, we return to the world of It. According to Buber,
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"All response binds the You into the It-world. That is the m elancholy of 
m an, and that is his greatness. For thus knowledge, thus works, thus image 
and exam ple come into being among the living" (I and Thou 89-90). While 
our response m ay be grounded in our participation in I-Thou dialogue, it is 
em bodied - incarnated - in the It-world. For Buber, the dynam ic w hereby our 
dialogical encounters find embodim ent in com m itted action, w hich he refers 
to as Verwirklichung ("realization" or "actualization," depending  on 
translations), provides a critical link between the worlds of Thou and It.13 
Through this process the It-world is illum inated and hallowed w ith the 
m eaningful and destinate force of the I-Thou encounter, and, at the same 
time, the presence and m eaning received in that encounter is 'm ade flesh' - 
actualized - in the world of experience. For the I, the actualization of the 
dialogical encounter in action offers the possibility of integrity and unity  in 
the continuity of committed response. Born out of the m om ent of holy 
intercourse, we find our actions inspirited with a sense of decisiveness and 
resolve.
In trying to explain this process of actualization, Buber uses the 
example of the artist. In the conception of the creative act, the artist 
encounters the sheer presence of the form. According to Buber, "The form 
that confronts me I cannot experience nor describe; I can only actualize it. 
A nd yet I see it, radiant in the splendor of the confrontation, far m ore clearly 
than all clarity of the experienced world. Not as a thing am ong the 'internal' 
things, not as a figment of the 'imagination,' but as w hat is present" (I and 
T hou 61). In the moment of encounter, the artist and the form enter into an
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actual relation. However, if the form is to find em bodim ent, the artist m ust 
actualize it. In doing so, Buber writes, "I lead the form across - into the world 
of It. The created work is a thing among things and can be experienced and 
described as an aggregate of qualities" (I and Thou 61). As such, the artistic act 
involves both participation in an actual relation and the actualization and 
em bodim ent of that relation in the world of action.
Of course, given the incomprehensible and ineffable nature of the I- 
Thou relation, such actualization will, of necessity, be incomplete. O ut of the 
m ultitude of potentially appropriate responses, the artist m ust choose one 
and comm it h im self/herself to its actualization. For Buber, this is the 
"sacrifice" involved in the actualization process, where "infinite possibility is 
surrendered on the altar of the form" (I and Thou 60). To a certain degree, all 
creative acts of em bodim ent necessarily involve the death of possibility. 
However, through this sacrifice and death, resurrection also becomes a 
possibility - not only for the artist but for the larger comm unity as well. 
Through the artist's active and creative response to the sponsoring relational 
event, h e /sh e  actualizes the encounter and allows it to be shared. Robert 
W ood explains this in the following way:
But in all this there is the alternation of the actual and the latent; once 
achieved, relation is recognized as that which is hidden w ithin the 
Thou-become-It, and from time to time it can be actualized - provided 
one persists in faithful openness. The situation of thinghood envelops 
the Thou as a chrysallis envelops the butterfly. But in being reduced to 
this state, the It is located as something that can become Thou for 
others. Hence the It-world has a function to play that is essential. 
Relation, however, is first (62).
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In our response to the dialogical moment, faithfully articulated, we bear 
w itness to the reality and truth present in the encounter. In doing so, 
however, our witness becomes a thing among things, but it is a thing which 
points to, and invites participation in, the ongoing life of dialogue. Like the 
actual encounters themselves, our faithful testimony may work evocatively - 
upon ourselves and others - and call us forth in renewed readiness to meet 
our fellows in dialogue.
At this point, then, we have come full circle. Beginning w ith an 
account of the faith posture in which we m ust necessarily stand if we hope to 
hear the call of the other as it addresses us and, thus, encounter the other in 
dialogue, we have concluded by describing the alternation between I-Thou 
and I-It relations which, in turn, may engender such a disposition and point 
us tow ard future participation in I-Thou dialogue. As we go forth to meet 
others in faith, we may come to know them - intimately and decisively - and 
find m eaning and truth in our lives; in doing so, our faith is upheld  and 
deepened as it finds embodim ent in our committed response. It is this 
response, examined in terms of our ethical responsibility, that I will examine 
in the following chapter.
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EXPLANATORY NOTES
1 - Kaufman, in his 1970 translation, uses I-You instead of I-Thou. H e does so 
to preserve the intim ate and familiar nature of Ich-Du and, at the same time, 
dow nplay the over-emphasis on the theological associations rooted in the 
tendency of m odern English readers to understand "Thou" as referring 
exclusively to God. See Kaufman's lengthy translator's introduction for a 
m ore complete account of his reasons for preferring I-You over I-Thou.
2 - For Buber, "The world is twofold for m an." Given that we enter relations 
from  the standpoint of humans, we can only legitimately describe those 
relations in anthropological terms. The ontology Buber presents here is a 
lim ited, regional one. See Ray H art's Unfinished Man and the Im agination 
for a discussion of regional ontologies, especially pp.91-92.
3 - A lthough often used interchangeably, especially in English, we m ust 
distinguish between faith, as I wish to use it here, and belief, which 
comm only refers to our intellectual assent to a truth claim or proposition 
such as "I believe that the world is flat," or "I believe that God exists." For an 
excellent analysis of faith and belief along these lines see W ilfred Cantwell 
Sm ith’s The M eaning and End of Religion and Faith and Belief.
4 - See Bugbee's "Le Recueillement et L' Accueil ," especially page 9, for a 
discussion of availability and its central importance in Marcel's thought.
5- Both Bugbee and Marcel make similar moves in their use of "meta- 
technical" and "meta-objective" as referring to being and beings in a way that 
defies charaterization and reduction into the framework of a subject's 
know ing and representing an object. I will take up with Bugbee's 
understanding  of the meta-objective categories of finality, necessity and 
certainty in considerable detail in Chapter 2.
6 - A note on translations: Smith translates Buber's Begegnung as "meeting," 
w hile Kaufman translates the same w ord as "encounter." In Kaufm an's 
translation of I and Thou this passage reads, "All actual life is encounter" (62). 
For Buber, Begegnung always describes the I-Thou relation (Ich-Du 
Beziehung ) and never the I-It relation (Jch-Es Verhnltnis ). Thus, m eeting 
here refers to the meeting between an I and a Thou. In this paper, I will use 
m eeting and encounter interchangeably.
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7 - Friedm an's choice of terms is som ewhat unfortunate for my purposes 
here. In his discussion of the twofold nature of Marcel’s disponibilite ,
Bugbee distinguishes between "reflexive" and what we might call referential 
disponibilite . In his essay "Ly Exigence Ontologique," Bugbee describes the 
inerplay between the two as follows:
Reflexive disponibilite is the deepening of concern in its radical 
character—and ultimately no less than a willing disposition of oneself 
in accord with being unconditionally claimed. But it is in and  ou t of 
being so claimed that we can come to 'hear' and to heed beings in their 
grounded claim upon us; that hearing and heeding is the m anner of 
our disponibilite in the direct engagement of concern by beings 
occupying our attention; accordingly disponibilite is also coordinate 
w ith respect to them (5).
For Marcel and Bugbee, reflexive disponibilite is som ething like a prim ary 
awareness of our situation as one in which we find ourselves as given along 
w ith our fellow beings who are likewise given in our m utual co-existence. It 
is out of such recognition that we find ourselves called upon to m ake 
ourselves available to our fellows - in the referential sense. Thus, it is akin to 
the fundam ental posture we have been discussing and completely antithetical 
to w hat Friedman means by reflexion as he uses the term. In a translator's 
note to Buber's essay entitled "Dialogue," Friedman describes reflexion as 
"...the essence of the 'monological' life, in which the other is not really m et as 
the other, but merely as a part of the monological self, in an Erlebnis or inner 
experience which has no objective import: w hat happens is that the self 
'curves back on itself" (Buber, Between 206).
8 - For the purposes of this paper, it is im portant not to read "persons" within 
the fram ework of the noematic prejudice we are attem pting to overcome.
The category of "persons” is not limited exclusively to hum an persons. I will 
follow the inclusive personalism  of Erazim Kohak, here, as he presents it in 
The Embers and the Stars. According to Kohak,
To speak of the world as 'personal' means to conceive of it as 
structured in terms of relations best understood on the m odel of 
m eaningful relations among persons. It is to conceive of it as peopled 
by beings who are similarly best understood on the m odel of persons, 
modified as needed, rather than on the model of m atter in motion, 
raised to infinite complexity(209).
Thus, for Kohak- and for us - "[A] person, ultimately, is not just a being who 
possesses a psyche or manifests certain personality traits as much as a being
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who stands in a moral relation to us, a being we encounter as a Thou" (The 
Embers and the Stars 128-129). Throughout this paper, then, "person" refers 
to a being with whom we may engage in authentic I-Thou dialogue and 
should be understood in the most inclusive, noetic sense of that term.
9 - A t this point in the paper I am merely trying to outline the basic 
characteristics of I-Thou and I-It relations in general terms. Therefore, I wish 
to hold off on my (and Buber's) attem pt to answer the obvious question: How 
do these "lifeless and speechless objects" (sic) reciprocate? For now, I will 
follow Buber and say that reciprocity with such beings involves "the 
reciprocity of being itself" (Afterword to I and Thou, 173). I will take up  with 
this question in more detail in Chapter Three, where I will p resent Buber's 
defense of his claim that reciprocal I-Thou relations can and do occur between 
hum ans and animals, plants and rocks.
10 - A lthough this quote occurs in the context of Buber's discussion of our 
relations w ith God, it also holds true for the whole of our relational lives, 
including our relations with our fellow finite beings. As w ith the other 
implicitly theological references I have m ade up to this point in the paper, I 
ask the reader’s patience until Chapter 2, when I will address Buber's theology 
and philosophy of religion explicitly and in some depth.
11 - Two notes here: First, my discussion of integrity and wholeness in this 
paragraph brings us to the topic of a life informed by what can be called a 
sense of vocation; as an active, non-static category it implies that our lives 
become informed with direction and follow along a path that becomes a way. 
But here, we move into the realm of Buber's - and Bugbee's - philosophical 
anthropology, a subject I will discuss in detail in Chapter 2. Second, the more 
static connotations of wholeness still persist. And yet, Buber makes it clear 
that we never become whole in any finished or once-and-for-all sense; to use 
Ray H art's language, we cannot bridge the "ontological difference" between 
who we are and who we are to become - between who we actually and 
potentially are - in any absolute sense. I think the wholeness of which Buber 
speaks is more akin to finding direction and vocation along the course of 
one's life. Throughout the paper, it is this more fluid, process-oriented 
m eaning of wholeness and integrity that I mean.
12 - Because "eternal life" is so easily m isinterpreted, I w ould suggest that 
Bugbee's sense of "finality," as he presents it in Inw ard M orning, is more akin 
to w hat Buber means here. For a more detailed discussion of finality, see 
Bugbee's Inw ard Morning: I will discuss Bugbee's understanding of finality in 
some detail in the next chapter.
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13- Friedm an follows Smith's original translation of Verwirklichung as 
"realization," whereas Kaufman opts for "actualization." See Friedm an's 
Preface to Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue for a more detailed explanation 
of the translators' choice of words.
A CORRELATIVE ETHIC OF RESPONSIBILITY
As I tried to show in Chapter One of this essay, our existence, 
understood dialogically, is essentially a matter of address and response. In the 
m ultitude of relational events that constitute our daily lives, we find 
ourselves addressed in a way that calls forth our response. In turn, we 
respond through our words and actions or, in other cases, our silences and 
non-actions; even our failure to hear a n d /o r  respond is a form of response.
As relational beings, we are forever placed in the position of being responsible 
- answerable - to the address received in each new and unforeseeable 
relational event. As we participate in these events, we find ourselves called, 
claimed, and it is our responsibility to respond in an appropriate and decisive 
m anner - in an ethical manner.
This dynam ic of address and response - claim and responsibility - lies at 
the heart of a dialogical understanding of ethical responsibility. W ithin the 
context of a philosophy of dialogue, ethical decision-making and action are 
not m atters of applying or prescribing general or universal principles to the 
particular situations in which we find ourselves and acting accordingly. 
Instead, ethics begins w ith our being truly present and attentive to the 
concrete situation and venturing to respond to the unique and 
unprecedented claims of that moment. As Martin Buber explains in his essay 
en titled  "Dialogue,"
The idea of responsibility is to be brought back from the province of 
specialized ethics, of an "ought" that swings free in the air, into that of 





To w hat happens to one, to w hat is to be seen and heard and felt. Each 
concrete hour allotted to the person, w ith its context draw n from  the 
w orld and from destiny, is speech for the m an who is attentive. 
Attentive, for no more than that is needed in order to m ake a 
beginning with the reading of the signs that are given you. ...
It will, then, be expected of the attentive m an that he faces creation as it 
happens. It happens as speech, and not as speech rushing out over his 
head but as speech directed precisely at him  (Between 16)
As Buber suggests, our ethical responsibility begins as we take up  w ith things 
in a spirit of attentiveness, availability and respect - that fundam ental posture 
of faith described in Chapter One. Only as we step out to meet our fellow 
beings in such a m anner do we find ourselves addressed by them and called 
forth to respond. Our capacity to say Thou to our fellow creatures is a 
necessary precondition of our participation in genuine I-Thou dialogue. And 
it is here, in and through our participation in dialogical encounters (and, 
m ore generally, in life lived in the mode of dialogue), that we are em pow ered 
to comm it ourselves in decisive ethical action. Ethical responsibility 
involves, above all, the actualization of our I-Thou encounters in the w orld 
of action. That is, as we come to know the other as Thou, we come to know 
w hat is asked of us (required of us), and our actions, if they are to be ethical, 
will em body the knowledge and m eaning received in the m om ent of 
dialogue. The address received in dialogue is not neutral; it carries w ith it an 
im perative - a compelling claim to respond in a decisive and com m itted 
m an n er.
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How, specifically, our response will be actualized is impossible to say 
outside of the situation in which we find ourselves called upon. Genuine 
ethical responsibility, by its very nature, cannot be prescribed. Universal 
m oral laws, categorical imperatives, and the like may, at times, be useful, but 
they cannot remove from us the burden of our responsibility in the particular 
and  utterly  unique and unforeseeable situations in which we find ourselves. 
O ur responsibility can only be fulfilled in responding to the claims of each 
particu lar relational moment.
For Buber, the moment, received in depth, speaks to us in w hat may be 
understood as a threefold way. First, and most obviously, we are addressed by 
the particular finite other whom we meet and w ith w hom  we have to do. 
H owever, in being so addressed, we are also confronted w ith the m eaning of 
our existence as called upon by beings who, although radically other, are, at 
the same time, co-existents with whom  we share our being - a being which we 
d id  not choose or originate. In traditional theological language, we find 
ourselves together with our fellows as creatures - created, derivative, 
sponsored beings. And, w hat is more, this creatureliness involves a task; we 
are called, out of creation and in the depths of each moment, to become the 
particular beings who we are created to be. O ur proper vocation is to actualize 
our unique potentialities, and we do this insofar as we truly respond to the 
evocative speech of our fellow creatures.1 And lastly, in the address of the 
m om ent acknowledged in its fullness and meaning, we receive the call of the 
Creator w ho speaks to us through our fellow creatures and who, in creating 
us, sponsors us and sends us forth along our way - who offers us a destiny we
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are free to fulfill. Thus, the call of the other, the call of our creaturely task, 
and the call of our sponsoring and abiding Creator speak together in the 
depths of the moment, decisively received, and charge our dialogical 
encounters w ith im perative force, empowering us to respond in a decisive, 
com m itted m anner. That is, through our engaged participation in these 
events, we come to know w hat is necessary in this our unique situation, and 
w e find, at the same time, the capacity to commit ourselves in necessary 
action.
In attem pting to outline a dialogical understanding of ethical 
responsibility, I will begin this chapter by examining, in greater detail, how 
the call of the other, the call of our creaturely task, and the call of our Creator 
each address us in and through our participation in dialogical encounters, 
claiming us and calling us forth into committed, ethical action. I will suggest 
that in the claim of the situation, heard singularly and in its entirety, our 
lives are inform ed with a fundam ental m eaning, and we receive a 
compelling im perative to incarnate that m eaning in our actions. After 
attem pting to outline this 'rhythm  of ethical responsibility' I will close by 
show ing the experiential, non-prescriptive and non-verifiable nature of such 
an ethic and restating the necessity of grounding our responsibility in our 
participation in dialogical encounters w ith our fellow beings.
W ithin each relational moment, we find ourselves addressed, m ost 
im m ediately and apparently, by the particular, finite other who crosses our
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path. As suggested in Chapter One, the m ultitude of others whom  we meet 
have a w ord to speak to us, which, when decisively received in dialogue, calls 
us forth to respond; in fact, the very meaning of this w ord of address lies in its 
evocative force. As Emmanuel Levinas explains, "The essence of the 'w ord ' 
does no t initially consist in its objective m eaning or descriptive possibilities, 
b u t in the response that it elicits" (142). W ithin the dialogical, I-Thou 
encounter, the beings whom  we meet speak to us evocatively, and w e find 
ourselves called upon to answer their w ord of address; we are responsible to 
them .
O ur participation in such dialogical m oments grounds genuine ethical 
responsibility. Only as we meet the other in dialogue do we hear the w ord of 
address that elicits our ethical response. As Buber writes in I and Thou, "Only 
those who know relation and who know the presence of You have the 
capacity for decision" (100). Quite simply, ethical decision-making begins 
w ith our participation in I-Thou encounters, which come to fruition as we 
attem pt to actualize them in our various actions and non-actions.
As such, we practice genuine responsibility, at the m ost basic level, to 
the others whom  we meet - that is, whom we meet as Thous. As described in 
C hapter One, in the reciprocal, present, imm ediate and whole I-Thou 
encounter, we come to know the other in a deep and intim ate way. The other 
speaks to us, not as an object to be analyzed a n d /o r  m anipulated for our 
private purposes and according to our intentions, bu t as an independent 
partner in dialogue - a unique and wholly other being. It is the voice of the
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other, heard  as such, that makes ethical claims upon us and  elicits our 
response. In his essay "The Question to the Single One" Buber writes, 
"Responsibility presupposes one who addresses me prim arily. That is, from a 
realm  independent of myself, and to whom  I am answerable. ... It can only be 
experienced when one is not closed to the otherness, the ontic and  prim al 
otherness of the other" (Between 45). In the m oment of dialogue w e find 
ourselves responsible to the other whom  we meet, an other that is neither It 
nor I bu t Thou. As Levinas explains, "For only w hat is other can elicit an act 
of responsibility. Buber attem pts to m aintain the radical otherness of the 
Thou in the Thou relation: The I does not construe the Thou as object, nor 
ecstatically identify itself w ith the Thou, for the terms rem ain independent 
despite the relation into which they enter" (141). For Buber, we cannot 
practice responsibility to the other if we reduce it to just another object among 
objects; objects cannot claim our responsibility. However, neither can we 
include or appropriate the other w ithin ourselves; we are not responsible to 
ourselves. If the other is to engender and elicit our ethical response, it m ust 
speak to us of its singular, irreducible, independent, and uncanny otherness. 
Quite simply, it m ust speak to us of itself, and we m ust hear it as such. For, as 
H enry Bugbee points out, "Things say themselves, univocally, unisonously, 
form ulating a tautology of infinite significance" (Inw ard M orning 141). As 
we m eet w ith others in authentic dialogue, they speak to us of their deep and 
inexhaustible otherness, and their voices resonate within us, stirring us up 
and  calling us forth into decisive and committed response. Acknowledged in 
their ow n right, they rightfully claim our responsibility and, a t the same time, 
renew  and deepen our respect.
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However, this emphasis upon the otherness of the beings w hom  we 
m eet in dialogue does not imply contrariety or 'atomic' isolation. These 
beings are, indeed, other, but they are other in such a way that they can be 
m et. In turn, as we m eet these others as independent partners in dialogue, 
we come to know  them as co-existents, fellow creatures, kin. According to 
Bugbee,
Things exist in their own right; it is a lesson that escapes us except as 
they hold us in awe. ... A philosophy of the given misses the point 
which does not think of things as given in their independence.
Yet the truth of the independence of things should not lead us to 
succum b to a sense of isolation and insularity among independent 
existents. The independence of things is no w arrant for an 
objectivizing m ode of thought about them, for taking an abstract point 
of view toward them and ourselves. For concretely, experience of the 
presence of things is also complete intimacy w ith them, the opposite of 
estrangem ent from  them and ourselves. The gift of things in their 
independence is also the gift of ourselves together w ith them  (Inw ard 
M orning 164).
To acknowledge the independence and otherness of the beings and things we 
come across in our daily lives does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that 
they are, therefore, atomic objects existing over-against us and from whom  
we are separated by an unbridgeable and, finally, incommunicable gulf. The 
either-or choice betw een fusion/identification and atomism is a false one, 
born of ideologies trapped within an exclusively subjective-objective (I-It) 
understanding  of our relationality.2 In the reciprocal and dialogical 
encounter - in the reception of the given thing as presence, to follow Bugbee's 
use of M arcel’s terms in the quote above - we meet w hat is other not as an It - 
an object - bu t as a Thou, a fellow being and co-participant in the m utuality of
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our shared existence. In and through our participation in I-Thou dialogue we 
come to know  the beings whom  we meet as both other and kin, standing side 
by side as fellow members of w hat Maurice Friedman calls the "com m unity 
of otherness" (Touchstones 268).
Bound together within this existential comm unity of otherness, we 
hear the address of the particular being whom we meet as the call of the other 
w ho is, at the same time, also our fellow creature. And if the otherness of our 
fellows, received in depth, elicits our respectful response, so too, will the 
realization of our m utual standing and co-creaturely kinship as it daw ns 
upon  us through the gracious advent of our dialogical encounters. As we 
come to know  our fellow beings as kin, we come to know them  as 
engendering and warranting our respect. According to Bugbee, "It is in and 
out of that m utuality appreciated as final and ultim ate that we can affirm 
things and other persons in their independence, and also at the same time - 
reflexively - ourselves. This affirmation is respect" ("The Sublime" 5). Our 
capacity for respect and, in turn, respectful response is grounded in our 
participation in authentic encounter, through which we come to know the 
other as kin and become aware of ourselves as bound together with one 
another in a shared existence.
O ur ethical responsibility will, then, involve the active em bodim ent 
(or, in Buber's language, actualization) of the respect engendered a n d /o r  
deepened in our dialogical encounters w ith the beings w hom  we m eet - and 
come to know  - as both other and kin. As other, we become aware of these
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beings as existing in their own right, independent of our purposes, desires 
and intentions. They do not exist merely as psychological extensions of our 
m inds or as tools and resources for our use; their being and value lies beyond 
our m ental constructs and instrumentality. As such, they are to be treated not 
m erely as m eans to our ends but also as ends in themselves. Therefore, as 
Friedm an points out in his discussion of Buber’s ethics, "Buber's concept of 
the responsibility of an I to a Thou is closely similar to Kant's second 
form ulation of the categorical imperative: Never treat one's fellows as a 
m eans only but always also as an end of value in himself" (Life of Dialogue 
200). Yet even here, where Buber and Kant seem to be saying the same thing, 
there is a crucial difference. W hereas Kant comes to this principle 
universally and abstractly (and exclusively, in so far as he limits its 
application to our treatm ent of rational beings), attem pting to apply it to each 
particular situation as it presents itself, Buber's ethic of responsibility is rooted 
in our genuine participation in the particular situation in which we find 
ourselves and m ust be renewed and re-tested again and again in the unique 
and unforeseeable m om ent of each new encounter. Friedm an attem pts to 
articulate this fundam ental difference as follows:
To Kant the respect for the dignity of others grows out of one's 
own dignity as a rational being bound to act according to 
universal laws. For Buber the concern for the other as an end in 
himself grows out of one's direct relation to this other and to 
that higher end which he serves through the fulfilm ent of his 
created uniqueness. Thus Kant's im perative is essentially 
subjective (the isolated individual) and  objective (universal 
reason) whereas Buber's is dialogical (Life of Dialogue 200).
For Buber, our respect for the other is grounded in our hearing its address - 
spoken out of all its unique, irreducible and uncanny otherness - in the
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m om ent of dialogue. Only as we receive the word of the other as a Thou, and 
not m erely and exclusively an It, can we venture to respond in a truly 
respectful - ethical manner.
In addition, if our awareness of the otherness of the being w hom  we 
m eet in dialogue evokes our respect for it as an end in itself, then our 
sim ilarly experiential awareness of the kinship of our co-creatureliness will 
call forth our respectful solidarity with and compassion for our fellow beings. 
As kin, we share an intimacy and affinity w ith our fellow beings, and we 
recognize them, even in their independence, as co-participants in a common 
situation; we are all, so to speak, in the same ontic boat. Born out of the 
acknow ledgem ent of our common lot, we treat the fellow being w hom  we 
m eet w ith the respect - even love - due one who is "like yourself." Here, 
again, Buber arrives at the same point, although again via a different route, as 
a traditional ethical norm: God's injunction in Leviticus 19:18 to, "Love your 
neighbour as one like yourself" (Between 51). In m eeting our fellow beings as 
Thou, we come to know and respect them as creatures like ourselves, and 
our actions tow ard them, if they are to be ethical, will em body that 
knowledge, compassion and respect. But again, this cannot be reduced to the 
rote application of a universal norm  to the particular situations that arise; our 
com passion, respect and consequent response - the fulfilm ent of our 
responsibility - are inseparable from the unique relation out of which they 
arise and become actual. Thus, in his book Touchstones of Reality. Friedm an 
interprets, and qualifies, Buber's use of the biblical com m and as follows:
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H ere the true m eaning of "love your neighbor" unfolds itself: "Deal 
lovingly w ith your neighbor as one equal to yourself," as your fellow 
creature, your brother, your "Thou."
You cannot "deal lovingly w ith your neighbor as one equal to yourself" 
as a general principle, but only in a m utual relationship in a concrete 
situation (266).3
Through our participation in the I-Thou relation, we come to know the being 
w hom  we m eet as our neighbor and our kin - a being w ith w hom  we share 
our existence. To know  our fellow beings in such a decisive and intim ate way 
is to know  them  as w arranting our compassion, comm itm ent, and respect.
Initially, then, ethical responsibility involves hearing the 
address of the other as it speaks to us out of both its otherness and its fellow- 
creatureliness; ethical responsibility begins w ith m eeting the other as a Thou, 
a being who is neither I nor It. Only as a Thou can such beings elicit our 
respect and compassion and call us forth to incarnate that same respect and 
com passion in comm itted, ethical response. Therefore, although certain 
m oral principles and commandments may be suggestive and helpful, they 
cannot substitute for our engagement in genuine dialogue w ith our fellow 
beings. Ethical responsibility involves responding whole-heartedly to the 
voice of the other whom  we m eet as Thou in the concrete and utterly  unique 
m om ent of dialogue; unless we hear that voice as it speaks to us, how  can we 
find w ithin ourselves the capacity for authentic response?
7 1
In the m om ent of dialogue we find ourselves addressed by the beings 
w hom  we meet, and through our participation in such dialogical encounters 
we become aware of ourselves as called upon. That is, we recognize our 
existential situation as one of standing together w ith our fellow beings in the 
m anner of being called upon and, consequently, of being answerable. This is 
the m eaning of w hat Marcel and Bugbee refer to as "Vexigence ontologique 
"the w ay in which we are as called upon" ("L'Exigence Ontologique" 16). In 
each particular situation we find ourselves called upon by the other whom  
we m eet and w ith whom  we have to do, but, underlying and circumscribing 
each particular relational event, we are likewise addressed by the very 
m eaning of our existence as one who is called upon. In turn, we practice 
responsibility for this meaning - we participate in m eaningful existence - in 
so far as we respond truly to the situations of our lives. As such, both the call 
of the other - of our fellow being - and the call of our unique existence speak 
together in the relational moment, claiming us and calling forth our 
com m itted, ethical response.
If our existence is defined in terms of our being beings who are called 
upon - both by our fellow creatures and from the root, existentially, so to 
speak - then we may rightly speak of our existence as assum ing the character 
of a vocation, in the Latin sense of vocatio : a calling or sum m ons, an 
invitation. And, according to Bugbee, this is, indeed, the case: "Our lives are 
in essence vocational" ("Thoughts on Creation" 5). Here the m eaning of life 
as an ongoing dialogue carries existential import. U nderstood in term s of a
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vocation - a calling - our very existence speaks to us in the m anner of a 
fundam ental address to which we m ust venture to respond. In turn, we 
practice responsibility not only in and for each relational m om ent bu t also - 
w rit large - for the m eaning and purpose of our creaturely being. Towards the 
end of Inw ard M orning Bugbee writes,
I think of reality as ever questioning, calling upon us, as if in syllables 
shaped from a m outh, which issue almost soundlessly. In a noisy soul 
this call is utterly ignored. But as true stillness comes upon us, we 
hear, we hear, and we learn that our whole lives m ay have the 
character of finding that anthem  which w ould be native to our own 
tongue, and which alone can be the true answer for each of us to the 
questioning, the calling, the dem and for ultim ate reckoning which 
devolves upon us (221).
As our lives come to us in the m anner of a calling, so it is w ith our lives that 
we m ust answer this same call.
Thus, like a dialogue, the vocational character of our lives is essentially 
twofold: call and answer, claim and responsibility. Buber addresses both 
aspects of our existential vocation when he writes, "[T]rue hum an existence ... 
m eans being sent and being commissioned" (Eclipse of God 69). In speaking 
of ourselves as "sent" he acknowledges the m eaning of our creatureliness, as 
discussed above. We exist as creatures, created beings, originated and 
sponsored from a source outside ourselves. "For one is anim ated; and  one 
does not anim ate himself" (Bugbee, "On Starting w ith Love" 17). As 
creatures who are sent forth into existence, our very being comes to us as a 
gift, and we recognize it as such as we become more clearly aware of our 
creatureliness.
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But, according to Buber, we are not only sent; we are also 
commissioned. That is, our creatureliness involves a task; we are sent into 
existence w ith a purpose. In Good and Evil Buber writes,
My uniqueness, this unrepeatable form of being here, not analysable 
into any elements and not com poundable out of any, I experience as a 
designed or preform ed one, entrusted to me for execution, although 
everything that affects me participates in this execution. That a unique 
hum an being is created does not mean that it is p u t into being for a 
m ere existence, but for the fulfilment of a being-intention, an intention 
of being which is personal, not however in the sense of a free 
unfolding of infinite singularities, but of a realisation of the right in 
infinite personal shapes (142-143).
As creatures, we are created, intended for a task peculiar to each of us, and 
that task is to become who we are created to be. To repeat a statem ent quoted 
in the Introduction to this paper, according to Buber, "Every m an's foremost 
task is the actualization of his unique, unprecedented and never-recurring 
potentialities, and not the repitition of something that another, and  be it even 
the greatest, has already achieved" (Hasidism and M odern M an 140). Our 
true vocation, the task we have been sent forth to accomplish, is to become 
ever more fully the unique creatures we are called upon to be. This is the 
m eaning of the Hasidic saying attributed to Rabbi Zusya of H anipol, which 
Buber recounts in his Tales of the Hasidim: Early M asters as follows: "Before 
his death, Rabbi Zusya said, 'In the coming world, they will not ask me: Why 
w ere you not Moses? They will ask me: Why were you not Zusya?'" (251).
For both Buber and the Hasid, each one of us is called to fulfill our particular 
task - a task which no one else can perform and whose responsibility we 
cannot abrogate. Only we - each one of us - can become m ore truly ourselves.
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H owever, this does not mean that our essential task is to achieve 
individual perfection or to attain some pre-ordained and fixed vision of an 
ideal or potential self; our uniquely personal vocation is not a m atter of self- 
realization, nor is it a terminus or goal tow ard which we strive. As creatures 
w ho exist as co-participants in an ongoing process of creation, we can only 
become who we are called to be (and receive that m easure of authenticity in 
our lives) through m eaningful and decisive relations w ith our fellow 
creatures. According to Bugbee, "We are such as we are in answ ering these 
beings in their address to us - in that meaning they come to hold in our 
receiving them, worked out answeringly. ... [0]ne’s mode of being only 
receives definition in and through the manifold of relations and 
undertakings through which one participates in the world" ("Loneliness, 
Solitude" 4 & 5). We are who we are in and through our various relations 
w ith our fellow beings. If we are to become more authentically w ho we are 
called to be, then our meetings with our fellow beings m ust carry the weight 
of authenticity. Therefore, entering dialogical relations with our fellows goes 
hand  in hand  w ith fulfilling our essential task. For, as Maurice Friedm an 
explains, "If m an becomes authentic, if the person becomes w hat only he can 
and should become, it is through responding with his whole being to the 
address of the unique situation which confronts him, through becom ing 
whole and finding his true personal direction" ("Bases" 179). O ur personal 
vocation calls to us time and time again in the m ultitude of relational events 
that m ake up our lives. As we engage ourselves in dialogue, we heed the call 
and answ er for the potential m eaning in our lives, and, in doing so, our lives 
are directed along a path - the pathw ay of dialogue - ever open and calling us
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onw ard to renewed attentiveness and responsibility. And, it is along the way, 
w hich we m ust continually work out and discover for ourselves w ith each 
step, that our lives find a degree of integrity and our actions m anifest an 
enduring  constancy and commitment. According to Buber,
Only on the path of true intercourse w ith the things and beings does 
m an attain to true life ... [MJore than ever, existence in reality is 
recognizable as an unbroken chain of meetings, each of which 
dem ands the person for w hat can be fulfilled by him, just by him  and 
just in this hour. In opposition to the illusion of ostensibly-attained 
perfection, as it prevailed in the confusion of the false Messianic, here 
stands the life of the everyday, which has found its fulfillm ent as the 
true miracle (Origin and M eaning 86).
In w orking out our way along this path, the unique and personal task of our 
existence calls to us, and, in responding truly, we find that m easure of 
m eaning and fulfillment accessible to us - here and now, m iraculously.
However, just as the struggle to fulfill our essential task - our vocation 
- is not a m atter of self-realization, neither is the path  along which we 
incarnate and enact our personal direction one of blind, indeterm inable fate. 
For although we are called unto and along our way, we alone m ust practice 
responsibility for the m anner of our response in each new m om ent of 
m eeting and for the meaning and direction of our lives. Only as we take this 
responsibility (often heavy and burdensom e with ever new  claims, dem ands, 
choices) upon ourselves, can we find genuine, liberating freedom  in our 
lives.
In responding decisively to the dem ands of the m oment, we are free to fulfill 
our unique, creaturely task. Thus, according to Bugbee, our existence comes 
to us not as inscrutable fate but as a destiny we are free to fulfill - or refuse. In
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Inw ard  M orning he distinguishes between fate and destiny in the following 
way:
Care m ust be exercised in working out the idea of having a destiny to 
fulfill so as to extricate it, for one thing, from the idea of having a fate, 
of being fated. It seems to me that I am invited by the idea of fate to 
think from the standpoint of a certain inner paralysis often reflected in 
speaking of man's helplessness in the hands of fate. O n the other hand 
the idea of having a destiny to fulfill seems to invite me to think from 
the standpoint of responsibility, as one responsive to a call: a call 
clarifying itself in its constancy as we respond with relevance in 
m ultiform  situations engendering it: a call im parting to sustained 
courses of action a vocational significance which is at the heart of not 
acting in vain.
The idea of fate not only suggests that we act in vain; it tends to 
controvert the very idea of our acting. The idea of a destiny to be 
fulfilled suggests that we are followed wherever we go, w hatever we 
do, by a basic significance in terms of which our lives m ust be 
construed, and that we act in vain only as we fail to respond 
consonantly w ith the significance aligning the otherwise contingent 
m om ents of our lives (144-145).
As opposed to doom ing us to a fate toward which we m ust passively resign 
ourselves, the call of our existence offers us a destiny we are free to fulfill 
insofar as we practice genuine responsibility for it in the course of our being- 
w ith-others. In turn, as we struggle to fulfill this vocation, our lives are 
inform ed by a sense of direction and wholeness out of which we are 
em pow ered to respond to the claims of each new situation w ith purpose and 
integrity. We are free to act, w ithin the limitations - the liberating lim itations 
- of the situation in which we find ourselves, in a meaningful and ethical 
m an n e r.
This awareness of ourselves as creatures w ith a unique and particular 
task - a destiny to fulfill - carries w ith it a powerful imperative force. The
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creatures we are created to become are also, then, the creatures we ought to 
become. For Buber, this ever-growing, ever-changing awareness of w ho we 
ought to be, as well as the recognition of the gap between who w e are and 
w ho we ought to be, are central to his understanding of the role of conscience 
in ethical decision-making and action. In his essay "Religion and Ethics" 
Buber describes what he means by conscience as follows:
It is the individual's awareness of what he is "in truth," of w hat in his 
unique and non-repea table created existence he is intended to be. From 
this awareness, when it is fully present, the comparison betw een what 
one actually is and w hat one is intended to be can emerge. W hat is 
found is m easured against the image, no so-called ideal image, nor 
anything imagined by man, but an image arising out of that m ystery of 
being itself that we call the person (Eclipse of God 95-96).
As I have already said, in each moment we are called upon not only by the 
other being whom  we meet but also by the very meaning of our created being 
- our creaturely task. H ow we respond to the moment is determ ined by the 
voice of the other as it speaks to us as well as by our understanding of who we 
are called to be and how we are to fulfill that destiny as it comes to us in this 
particular relational event. That is, we m ust take stock of ourselves, deciding 
and acting out of the depths of who we are and who we are called to be; we 
m ust answ er for ourselves and for the direction of our lives in the present 
m om ent of decision. Thus, our ethical responsibility involves not only 
responding to the call of the other but also from the depths of our conscience - 
our reflective recognition of our being as called upon to perform  a particular 
task that has been entrusted to us. This is the reflective and inescapably 
personal element of all truly ethical decision-making and action. According 
to Friedm an,
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It is only when I ask, "What ought I do in this situation?" - not w hat 
ought one, but what ought I do? - that I begin to understand  the 
problem  of moral action from within. ... [T]he only real perspective for 
m oral judgm ent and decision [is] the ground on which I stand and 
from which I respond to the claim of the situation upon me 
(Touchstones 281).
The "ground" upon and from which we move and act is alw ays a deeply 
personal one, and thus, our ethical responsibility is, likewise, a deeply 
personal (but, at the same time, neither individualistic nor relativistic) affair. 
In the m om ent of ethical decision, we find ourselves placed in a situation 
that requires an answer from us. The beings whom  we encounter and our 
aw areness of our creaturely vocation call forth our response, and  no one else - 
not God, not the prophets, not even the moral theorists - can respond for us. 
In turn, if our response is to be genuinely ethical, it m ust em body not only 
the respect and compassion engendered in the m eeting w ith the other who is 
at the same time our kin, but it m ust also be brought forth out of our 
recognition of ourselves as called upon to fulfill our intended task, which 
comes to us ever anew in an ongoing chain of relational events and which 
we m ust w ork out and struggle to fulfill through engaged participation in 
dialogue w ith our fellow beings. As we ever more clearly come to realize the 
task preferred us, our lives take on the character of a way, and we come to 
know  integrity and vocational unity as we act in consonance w ith the 
direction and m eaning our lives find along that path.
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Up to this point, I have portrayed our ethical responsibility in term s of 
our responsiveness to the call of our fellow creatures as well as our 
responsiveness to the call of our unique, creaturely vocation. Yet, according 
to Buber, Friedm an and others, there is yet a third call to which we m ust 
respond: the call of the Creator, who not only sends us forth to fulfill our 
particular task but who also meets us and speaks to us in and through each 
encounter w ith the other finite creatures whom  we m eet in dialogue. As 
such, our ethical responsibility involves our decisive and com m itted 
response to the call of this sponsoring and abiding Presence, as it reveals itself 
to us - and we discover it - in our lives.
W hat follows in this section, then, m ight be described as the explicitly 
religious element of our ethical responsibility. But is this really necessary? Is 
the overtly religious an indispensable part of the ethical orientation in 
question? Clearly, for Martin Buber, the answer is an em phatic yes.4 In his 
essay entitled "The Bases of Buber’s Ethics," Maurice Friedm an - the foremost 
English-speaking translator and student of Buber's works - asks this same 
question and answers it as follows:
Can we say, then, that it is possible to carve out of Buber's philosophy 
an autonom ous ethics, free from a necessary connection w ith religion? 
Yes and no. Yes, if we mean by religion a separate sphere of special, 
specifically religious revelation and command; no, if we understand 
G od’s "Where art thou, Adam?" to be addressed to every m an at every 
hour through each everyday event that confronts him , for then 
"religion" is just m an's listening and responding to this address (188- 
189).5
N ot surprisingly, the religious life, for Buber, is prim arily a m atter of 
dialogue. The genuine, I-Thou dialogue w ith our fellow creature is, at the
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sam e time, the religious dialogue w ith God, the eternal Thou. A nd as we 
hear the address of the eternal Thou in the dialogical moment, we, in turn, 
respond w ith our actions and non-actions. Buber, himself, describes the 
essentially dialogical character of "religion" in the following way:
I know  no fulness but each mortal hour's fulness of claim and 
responsibility. Though far from being equal to it, yet I know  that in the 
claim I am claimed and may respond in responsibility, and know who 
speaks and dem ands a response.
I do not know m uch more. If that is religion then it is just everything, 
simply all that is lived in the possibility of dialogue (Between 14).
Here, Buber's 'definition' of religion comes very close to his understanding of 
ethics in the m ode of dialogue: claim and response. Conversely, elsewhere 
Buber defines "the ethical" in decidely religious language: "But the ethical in 
its plain truth m eans to help God by loving his creation in his creatures, by 
loving it towards him" (Between 57). For Buber, at a certain level - the level 
of dialogue - there is very little difference between the truly religious and the 
truly ethical; together, they weave a seamless fabric of meaning - and 
m eaningful action - in the life of dialogue.
As such, it is impossible to have one w ithout the other. If the religious 
is necessary for the ethical [And for Buber, there is no question about this. In 
"Religion and Ethics" he writes, "But always it is the religious which bestows, 
the ethical which receives" (Eclipse of God 98).], then religion w ithout ethical 
responsibility is similarly bankrupt. The meeting w ith God, the eternal Thou, 
carries w ith it an imperative force that turns us tow ard and renews our active 
comm itm ent to our fellow beings. God calls to us in and through our 
relations with our fellow creatures, and our response to the call of the Creator
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and the creature is inseparable. We cannot know God apart from  God's 
creation (and apart from or outside of our own createdness), and as we treat 
our fellow creatures, so, too, we treat their (our) Creator. In I and Thou Buber 
w rites,
Sea and rivers - who would make bold to.separate here and define 
limits? There is only the one flood from I to You, ever m ore infinite, 
the one boundless flood of actual life. One cannot divide one's life 
betw een an actual relationship to God and an inactual I-It relationship 
to the w orld - praying to God in truth and utilizing the world.
W hoever knows the world as something to be utilized knows God the 
same way (155-156).
A nd, again in a later essay entitled "Love of God and Love of Neighbor," he 
writes,
[A] direct relation to God that includes no direct relation to the world 
is, if not deception, self-deception; if you turn away from  the world in 
order to turn to God, you have not turned tow ard the reality of God but 
only tow ard your concept of God; the isolated religious is also in reality 
the not religious (Hasidism  and M odern M an 235).
For Buber, religiousness and ethics cannot be separated because both are 
grounded in the dialogical, I-Thou encounter, where we cannot - and need 
not - distinguish between the address of the present other and the divine 
Presence. In the m om ent of dialogue both speak to us and call us forth to 
actualize the sacram ental m eaning of the encounter in our com m itted 
response. Thus, Buber can claim that, "The genuine m oral act is done to 
God" (Hasidism  and M odern Man 241).
That we can - and do - encounter God, the eternal Thou, at all is 
possible because God addresses us in all the various, creaturely situations of
82
our everyday lives. According to Buber, "The first Biblical axiom is: 'M an is 
addressed by God in his life'" (On Tudaism 218). This is the fundam ental 
starting point for Buber's understanding of religious life, and specifically 
Jewish religiousness, as an ongoing dialogue between God and hum anity - a 
dialogue between heaven and earth. It is the awareness that w ithin the 
address of our fellow beings and within our never-ending struggle to find 
direction and integrity in our finite existence, som ething of the ineffable and 
transcendent mystery speaks to us and endows our lives and actions w ith that 
degree of m eaning, resolve and finality available to us. Furtherm ore, this call 
comes to us not only as it spoke to Moses in the burning bush or atop Mount 
Sinai but in the seemingly inconsequential and ordinary occurrences of our 
lives, and it is here - and now - that it m ust ever be re-discovered and heard 
anew. Buber likens this awareness of ourselves as 'divinely' called upon to 
the often m isunderstood biblical notion of the "fear of God."
All religious reality begins with what Biblical religion calls the "fear of 
God." It comes when our existence between birth and  death  becomes 
incom prehensible and uncanny, when all security is shattered through 
the mystery. This is not the relative m ystery of that which is 
inaccessible only to the present state of hum an knowledge and is hence 
in principle discoverable. It is the essential m ystery, the 
inscrutableness of which belongs to its very nature; it is unknowable. 
Through this dark gate (which is only a gate and not, as some 
theologians believe, a dwelling) the believing m an steps forth into the 
everyday which is henceforth hallowed as the place in which he has to 
live with the mystery. He steps forth directed and assigned to the 
concrete, contextual situations of his existence. That he henceforth 
accepts the situation as given him by the Giver is w hat Biblical religion 
calls the "fear of God" (Eclipse of God 36).6
The m ystery of the existence given us as created beings and the Present 
m ystery that beckons to us in and through the particular events of that very
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existence speak together, for the theistically religious person, as the call of the 
sponsoring and enduring Creator - a call which is ever open to us as 
participants in the ongoing event of creation.
A nd if it is through creation that the Creator God speaks to us, then it is 
through our engagement in authentic dialogue w ith creatures that we are 
able to hear this divine address and respond to it. That is, our m eeting with 
God, the eternal Thou, occurs within and through our I-Thou m eetings w ith 
our finite, fellow creatures.7 As Buber explains, "Meet the w orld w ith the 
fullness of your being and you shall meet Him" (On Tudaism 213); "[I]f you 
hallow  this life you meet the living God" (I and Thou. Smith trans. 79).8 
Thus, the necessary condition for m eeting God and receiving G od's divine 
address, is genuine dialogical participation in the relational events of our 
daily lives.
Furtherm ore, any relational event, no m atter how  seem ingly trivial or 
insignificant, may be the bearer of divine Presence - and speech - in so far as it 
is received in dialogue. According to Robert Wood, "It is in the depths of the 
Between, grounded upon spirit, that the opening to the eternal Thou occurs" 
(72). A nd the between, as discussed in the previous chapter, is not lim ited to 
any fixed place or genus of relata; it is constituted in the relation of an I and a 
Thou - any Thou.
In every sphere, in every relational act, through everything that 
becomes present to us, we gaze toward the train of the eternal You; in 
each we perceive a breath of it; in every You we address the eternal 
You, in every sphere according to its manner. All spheres are included 
in it, while it is included in none.
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Through all of them shines the one presence (I and Thou 150).
As we open ourselves to the address of our fellow creatures, we receive, at the 
sam e time, the address of God; in meeting other finite beings as Thou, we 
m eet the eternal Thou. Because of this, all the relational events of our lives 
have the potential to become revelation and sacram ent insofar as they take 
on the character of dialogue.
But just as we may encounter the Divine Presence and receive the 
divine address in and through each and every dialogical m eeting with our 
fellow creatures, so, too, there is one 'place' where God can never be 
encountered: the I-It relation. According to Wood, "The only w orld where 
God cannot be met is the world of It" (95-96). Here we are at the heart of 
Buber's notion of God as the eternal Thou. In contrast to the twofold nature 
of our relations with other finite beings (I-Thou and I-It), we can only meet 
and know  God in one way, as a Thou. In I and Thou Buber writes,
By its very nature the eternal You cannot become an It; because by its 
very nature it cannot be placed within m easure and limit, not even 
w ithin the m easure of the im m easurable and the lim it of the 
unlim ited; because by its very nature it cannot be grasped as a sum  of 
qualities, not even as an infinite sum  of qualities that have been raised 
to transcendence; because it is not to be found either in or outside the 
world; because it cannot be experienced; because it cannot be thought; 
because we transgress against it, against that which has being, if we say: 
"I believe that he is" - even "he" is still a m etaphor, while "you" is not. 
A nd yet we reduce the eternal You ever again to an It, to something, 
turning God into a thing, in accordance with our nature (160-161).
Elsewhere, Buber simply says, "[I]t is also only the relation I-Thou in which 
we can meet God at all, because of Him, in absolute contrast to all existing
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beings, no objective aspects can be obtained" (Eclipse of God 128). For Buber, 
w e cannot experience God as an It, and we cannot know  anything about God. 
And yet, God can be met as Thou, as a real and abiding presence in dialogue.
Therefore, it is through our participation in dialogue that the Divine 
Presence addresses us and reveals itself to us. For Buber, the genuine I-Thou 
relation is nothing less than the bearer of divine revelation, and  w hat God 
reveals to us in and through the dialogical event is not an objective content 
bu t a presence. As Emil Fackenheim explains, "[T]he core of the revelation is 
not the comm unication of content but the event of God's presence" (290). 
A nd Friedm an echoes this idea when he writes, "Revelation is thus m an's 
encounter w ith God's presence rather than inform ation about His essence" 
(Life of Dialogue 246). Divine revelation does not disclose anything about 
God; through it, we learn nothing about the divine essence, nature, attributes 
or properties. Instead, w hat God reveals to us is God's enduring presence as 
the eternal Thou - our ever-present partner in dialogue. Indeed, for Buber, 
this is the m eaning of God's message to Moses in Exodus 3:14, which Buber 
interprets as follows:
This is the eternal revelation which is present in the here and  now. ... 
The w ord of revelation is: I am there as whoever I am there. That 
which reveals is that which reveals. That which has being is there, 
nothing more. The eternal source of strength flows, the eternal touch 
is waiting, the eternal voice sounds, nothing more (I and Thou 160).9
For Buber, the significance of the "word of revelation" is not only that God is 
but that this God is also present among us and prom ises to be present in the 
future. Expanding upon Buber's interpretation of God's w ords to Moses from
8 6
the burning  bush, W alter Kaufmann writes, "The Tetragram m aton, w ith the 
initial J or Y which indicates the third person, w ould then mean: HE IS 
PRESENT" (381). In addition, this promise of abiding presence is not lim ited 
to God's encounter w ith Moses at the burning bush or w ith the children of 
Israel at M ount Sinai; according to Friedman, "YHVH is He who is present in 
every now  and in every here" (Life of Dialogue 246). Each event in our lives 
holds the possibility of divine revelation; through each (no m atter how  
seem ingly trivial or 'profane'), we m ay receive the gracious self-disclosure of 
the Divine Presence. For, as Buber explains, "The powerful revelations 
invoked by the religions are essentially the same as the quiet one that occurs 
every where and at all times" (I and Thou 165-166).
H ow ever, this revelation of Divine Presence, which is potentially open 
to us w ithin  each and every m om ent of our lives, is not som ething timeless, 
changeless or monolithic. God's revelation of God's enduring  presence 
m anifests itself w ithin and through the particularity of each unique situation. 
In other words, God’s revelation is not one of generic presence; God reveals 
God's self as the Present One - whose presentness is inextricably bound up  
w ith the irreducible particularity of the dialogical event through which it is 
revealed. According to Fackenheim,
The God of dialogue, like any Thou in any dialogue, speaks to a unique 
partner in a unique situation, disclosing Himself according to the 
unique exigencies of each situation. ...[God] can only be encountered in 
each here and now, as He m ay show Himself in each here and now 
(285).
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Thus, God reveals God's enduring, eternal presence ever anew and afresh in 
the m ultiplicity of each new moment of revelation; God 'speaks' this abiding 
presence in and through the unique and non-repea table w ords of the 
m anifold situations of our lives.
Furtherm ore, as God becomes present to us as the eternal Thou in and 
through our I-Thou encounters, these relations take on the character of a 
sacram ent. Through the revelation and actualization of the Divine Presence 
in dialogue, the world becomes a holy place. Thus, each and every relational 
event in our lives is potentially not only the bearer of divine revelation; it 
can also become sacram ent insofar as it is raised to the level of dialogue. For 
Buber, this pansacram entalism  lies at the heart of the Hasidic notion of 
"hallowing the everyday." In the story cited in the Introduction to this paper, 
Rabbi M enahem  M endel of Kotzk teaches his learned audience that although 
the entire w orld is full of God's glory, God is truly present am ong us only 
insofar as we "let God in" and make a dwelling-place for God in our lives.
For Buber and the Hasid, there is no time or place w here God cannot be found 
because the whole world exists in God.10 And yet, God is truly present with 
us only as we m aintain "holy intercourse" with that part of the w orld w ith 
which we have to do. Or, to put it another way, God, the eternal Thou, 
becomes truly present among us - between us - in and through our 
participation in I-Thou dialogue. According to Friedman,
It is because God dwells in the world that the world can be turned  into 
a sacrament. But this does not m ean that the world is objectively 
already a sacrament. It is only capable of becoming one through the 
redeem ing contact with the individual. ... Sacramental existence, like
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dialogical existence in general, involves a m eeting w ith the other in 
which the eternal Thou manifests itself (Life of Dialoeue 140).
Therefore, although our world is not holy in any static, essential sense, it can 
become hallow ed through the sacrament of dialogue, in and through  which 
God's presence is m ade actual and manifest among us. And, as m entioned 
earlier, there is no time or place, no relational event, that cannot become the 
sacram ental 'host'; every aspect of our lives can become hallowed to the 
degree we take up with our fellow creatures in the spirit of dialogue.
Speaking, again, of the Hasidic way, Buber writes,
One m ay and should live genuinely w ith all, but one should live w ith 
it in consecration, one should hallow all that one does in his natural 
life. No renunciation is comm anded. One eats in consecration, one 
savors one's taste of food in consecration, and the table becomes an 
altar. One works in consecration and lifts the sparks that are hidden in 
all tools. One walks over the fields in consecration, and the silent 
songs of all creatures, those they speak to God, enter into the song of 
one's own soul. One drinks to one's companions in consecration, each 
to the other, and it is as if one studied together with them in the Torah. 
One dances in consecration, and a splendor radiates over the 
com m unity. A m an is united w ith his wife in consecration, and the 
Shekina [the indwelling Divine Presence or Glory] rests over them  
(Origin and M eaning 55-56).
And, coming from quite a different perspective, H enry Bugbee echoes m any 
of the same ideas when he writes,
W hat is there that is native and natural in life that is not open to a 
hallowing? that, indeed, m ay not call for it? By virtue of w hat are 
things m ade holy and how is it that we m ay come to participate and 
partake in this? Are we the initiators? No, surely not. For our part in 
it is enacted at its inception as an act of acknowledgm ent and of 
sponsored recognition and commitment occurrent w ithin the w ay in 
which the natural is given us and received, brought to cum ulative 
m aturity. One knows full well, furtherm ore, that there is nothing 
autom atic or matter-of-course about it. For the hallowing of the
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natural occurs only in and through our being radically recalled out of 
im m ersion in thoughtless ways, inadvertent cheapening of life, and 
the oppressive incubus of things-taken-for-granted and threatening to 
go stale ("Loneliness, Solitude" 9-10).
For Bugbee, as well as Buber and the Hasidim, there is nothing in our lives 
that cannot be m ade holy; everything is potential sacrament. A nd, as Bugbee 
carefully points out, although we are not solely (or even prim arily) 
responsible for the m anifestation of the Divine Presence in our world, our 
genuine presence and engaged participation in dialogical existence is surely a 
necessary condition for the actualization of the sacram ental character of each 
encoun ter.11 For, as quoted earlier, "He who is not present perceives no 
Presence" (Buber, Eclipse of God 126). If the world is to become sacram ent for 
us, we m ust rem ain open and available to the others whom  we m eet and be 
responsive to the divine address present in the situations given us; if God, 
the Creator and eternal Thou, is to dwell among us, we m ust "let God in" by 
m aintaining holy intercourse with our fellow creatures in the sacram ent of I- 
Thou dialogue.
Therefore, we can speak of the dialogical encounter in and through 
which the eternal Thou is revealed and m ade manifest am ong us as both 
revelatory and sacramental. And both revelation and sacrament, as they are 
traditionally understood, imply a commission. That is, they are not term inal 
events bu t rather sponsoring, initiating ones. We are sent forth from our 
m eeting w ith the eternal Thou to em body the tru th  and m eaning of that 
encounter in our daily lives. According to Buber, "The encounter w ith God 
does not come to man in order that he may henceforth attend to God bu t in
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order that he may prove its meaning in action in the world. All revelation is 
a calling and a mission" (I and Thou 164). As God addresses us in  the 
sacram ent of dialogue we are called forth to actualize the divine w ord  in our 
lives w ith our fellow creatures. As Robert Wood explains, ”[T]here is a 
rhythm  here; meeting and mission, sum m ons and sending, alternate" (107).
Here, we come to the decidedly ethical nature of the divine-hum an 
dialogue. As stated earlier, God addresses us in and through the m ultitude of 
events and situations that we face in our daily lives. These events, perceived 
in their fullness and depth, have a divine word to speak to us. Furthermore, 
this divine speech makes dem ands upon us, claiming us w ith its powerful 
im perative force. In his "Afterword" to the second edition of I and Thou 
Buber writes,
God's address to m an penetrates the events in all our lives and 
all the events in the w orld around us, everything biographical 
and everything historical, and turns it into instruction, into 
dem ands for you and me. Event upon event, situation upon 
situation is enabled and empowered by this personal language to 
call upon the hum an person to endure and decide. Often we 
think that there is nothing to be heard as if we had not long ago 
plugged wax into our own ears" (182).
In so far as we rem ain open to and receive the address of the eternal Thou as 
it speaks to us in our everyday lives, we find ourselves instructed and 
claim ed by a divine command - a unique and personal "Thou shalt."
But how is this possible? Earlier I suggested that, for Buber, the core of 
divine revelation was not any particular content but rather the m anifestation 
of Divine Presence. Doesn't the idea of a divine im perative present in the
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encounter w ith the eternal Thou imply a content of some sort? According to 
Buber, it does not, although he does elaborate on the nature of the "presence" 
received in the meeting w ith the eternal Thou.(12) In Part III of I and Thou 
he explains,
Man receives, and w hat he receives is not a "content" but a presence, a 
presence as strength. This presence and strength includes three 
elements that are not separate but may nevertheless be contem plated as 
three. First, the whole abundance of reciprocity, of being adm itted, of 
being associated while one is altogether unable to indicate w hat that is 
like w ith which one is associated, nor does association m ake life any 
easier for us - it makes life heavier but heavy w ith m eaning. A nd this 
is second: the inexpressible confirmation of meaning. It is guaranteed. 
Nothing, nothing can henceforth be m eaningless. ... You do not know 
how to point to or define the meaning, you lack any form ula or image 
for it, and yet it is more certain for you than the sensations of your 
senses. W hat w ould it intend with us, what does it desire from us, 
being revealed and surreptitious? It does not w ish to be interpreted by 
us - for that we lack the ability - only to be done by us. This comes 
third: it is not the meaning of "another life" but that of this our life, 
not that of a "beyond" but of this our world, and it w ants to be 
dem onstrated by us in this life and this world. The m eaning can be 
received but not experienced; it cannot be experienced, but it can be 
done; and this is what it intends with us. The guarantee does not wish 
to rem ain shut up within me, it wants to be born in the w orld by me. 
But even as the m eaning itself cannot be transform ed or expressed as a 
universally valid and generally acceptable piece of knowledge, putting 
it to the proof in action cannot be handed on as a valid ought; it is not 
prescribed ... The meaning we receive can be pu t to the proof in action 
only by each person in the uniqueness of his being and in the 
uniqueness of his life. No prescription can lead us to the encounter, 
and none leads from it. Only the acceptance of the presence is required 
to come to it or, in a new sense, to go from it. As we have nothing but 
a You on our lips when we enter the encounter, it is w ith this on our 
lips that we are released from it into the world. That before which we 
live, that in which we live, that out of which and into which we live, 
the m ystery - has rem ained w hat it was. It has become present for us, 
and through its presence it has m ade itself known to us as salvation; 
we have "known" it, but we have no knowledge of it that m ight 
dim inish or extenuate the mysteriousness. We have come close to 
God, but no closer to an unriddling, unveiling of being. We have felt
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salvation but no "solution." We cannot go to others w ith w hat we 
have received, saying: This is what needs to be known, this is w hat 
needs to be done. -We can only go and put to the proof in action. And 
even this is not w hat we "ought to" do: rather we can - we cannot do 
otherwise (158-160).
I have indulged in this extremely long quote not only because it shows Buber 
at his m ost inspired but because it is so central to Buber's understanding of 
revelation, ethical action and the tenuous relation between the two. In the 
encounter w ith the eternal Thou we are graced by the Divine Presence, which 
bestow s upon us the "abundance of reciprocity," the "confirmation of 
m eaning" and the charge to incarnate this reciprocity and m eaning in our 
actions. Together, these three elements of the revelation of Divine Presence 
m ay inspirit our actions with the direction, integrity and certainty inherent 
in truly necessary, ethical action: we find ourselves called upon, directed to 
act as we must. And yet, the specific forms such actions will em body are 
w edded  so intimately to the situations in which we find ourselves addressed, 
and  so irreducibly concrete, that we cannot possibly say in advance, or in 
general, w hat we 'ought' to do in such and such a set of circumstances.
A nd it is here, at the point of deciding and acting, that we arrive at the 
'hum an side' of the dialogue between God and hum anity. For as God reveals 
- 'speaks' - God's presence in the everyday situations of our lives, it is 
th rough our various actions and non-actions that we answer this address. 
A nd although the divine address may carry with it a powerful and 
compelling imperative, we remain free to hear and respond in an ethical 
m anner. That is, although we respond to the em powering and directing 
address of the eternal Thou, we alone remain responsible for our actions,
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again and again confronted w ith new  and unforeseeable situations of decision 
and choice. Our personal responsibility to respond decisively and ethically to 
the call of the Divine Presence cannot be abrogated. As Buber explains,
A nd he, the Single One[the person of dialogue], m ust answer, by w hat 
he does and does not do, he m ust accept and answer for the hour, the 
hour of the world, of all the world, as that which is given to him , 
entrusted to him. Reduction is forbidden; you are not at liberty to 
select w hat suits you, the whole cruel hour is at stake, the whole claims 
you, and you m ust answer - Him (Between 66).
In our ongoing participation in creation, we are constantly faced w ith ever 
new  situations of choice to which we m ust venture to respond. In so far as 
we m eet these situations in a spirit of dialogue, in so far as these situations 
become sacram ent and revelation for us, we m ay receive the direction and 
'inspiration' present in the divine address. And yet, we are not relieved of 
deciding and choosing again and again in favor of responsible, right action. 
God com m ands, but we practice responsibility for hearing and responding in 
a decisive, ethical manner.
This, then, is the "rhythm" at the heart of divine-hum an dialogue: 
God meets us - calls us and claims us - in the everyday situations of our 
existence, and we respond through our decisions and actions. Buber 
sum m arizes this dynam ic in the following way:
In the infinite language of events and situations, eternally changing, 
b u t plain to the truly attentive, transcendence speaks to our hearts at 
the essential moments of personal life. And there is a language in 
w hich we can answer it; it is the language of our actions and attitudes, 
our reactions and our abstentions. The totality of these responses is 
w hat we m ay call our responsibility in the proper sense of the w ord 
(On Tudaism 215-216).
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Again, for Buber, at the most fundam ental level, ethical responsibility, and 
thus ethical action, involves hearing the address of our fellow creatures, the 
address of our creaturely task, and the address of the Creator who speaks to us 
through creation, and responding w ith compassion and respect, integrity and 
direction.
For some readers, linking ethical responsibility w ith a personally 
apprehended divine address will appear as nothing m ore than a grasping at 
straw s, a psychotic delusion, or worse, a specious apology for fanaticism. 
W hose voice are we hearing - God’s? the devil's? or some psychological or 
societal demon's? Even Buber w arns that Moloch m ay im itate the voice of 
God (Eclipse of God 118). How can we be sure that our actions - let alone the 
actions of others - are grounded in and embody the spirit of divine address? 
For Buber, of course, we cannot be sure in any arguable way; we cannot 
empirically and objectively 'prove' the rightness of our actions or justify 
them. A nd although we may commit ourselves w ith w holeheartedness and 
certainty to a particular course of action, nothing can rem ove the degree of 
insecurity and risk that accompanies our ethical responsibility. However, in 
his essay "On the Suspension of the Ethical," in which he takes up  w ith 
K ierkegaard's famous treatm ent of the story of Abraham  and Isaac, Buber 
offers the following practical advice: "In contrast to this, God Him self 
dem ands of this as of every m an (not Abraham, His chosen one, but of you 
and me) nothing more than justice and love, and that he 'walk hum bly' with 
H im , w ith God (Micah 6:8) - in other words, not much more than the 
fundam ental ethical" (Eclipse of God 118). Buber never suggests that we
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disregard such ethical injunctions as the one given in Micah or, say, the Ten 
Com m andm ents (as a devout Jew and lifelong student of the Torah, it w ould 
be very strange if he did). And yet, he insists that such maxims are no t 
prescriptions for ethical action; they serve as guidelines and signposts. They 
cannot substitute for our engaged participation in, and existentially grounded 
response to, the situations in which we find ourselves called upon.
According to Buber and Friedman, such ethical form ulations can only 
become truly personal and meaningful for us in so far as we "rehear" them  
again and again in each new situation of choice. As Friedman explains,
The God who speaks to the people, correspondingly, is not a cosmic 
God who guarantees a universal moral order, bu t the God of the Ten 
C om m andm ents whose "Thou shalt" is apprehended by the 
individual person and by the group only in the unique, concrete 
situation - the ever renewed dem and of the present. It is only m odern 
m an who has converted these comm ands into the im personal "one 
must" of the social norm. The "ought" implicit in the com m and can 
be derived only from the responsibility of the person to w hat claims 
him  in the particular situation in which he finds himself. One does 
not apply the Ten Com m andm ents to the situation: one rehears 
them  as utterly unique, present commands (Touchstones 137).
For both Buber and Friedman, ethical responsibility and action can never be 
reduced to the rote application of norms and maxims. The im perative force 
behind such moral guidelines can only be realized as we open ourselves to, 
and place ourselves at the disposal of, the address of the situation in which 
we find ourselves and respond to the claims and exigencies present w ithin 
that threefold address.
But, by now, perhaps, I’ve said too much - and, undoubtedly, for some 
of m y readers, too little. My preceding analysis of the threefold claim present
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in the I-Thou dialogue shows the strain of dissection and burdens these holy 
relations w ith almost insupportable conceptual baggage. Clearly, our 
involvem ent in these ephem eral and evanescent I-Thou encounters does not 
m atter-of-factly call up the range of thoughts and intim ations it has taken me 
the past twenty-five or so pages to outline. I adm it that such abstract 
theorizing and conjecture are as likely to miss the point as they are to connect. 
A nd yet, it seems to me that something of each of these three elem ents is 
present in the depths of our dialogical encounters with our fellow beings. In 
the clarity and immediacy of these meetings the m eaning, w onder and non­
instrum ental value of these distinctly and independently other beings elicit 
our respect, while, at the same time, our intimate being-together evokes a 
sense of compassion and even solidarity. And such respect and fellow- 
feeling, likewise, seem inseparable from self-respect and personal integrity.
For it is in our dialogues w ith our fellow creatures, as well as in our respectful 
and compassionate responses to them, that we come closest to finding 
personal fulfillment and an intim ation of our potential; that is, we glimpse 
w hat is best and m ost profoundly worthwhile in ourselves as we m eet others 
honestly and openly and respond decisively and w hole-heartedly from the 
very depths of our person. Furthermore, over time our engaged participation 
in such encounters engenders within us a sense of coherence and  vocational 
integrity. Finally, such meetings are charged w ith an overw helm ing sense of 
ultim ate significance and sacredness; a divine presence rests over them. It 
seems that a meaning and a purpose inform these dialogical encounters that 
are sponsored in neither the 'I' nor the finite 'Thou' w hom  it meets; they are 
pervaded by the m ystery of Something Other, More and Less, and this
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m eaning and m ystery cry out to be incarnated in the world of action. Viewed 
as a whole, then, it seems that our engaged participation in I-Thou 
encounters w ith our fellow creatures - and in the presence of the eternal 
Thou - does, indeed, offer us a glimpse of the m eaning and tru th  available to 
us and em pow er us to act in a meaningful and truthful - an ethical - way.
Therefore, we can say that our capacity for truly ethical action is 
g rounded in our finding bedrock meaning in and through the situations in 
which we are placed. Or, to paraphrase Henry Bugbee, it is only as we find 
"finality" in the everyday events of our existence that our decisions and 
actions are infused with the spirit of necessity and certainty and we come to 
know  w hat is required of us. In his Preface to Inw ard M orning, Bugbee 
w rites,
W hat I have called finality proves to be the unifying theme of the 
work. By finality I intend the meaning of reality as realized in true 
decision. The vein in which it comes to us is the vein of w onder, of 
faith, of certainty. It is the ground of ultim ate hum an concern w ith 
which the will is informed (10).
And furtherm ore, the appreciation of finality comes to us as we encounter 
our fellow creatures in their m eaning and depth  - as "presences," to use 
Gabriel Marcel's term. Again, from Inward M orning. Bugbee explains,
Only reality is given. But its givenness is consum m ated in the 
reception of things as presences - as we find finality in them. There is 
certainty in experience in which reality is given; bu t this does not seem 
to be a certainty of knowledge about anything we represent to ourselves 
and describe. ...
Givenness is decisive experience of reality, enabling decisiveness in 
our thinking and in such action as is really decisive. ...
I w ould be content to speak of things as given, but given only in the 
experience of them as presences, in their finality. They are, then,
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reality manifest. But you cannot capture reality m anifest in your 
description of those things (175-176).
That is to say, the appreciation of finality is open to us in and through our 
relations w ith the things and beings with whom  we share our existence, but 
only in so far as we take up w ith them  as presences and not m erely as objects 
to study, describe, classify and manipulate. In other words, finality dawns 
upon  us through our engaged participation in dialogue, w here we m eet our 
fellow creatures as Thous, not Its.
In turn, finality comes to us as both dem anding and empowering; it 
carries w ith it a call to embody the m eaning received in our decisions and 
actions. According to Bugbee, "Every appreciation of finality is charged w ith 
im perativeness for an active being, and becomes a liability to him  in so far as 
he fails to fulfill its potential in active commitment" (Inw ard M orning 206). 
To realize finality in the particular situations of our lives is to recognize 
ourselves as being placed in a position of obligation and responsibility. And it 
is through our participation in these particular events that we come to 
appreciate the responsible character of our lives - writ large; we exist as 
responsible beings. Or, as Bugbee puts it, ”[W]e are under obligation" (Inw ard 
M orning 68).
At the same time, however, the apperception of finality also em pow ers 
us to fulfill the obligations of responsible existence; we come to realize w hat is 
required of us - w hat is necessary. According to Bugbee, necessary action 
grows out of our awareness of the finality of things.
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W hat I w ish to suggest is that true realization of finality is ever the 
spring of necessary action, and not an achievem ent w hich renders 
action necessary as a m eans to it. Present realization of finality inform s 
the will w ith concern in the imperative m ood, and  necessary action is 
the w orking out of the implications of inform ed will, ever renew able 
and subject to clarification in further realization of finality. A nd true 
realization of finality is to be marked in the readying of the will for 
w hat is yet to come - come what may - and for w hat yet needs to be 
done, as long as one m ay live (Inward M orning 207).
The realization of finality is not the term inus of our activities and 
involvem ent in reality but rather the underlying source of our capacity to act 
as we m ust. In fact, unless we find finality in our lives, we will be incapable 
of finding m eaning and purpose in any action at all. As Bugbee explains,
If we fail to find finality in the world we will ultim ately fail to find it 
necessary to do anything; and all that we have done will come to seem 
senseless. But if we can act on faith that is an appreciation of the 
finality of things, we m ay come to understand that neither ourselves 
nor any finite being should be counted at naught. We all stand  only 
together, not only all men, but all things. To abandon things, and to 
abandon each other, is to be lost (Inward M orning 159).
N ecessary action, then, is dependent upon our realization of the finality of 
things. In turn, as we venture to respond to our recognition of finality and 
comm it ourselves in necessary, decisive action, we come to a renew ed and 
deepened awareness of the finality of things and our co-existence w ith them. 
That is, to act out of necessity may be a deliverance of finality, and we find our 
lives inform ed with m eaning through acting decisively and whole-heartedly. 
Thus, there is a reflexive rhythm  here as well, as ever new  realizations of 
m eaning and finality sponsor and bring to fruition ever new  and 
unforeseeable forms of m eaningful and necessary action - and vice versa.
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W hat necessary action may look like, specifically, however, cannot be 
said apart from  the situation in which we are called upon to act. Like finality, 
necessity is an experiential category and cannot be divorced from, or distilled 
out of, the particular situations of our ongoing involvem ent in reality. 
According to Bugbee, "Both [necessity and finality] are experiential ideas, 
there is no conclusive m eaning in the situation in which we live and move 
and have our being. And there is no dem onstrable necessity about any course 
of action we can represent to ourselves" (Inward M orning 152). We search in 
vain if we look for finality and necessity exclusively from the standpoint of 
abstract and detached objectivity. "Nothing is necessary that is merely looked 
a t " (Bugbee, Inw ard M orning 116). And yet, finality and necessity can and do 
grace our lives through our engaged participation with, and em beddedness 
in, the w orld in which we live. As we open ourselves to and receive the 
beings and things whom  we meet along our way, we find ourselves affirmed 
and em pow ered. But, this affirmation (the realization of finality) and 
em pow erm ent (the capacity and direction to commit ourselves in necessary 
action) depend precisely upon such unreserved immersion in reality and 
cannot be realized apart from it.
Therefore, we cannot say in advance of our involvem ent in a 
particular situation what we must do. If necessary action is an experiential 
category, then it is also a non-prescriptive one. As Bugbee matter-of-factly 
puts it, "We cannot know in advance what we m ust do" (Inw ard M orning 
224). Genuine responsibility means responding to the address of the 
situation at hand. If we are to receive the experiential m eaning and
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im perative that sponsors our ethical response, we m ust rem ain open and 
attentive to the present situation; each one carries w ith it a unique and 
unforeseeable w ord of address. According to Buber,
In spite of all similarities every living situation has, like a new born 
child, a new  face, that has never been before and will never come 
again. It dem ands of you a reaction which cannot be prepared 
beforehand. It dem ands nothing of w hat is past. It dem ands presence, 
responsibility; it dem ands you (Between 114).
For both Buber and Bugbee, ethical action - and ethical theory - can never be 
reduced to prescribing and applying abstract and general m oral m axims and 
principles to the concrete and particular situations in which we find 
ourselves obliged to act in an ethical manner. And while we may, at times, 
rely upon such norm s as useful and helpful guidelines, they cannot substitute 
for our presence in, and attentiveness to, the situations themselves. Every 
unique situation addresses us in a way that dem ands our presence and 
genuine response; we practice responsibility in so far as we ground our 
response upon that address, received in its uniqueness and m eaning. 
Concerning the relationship between moral guidelines and ethical 
responsibility, Robert W ood writes, "To serve hum an fulfillment, these 
norm s all have to be recast again and again in the fire of meeting. ... M orality 
has to be grounded ever anew in presence" (104). Ethical responsibility always 
involves hearing and responding to the claims of the present m oment; only 
then do we find the strength and certainty to act in a decisive and non- 
arbitrary way.
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However, certainty, like finality and necessity, is not subject to 
objective analysis or verification. For Bugbee, we may find certainty in w hat 
we do and, at the same time, be unable even to articulate, let alone prove, that 
of which we are certain. Near the beginning of Inw ard M orning Bugbee 
suggests that we
... consider certainty, not as something quested for, like a pot of gold for 
which longing search is undertaken, and not as som ething that hangs 
on the fate of isolated truth-claims or of structures of hypothesis, and 
not as very strong conviction, but rather as pertaining to that 
anim ating base on which hum an enterprise becomes sound.
I w ould wish to say that certainty lies at the root of action that makes 
sense. It is connected with the ultimate purport of our lives. Perhaps 
the last thing we should dem and of an interpretation of certainty is 
that it show how we are entitled to some credo, once-for-all, 
incontrovertibly. ...
Certainty may be quite compatible with being at a loss to say w hat one 
is certain of. Indeed, I seriously doubt if the notion of 'certainty of,’ or 
'certainty that' will take us accurately to the heart of the m atter. It 
seems to me that certainty is at least very m uch akin to hope and faith 
(36).
If we cannot say what it is of which we are certain or prove the.necessity of 
actions sponsored by that certainty, it is because our certainty cannot be 
reduced to objective, or even referential, terms. It involves a kind of 
know ledge that defies reduction to the categories of objective knowing. Like 
the know ledge received in the I-Thou encounter, it is an im m ediate and 
participatory knowing that is not a ’knowing about' anything. A nd while it 
m ay lack any objective content or referent, we come to know certainty in our 
lives and actions at the level of our m ost basic attitudes and dispositions; it is 
bound up with the faith that gives us the capacity to affirm the irreducible 
im port of our being-with-others and empowers us to commit ourselves in 
decisive action.
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It appears, then, that we can give no accurate account of ethical action, 
in term s of our ethical responsibility, if we approach the subject exclusively 
from  the standpoint of spectatorial objectivity. The fundam ental ground of 
our capacity to act in an ethical m anner lies at a level that Bugbee refers to as 
the "meta-objective." In Inw ard M orning he writes,
Here we may put the point by availing ourselves of a term  of Marcel's: 
Action and reflection on the point of action are both meta-technical, 
over and above whatever technique may enter into them. And for 
convenience let us use a similar term, and say that both are meta­
objective in the sense that they move in a dim ension of m eaning over 
which we cannot exercise the power of representation and control that 
obtains w ith respect to things in taking them as objects (55).
For Bugbee, ethical responsibility is intimately bound up  w ith and rooted in 
our realization of finality, necessity and certainty, all three of which inform  
our lives at the meta-objective level. Therefore, although we m ay offer 
objective reasons and lucid, compelling argum ents in attem pting to justify 
our actions, such discourse is always secondary and at some distance rem oved 
from  the fundam ental, meta-objective sources of genuinely responsible 
action. In his Introduction to Inw ard M orning, Marcel pu ts it this way:
O ur reasons for acting, whatever they may be, cannot substitute for true 
affirmation in its depth. This is not to suggest the slighting of reasons 
which we may have for acting, but rather to point out that these 
reasons are derivative and bring us only abstract versions of a 
responsibility in depth from which the philosopher needs to derive his 
own fundam ental im pulse (25).
Here, Marcel returns us to the central and constant them e of this entire 
discussion: responsibility. Ethics is, above all, a responding to which 
involves, at the same time, a responding from . And, as I have tried to
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suggest, w hat we respond to - the call of our fellow creatures received not as 
objects of analysis, m anipulation and use, Its, but as presences, Thous, and the 
holy voice of the ineffable m ystery in and out of which we exist - and w hat we 
respond from - those basic attitudes and faith postures that enable us to find 
and affirm m eaning and finality in our co-creaturely situation - can only be 
received and realized through engaged participation in the concrete situations 
of our day-to-day lives. The address of these situations, in which this 
threefold address comes to us in a singular evocation, cannot be heard in so 
far as we take up with things from a detached and 'distant' viewpoint. Nor 
can this address be translated and represented in abstract and objective terms; 
it comes to us with an untranslatable and irreducible immediacy and 
concreteness.
Because of this, we may be unable to articulate any justification for our 
actions in objective terms, even though we are quite certain of w hat we m ust 
do - cannot but do. However, neither Bugbee nor Buber view our inability to 
justify ethical action in explicit terms as a failure (although, at times, it m ay be 
m ost unsettling). This is because, according to Buber, as quoted earlier, the 
m eaning received in the situation of dialogue, "does not w ish to be 
interpreted by us - for that we lack the ability - only to be done by us" (I and 
Thou 159). Finality, necessity and certainty come to us so that we m ay 
incarnate them - "put [them] to the proof in action," as Buber says - in the 
w orld of action. In Inw ard Morning Bugbee expands on this theme w hen he 
w rites,
Perhaps our truest actions, as Meister Eckhart suggests, are those for
which we can give no justifying reasons at all, there being no
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separation of meaning from the act in which it is realized. If you 
believe profoundly in w hat you are doing, this doing itself is the m ode 
of being relevant, and it constitutes your m anner of being articulate 
(53).
A nd later on, he explains it this way:
Yet when you come right down to it, is it not clear that really believing 
in the categorical (i.e. genuine) imperativeness of w hat one is doing, or 
better, really believing in w hat one is doing, carries w ith it the 
realization that one has not proven, and could not prove the necessity 
of doing w hat he does? We can only bear witness to the necessity of 
w hat we do, and through that action which is necessary, rather than 
through show ing how w hat we do fulfils specifiable conditions by 
virtue of which it m ust be acknowledged as necessary. Appreciation of 
necessity cannot be forced (153).
O ur ethical responsibility, then, finds its fulfillment and realization, not in 
our ability to prove the ethicality of our actions to ourselves or our would-be 
judges, bu t in our capacity to embody the meaning received in acting as we 
m ust. The address of the situation makes claims upon us, and we fulfill 
those claims through responsible, ethical action - not by offering cogent 
argum ents in defense of those actions.
Claim and response. As m entioned earlier, this dynam ic rhythm  lies 
at the heart of our ethical responsibility. And, in case we should forget (as is 
so often the case), we do not make the claims; rather, we are claimed - in the 
m om ent and from the root of our very being. According to Bugbee, "[Olur 
true position in action would seem to be this: that it is one of being called 
upon to act, and not one of calling the moves" (Inward M orning 71). As such, 
ethical responsibility presupposes a spirit of attentiveness and availability on 
our part, a readiness to receive and respond to the call of each new  situation.
106
For, unless we open ourselves to receive that call, how can we respond truly? 
Surely, we cannot practice ethical responsibility w hen we shout dow n the 
claims m ade upon us in our desire to stake a claim; w hen we neglect the 
com m and present in the situation in our attem pts to take com m and; when 
we ignore the charge of the moment in our need to be in charge. In such 
cases, we impose our own will upon the situation forcefully and to such a 
degree that we can no longer hear that address to which we may have 
responded directly and decisively - ethically. According to Bugbee, our 
forcefulness, assertiveness and insistence prevent us from practicing 
responsibility and acting with necessity. In Inward M orning he writes,
I would be inclined to say that where the use of force is to the fore the 
appreciation of necessity is absent. Thus, for example, w hen we are 
im perious, reality withholds its instruction from us. We learn of 
necessity in all gentleness, or not at all. ... It may be of help to bear in 
m ind that the imperative mood is not the m ood of assertion. It is the 
m ood of affirmation, the mood in which we truly respond. It seems to 
m e that I have to discover over and over again that I am w rong when I 
insist; decisiveness is quite other than insistence. Only reality in its 
necessity can give finality to what we say or do (117).
We cannot respond truly to things in so far as we attem pt to take the world - 
and  the things in it - by storm; conversely, passive non-participation is 
equally bankrupt. And yet, if we meet the world in a spirit of openness and 
availability, we m ay find ourselves addressed and receive the gift of m eaning 
along w ith the command and the capacity to em body that m eaning in our 
decisive and ethical response.
In closing, there remains a series of questions that cannot be ignored. 
W hat about the apparent m uteness of the things around us? W hat about our
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isolating deafness? How are we to respond in these situations of paralyzing 
silence? Adm ittedly, there are times (many times) when we do not feel 
ourselves called upon, commanded, directed, and yet we m ust still venture to 
decide and act. And if, under these circumstances, we m ust fall back upon  
certain general ethical principles, let us act w ith hum ility and acknowledge 
the lim itations of such a 'response.' Even 'responsibility' can be tu rned  into 
an abstract ethical ideal that we employ to guide our actions; however, in 
doing so, we no longer respond to the utterly unique and irreducibly concrete 
address of the particular situation. Genuine responsibility cannot be divorced 
from  the call to which we respond; our capacity for responsible action 
depends upon our ever-renewed participation in dialogue. As Maurice 
Friedm an explains,
Although I do not necessarily cease to deal lovingly w ith another even 
w hen I am no longer in dialogue with him, it is just in the concrete 
that I m eet reality, and it is this which prevents dialogue from 
degenerating into "responsibility" to an abstract moral code or 
universal idea (Touchstones 267).
In the m om ent of dialogue, we receive the address of the Thou in all its 
otherness and co-creatureliness, and this address elicits our respectful and 
com passionate response. And, in general, our recollection of our fellow 
creature as Thou, and the awareness that each being and thing we encounter 
m ay potentially become Thou for us, will suggest that we treat everyone and 
everything we meet respectfully and compassionately. H ow ever, even our 
recognition of the potential Thouness of all things cannot substitu te for the 
dialogical encounters in which we meet them, in all actuality, as Thou. As
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M anfred Vogel points out, genuine ethical responsibility, for Buber, cannot be 
based upon such abstractions.
Yet, enticing as this answer may be, it is not open to us in the context of 
Buber's thought. For were we to follow it, we w ould fall straight into 
the trap of the It, in as m uch as "thouness" is a predicate, an aspect, and 
as such an abstraction, a principle, but not a concrete being, a person 
(180).
Ethical responsibility means responding to the call of the situation in which 
we find ourselves. In so far as we hear this call, we may receive meaning and 
direction and the capacity to respond in an ethical manner.
Adm ittedly, this is a huge task and we fail regularly. It would be 
tem pting to suggest that we modify our expectations a bit, provide a bit more 
security, minimize the risks wherever possible. And yet, in doing so we do 
an injustice to the m eaning inherent in the m oment, as well as the 
independence, uniqueness and value of our fellows, the integrity of our 
personhood, and the enduring and gracious presence of the divine mystery. 
All of these seem to beckon to us, or from within us, and dem and that we 
acknowledge and respond to them - here and now. This is the responsibility 
that seems inescapably - and liberatingly - ours and which we m ust fulfill to 
the degree we are able. And so, I'll close this chapter w ith one final quote 
from  Bugbee's Inw ard M orning:
If it be urged that much of the time we can do no better than a kind of 
objective fairness in our relationships w ith one another, let us not 
suffer the confusion of taking this as a paradigm  of w hat it m ay m ean 
to be responsible by reason that "we cannot be held responsible for 
m ore than this." Because a profound concern of m an for m an [sic] 
cannot be legislated into us does not mean that anything short of such
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concern can guide us into an adequate interpretation of the m eaning of 
responsibility (210).




1 - Again, w hat follows m ust be qualified as a regional ontology. M uch of 
w hat will be discussed here could be described as philosophical or theological 
anthropology. In other words, I do not think a question like "Do rocks have a 
'creaturely task'?" is relevant - let alone answerable - here.
2 - A note on Deep Ecology here. It seems to me that the initial im petus 
behind w hat’s loosely called Deep Ecology lies in a wholly justifiable rejection 
of an exclusively objectifying approach to nature, where all nonhum an beings 
and things are relegated to It-hood - means to hum an ends, resources to be 
m anipulated  and used. But, w ithin the limited fram ework of Deep Ecology’s 
discourse, the only alternative to nature's It-hood is to have it become a part 
of the self, the I - hence their self-identification, self-realization approach.
That is, they attem pt to give the other its due by claiming that the other and 
the I are, at root, One. In doing so, however, any sense of genuine and non- 
negotiable otherness and independence is trivialized or lost entirely, and 
dialogue becomes monologue. Jim Cheney’s articles "Eco-Feminism and 
Deep Ecology" and "The NeoStoicism of Radical Environm entalism " critique 
Deep Ecology along these lines (see the List of Works Cited for full citationsof 
Cheney's articles). Several years ago I took up with this topic in some detail 
in a paper I wrote for Tom Birch entitled, "The Monological self/Self of 
Identification: A Critique of Deep Ecology Based on the W ork of M artin 
Buber."
3 - Buber's translation of Lev. 19:18, as given a few sentences above, is 
translated into English by Friedman in "The Question to the Single One" as 
"Love your neighbour as one like yourself." Such an unusual translation is 
com m on for Buber, who, along w ith Franz Rosenzweig, com pleted a rather 
unorthodox translation of the Hebrew Bible from Hebrew  to German. In a 
translator's note to Between Man and Man. Friedm an explains this particular 
translation as follows:
"Love your neighbour as one like yourself": this departure  from  the 
custom ary rendering of the Authorized Version is again an effort to 
render the original more precise (In this case the H ebrew  of Lev. xix. 18) 
in order to keep before the reader the stark objectivity of the comm and 
- the other whom  you are required to "love" being one w ith a real life 
of his own, and not one whom  you are invited to "acquire" (208).
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A nd yet, in the passage from Touchstones of Reality I quoted in the text, 
Friedm an interprets the verse in terms of "equality." In the context of my 
paper, this seems unfortunate and potentially confusing, especially in the 
realm  of environm ental ethics where the notions of "equality" and "equal 
rights" have been more troublesome than helpful. I prefer Buber’s original 
translation then, which emphasizes our alm ost familial affinity w ith  our 
fellow beings rather than the more abstract and legalistic idea of equality. The 
respect of which I am speaking hear grows out of a kinship relation, and the 
notion of equality, although useful and perhaps even essential in another 
context, seems rather beside the point here.
4 - For Bugbee, the answer is less clear. His understanding of creation does 
not im ply any notion of a creator, much less a theistic one. In fact, he sees 
such a designation as potentially dangerous in several ways. First, it 
introduces a moral heteronom y to hum an agency, especially when 
in terpreted in its more predestinarian forms - a danger I tried to address in 
the previous section concerning our created task as a destiny as opposed to 
fate. He discusses these ideas in his entry of Friday, October 25 in Inw ard 
M orning, which covers pages 221-226). Secondly, the notion of a divine 
creator also implies the designation of the religious object - some object, 
entity, or being that referentially corresponds to our w ord God. A nd for 
Bugbee, such "object-mindedness" is the exact opposite of the "religious 
attitude" he regards so highly. Here, I will quote Bugbee at length - again 
from  Inw ard M orning - on this subject, if for no other reason than to show 
just how  closely he comes to Buber’s theistic understanding of m any of these 
sam e themes.
I recall some comments of Richard N iebuhr’s near the close of his 
course last fall in 19th and early 20th century religious thought. He 
question the tendency m arked, for example, in William James' 
Varieties of Religious Experience, to concentrate upon religious 
attitude to the exclusion of its 'objective basis' as I believe he pu t it. 
H ow  can the religious attitude be understood properly w ithout placing 
it in orientation to God? - that seemed to be his question; and he also 
seemed disposed to dem and a conception of God, w ith w hatever 
necessary qualifications about its analogical or symbolical character, as 
object upon which religious attitude m ust depend, if religious attitude 
is not to degenerate in the end into something subjective and 
gratuitous.
M uch as I concur against the psychologizing interpretation of religious 
attitude, and with the belief in the possibility of religious attitude of a 
non-gratuitous character; much as I think such attitude m ust be 
interpreted as having relevance, and relevance to w hat can be referred
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to; I cannot but think that the very notion of object incorporates a 
m ode of thinking with respect to reality which is cut loose from 
religious attitude. N o 'object' can serve to explicate the non­
arbitrariness of religious attitude. If it could, there w ould be no 
elem ent of faith requisite in religious understanding; and I m ean, for 
example, that element of faith in the experience of finite things w hich 
has led me to consider 'the object’ as abstract, and to attem pt 
reevaluation of the conception of things in distinction from  the 
conception of objects. Thus, too, I have questioned the in terpretation 
of the 'otherness' of other finite beings in terms of the 'standing-over- 
againstness' which seems inherent in the notion of objectivity. W hat I 
should wish to call religious attitude challenges the ultim acy of any 
interpretation of reality which is ’objective’ in the sense of abstracting 
from the depth of our experience as responsible beings. Thus to the 
dem and that we conceive the groundedness of religious a ttitude w ith 
reference to the objectively conceived, no m atter w hat qualifications 
are placed on the possibility of an adequate conception of the religious 
object, seems to me tantam ount to a request that religious thought be 
undertaken from a standpoint not merely independent of religious 
attitude but also tending to oppose it (217-218).
Like Buber, Bugbee rejects both subjectivism and objectivism as m eaningful 
and 'accurate' ways of taking up with and interpreting our world; both 
attem pt to describe meaningful existence in terms of the know ledge (which is 
not a know ledge about anything) and truth received through our engaged 
participation in dialogue. As such, both thinkers reject the either-or of 
subject-object m indedness when applied to our religious sensibility. This is 
the basis of Buber's notion of God as the eternal Thou - who, by its very 
nature, can never become an It, an object. As such, we can never know  
anything about God in any objective sense. And yet, for Buber, this God is a 
God w hom  we can meet and with whom we can enter into I-Thou dialogue 
(for Buber, his entire religious tradition - biblical, talmudic, mystical, 
rabbinical, hasidic - is a testimony to the reality of the ongoing dialogue 
betw een God and humanity). Therefore, Buber, like Bugbee, refuses to reduce 
God to the object of religious attitude, while at the same time bearing witness - 
to the reality of God's enduring Presence in the world.
5 - The reference here is, most obviously, to the book of Genesis, w here God 
calls to Adam  following the fall. However, the full m eaning of Friedm an’s 
explanation is rooted in the Hasidic legend attributed to Rabbi Schneur 
Zalman of Ladi. According to the story, the rabbi was in jail and awaitng trial 
for being a political agitator. While in his jail cell, the chief of police came to
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visit him, and they began to talk about various religious m atters. The tale 
culm inates as follows:
Finally he [the chief of police] asked: "How are we to understand  that 
God, the all-knowing, said to Adam: 'Where art thou?'"
"Do you believe," answered the rav, "that the Scriptures are eternal 
and that every era, every generation and every m an is included in 
them ?"
"I believe this," said the other.
"Well then," said the zaddik, "in every era, God calls to every man: 
W here are you in your world? So many years and days of those allotted 
to you have passed, and how far have you gotten in your world?' God 
says something like this: 'You have lived forty-six years. How far along 
are you?’"
W hen the chief of gendarm es heard his age m entioned, he pulled 
himself together, laid his hand on the rav's shoulder, and cried: 
"Bravo!" But his heart trembled (Buber, Tales of the Hasidim : Early 
M asters 268-269).
Here, the emphasis is placed upon practicing responsibility for the unique 
creaturely task for which each one of us is created - for one's own destiny, 
authenticity. However, the question also comes to us in each new  m om ent of 
relation and decision, with the finite being with whom we have to do 
echoing this same call. In "What is Man?" Buber writes,
Life is not lived by my playing the enigmatic game on a board by 
myself, but by my being placed in the presence of a being w ith whom  I 
have agreed on no rules for the game and w ith whom  no rules can be 
agreed on. This presence before which I am placed changes its form, its 
appearance, its revelation, they are different from myself, often 
terrifyingly different. If I stand up to them, concern myself w ith them, 
m eet them in a real way, that is, with the truth of m y whole life, then 
and only then am I "really" there: I am there if I am there , and where 
this "there" is, is always determined less by myself than by the presence 
of this being which changes its form and its appearance. If I am  not 
really there I am guilty. When I answer the call of present being - 
"Where art thou?" - w ith "Here am I," but am not really there, that is, 
not w ith the truth of my whole life, then I am guilty. Original guilt 
consists in rem aining w ith oneself (Between 166).
Thus, for Buber, this biblical call of "Where art thou?" speaks unisonously of 
the threefold calling to which we m ust respond in our lives - the call of God, 
the call of our creatureliness, and the call of the present other.
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6 - Buber's sense of mystery, as he presents it here, is very similar to Ray 
H art's notion of "problematic" and Gabriel M arcel's "meta-problematic."
7 - This, however, does not mean that, for Buber, we cannot also m eet the 
eternal Thou in an exclusive I-Thou relation occurring betw een the hum an 
being and the Divine Presence. Admittedly, though, Buber's w ritings on this 
subject can be confusing. For example, in his essay "Buber's Philosophical 
Anthropology," Philip W heelright suggests that for Buber there is no relation 
to G od independent of one’s relation to "other finite selves" (78). Buber 
himself, however, in his "Replies to My Critics," confesses that he "read this 
w ith  some surprise" and goes on to say that the "essential relation to man" 
and the "essential relation to God" are com plem entary and that this 
com plem entarity in no way contests "the direct relation to G od” (710).
8 - Here, I want to stress the Hasidic notion of "making holy" so I have chosen 
Sm ith's translation over Kaufman's ”[W]hen you consecrate life you 
encounter the living God" (128). The close association between "hallowing 
this life" and entering holy intercourse w ith one's fellows m aintains and 
em phasizes Buber's inescapably dialogical meaning. And since, as Charles 
H artshorne writes, this hallowing is "our proper vocation"(51), the charge to 
hallow  the everyday carries the full force of the threefold call under 
discussion in a singular and unified way.
9 - Again, Buber's biblical translation is a bit unorthodox. Buber translates the 
H ebrew  Ehyeh asher ehyey in Exodus 3:14 to the German Iclt bin da als der 
ich da bin, which Kaufmann translates in the English I and Thou to "I am 
there as whoever I am there," and Friedman translates in other texts as "I 
shall be there as I shall be there." In each case, the em phasis is placed upon 
God's enduring (although ever-changing) presence as opposed to G od’s 
essence or Being. According to Friedman, "The Biblical verb does not include 
this shade of m eaning of pure being" (Life of Dialogue 246).
10 - This is why I referred to Buber's theological position as a panentheistic 
pansacram entalism  in the Introduction. According to Buber, the w orld exists 
in God, who is both wholly transcendent and wholly imm anent. As he 
writes in I and Thou. "God embraces but is not the universe; just so, God 
embraces but is not my s e lf  (143). For Buber, God transcends both the w orld 
and the self, and any attem pt to limit God to this world, as in pantheism , or to 
m y self, as in panpsychism, denies God's radical transcendence and 
Otherness. For Buber, a totally im m anent a n d /o r  internal God is no God at 
all. A nd yet, neither is God exclusively transcendent for Buber(and, in fact, 
Buber's critics have often accused him of being a pantheist). "For,” as
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Friedm an writes, "if God were simply transcendent we could have no 
relation to him at all" (Life of Dialogue 228). And w hatever else Buber says - 
or refrains from saying - .about God, he insists that God, as the eternal Thou, 
can be m et as a partner in relation. Therefore, Buber m aintains the tension 
betw een God's transcendence and God’s immanence by placing the w orld  in 
God [drawing, at times, on the vivid imagery of Lurianic Kabbalism, in which 
the w orld is created through the self-limitation, w ithdraw al, or contraction 
(tsim tsum ) of the Godhead (YHVH) and the consequent em anation of the 
Divine into the worldly rungs or spheres]. In I and Thou. Buber sum s up  his 
panentheistic position as follows:
Looking away from the world is no help tow ard God; staring at the 
w orld is no help either; but whoever beholds the w orld in him  stands 
in his presence. "World here, God there" - that is It-talk; and "God in 
the world" - that, too, is It-talk; but leaving out nothing, leaving 
nothing behind, to comprehend all - all the world - in com prehending 
the You, giving the world its due and truth, to have nothing besides 
God but to grasp everything in him, that is the perfect relationship.
One does not find God if one remains in the world; one does not find 
God if one leaves the world. Whoever goes forth to his You with his 
whole being and carries to it all the being of the w orld, finds him 
whom  one cannot seek.
Of course, God is "the wholly other”; but he is also the wholly same: 
the wholly present. Of course, he is the mysterium tremendum  that 
appears and overwhelms; but he is also the m ystery of the obvious that 
is closer to me than my own I (127).
For Buber, God is neither wholly other than the world, nor is God exclusively 
lim ited to this world. God is the all-encompassing, all-inclusive God who 
nonetheless may m eet us and speak to us in and through the m ost seemingly 
com m onplace events of our lives.
11 - As in the discussion of the character of I-Thou relations in C hapter 1, the 
qualifications are necessary here. Sacramental and dialogical relations are 
always a m atter of "will and grace." Just as we are graced by the fundam ental 
givenness of our being-together-with our fellows and the reciprocal 
involvem ent of the others whom  we meet in dialogue, so, too, we are graced 
by the unprocurable m anifestation of the Divine Presence in the sacramental 
encounter. Therefore, in speaking of "letting God in" or "hallowing the 
everyday," we m ust not assume an activism in which we have the pow er or 
capacity, in and of ourselves, to m ake the world a sacrament; there is no 
m agic here, and the Divine Presence cannot be conjured up through hum an 
action (It is interesting to note that some Kabbalists and Hasidim  occasionally
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fell prey to the dangers of such an activism, resorting to various magical 
practices involving num erology and mystical kavanots - incantations or 
spells. M ost often they did this in an attem pt to force God's hand in hum an 
affairs, influence history or bring about the messianic age. Buber's "historical 
chronicle" entitled For the Sake of Heaven insightfully points ou t these 
excesses, even in as great a spiritual leader as the Seer of Lublin.). Like 
dialogical existence in general, we have an im portant role (but not the only, 
or even leading, role) to play in making the world a sacram ent - bu t always as 
priests, not magicians or sorcerers.
12 - The long quote that follows is taken from Buber’s discussion of the 
exclusive relation between a finite I and the eternal Thou(which, 
parodoxically, includes and encompasses all finite I-Thou relations in its 
halo-like glow). As discussed earlier, Buber acknowledges the possibility of 
such relations; w hat he dismisses entirely is the rejection of finite relations in 
order to devote oneself to God alone (His frequent discussions and critiques of 
K ierkegaard in this context are illuminating.). And yet, the ethical im port of 
the quote should be obvious; even the exclusive encounter with God returns 
us to active participation in finite existence with our fellow beings.
DIALOGUE AND RESPONSIBILITY IN ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS
I. INTRODUCTION
So, w hat about the martens and mountains, the ospreys and rivers, 
sequoias and bears? Having outlined, rather generally and abstractly, the main 
tenets of a philosophy of dialogue and its correlative ethic of responsibility in the 
two previous chapters, I now wish to return to the concrete, lived encounters 
w ith the nonhum an beings and things of nature described in the Introduction 
and attem pt to interpret their sense and meaning w ithin this theoretical 
framework. And yet, it seems unnecessary - and painfully redundant - to 
reconstruct this framework, in all its detail, as I narrow  my focus to our relations 
w ith nonhum ans and our ethical responsibilities toward such creatures. As 
stated at the outset of this paper, insofar as I have carried out this investigation of 
our relationality and ethical responsibility in general, noetic terms, from which 
no species of noema or relata has been a priori excluded, then it already includes 
an eidetic description and interpretation of hum an-nonhum an relations and an 
implicit environmental ethic. Therefore, given the scope and purpose of this 
paper, I hope that my audience has read the two preceding chapters with moose, 
wildflowers and seacoasts - among others - in mind.
Adm ittedly, however, such an implicit account of our relations with, and 
responsibilities toward, nonhum an creatures is, in itself, insufficient; in fact, it 
seems to raise at least as m any questions as it answers. In the second half of this 
paper I will try to sketch out some of these implications a bit more explicitly and
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attem pt to answer several of the more obvious a n d /o r  serious questions that 
need to be addressed. Due to its excessive length, I have broken dow n Chapter 
Three into five separate sections. Following this brief introduction and forecast, I 
will examine w hat Buber and his interpreters have to say, specifically, about our 
relations with nonhum an beings and conclude by stating three general premises 
affirming the possibility, actuality and meaning of our dialogues w ith nonhum an 
creatures. In the following section - section III - 1 will submit these basic 
premises to critical scrutiny by outlining two potential sources of criticism and 
testing the validity and veracity of m y premises in light of these challenges. 
Through analysis and argum ent as well as a basic re-affirmation of the primacy 
and meaning of lived experience, I will attempt to respond to these challenges - 
which m ight be labeled as the challenge of the noematic prejudice and the 
challenge of technology - and emerge from the fires of critical evaluation with 
these general premises intact - validated and, I hope, reforged, strengthened. In 
the two rem aining sections of this chapter I will explain and then attem pt to 
illustrate w hat the practice of ethical responsibility m ight look like in our 
relations with nonhum an creatures. Section IV will re-examine, in general terms, 
the rhythmic interplay between dialogue and responsibility - claim and response 
- as it informs our decisions and actions regarding nonhum an beings and things; 
section V will serve as the culmination of this entire chapter (and this entire 
paper up to this point), as I explore how we might properly reflect upon and 
speak about the way our particular, concrete encounters w ith creatures like 
m artens and m ountains sponsor, inform and direct our equally particular, 
concrete ethical responses to them - and to others.
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Given the theoretical framework and style of discourse suggested at the 
end of Chapter Three, I would like to conclude this essay, in Chapter Four, by 
offering a few remarks on dialogue, responsibility and wilderness in the more 
narrative, testimonial and reflective m anner appropriate to the interplay between 
these topics. I will suggest that wild places, for both conceptual and practical 
reasons, offer us a few remaining places where, despite our relational 
impoverishm ent, dialogue can flourish - a home of dialogue and a sabbath place 
of prayer and play. Of course, to say that we ought to preserve w ilderness as a 
church or playground would be just another variation on an 'ethic' of hum an self- 
interest. Rather, because wild places are so overwhelmingly eloquent and 
evocative and also because, as we immerse ourselves in their gracious presence, 
we may be more ready to avail ourselves to the self-speaking voice of the others 
we m eet therein, we find ourselves called forth and claimed by wilderness in a 
w ay that invites our most respectful and compassionate response. And in our 
respect and concern for wild places and wild creatures, engendered in intimate, 
know ing contact with them, we find ourselves obligated to protect and preserve 
the few rem aining wild places left on this continent. And so, I'll conclude this 
final chapter, and this paper, by advocating a particular course of ethical - even 
legislative - action. In endorsing the Northern Rockies Ecosystem Protection Act 
(NREPA) as a respectful and appropriate response to the gloriously eloquent and 
soul-stirringly evocative voice of wild nature in our region of the w orld (as well 
as the eloquent, evocative voice of each particular roadless area included in the 
proposal), I wish to express both my wholehearted support for the Act and, at 
the same time, show that the rhythm  of dialogue and responsibility informing 
our relations with nonhum an creatures> while perhaps seeming so ephemeral
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and 'impractical' to some of my readers, can and does lead to specific, concrete 
courses of action. In other words, I wish to show that the ethical position put 
forth in this essay, while not ’applicable,’ is both empowering and relevant.
II. DIALOGUE WITH NONHUMAN CREATURES
I find it reassuring, especially given the purposes of this paper, that 
Martin Buber's most detailed description of an I-Thou encounter in his book I 
and Thou is of a meeting that occurs between himself and a tree. In fact, given its 
placem ent at the beginning of the book and Buber’s use of the account to 
introduce so m any of the central themes that he develops later on, I would argue 
that this description is intended to serve as the paradigm  of w hat the I-Thou 
relation is - and is not. In presenting the passage here in its entirety, I w ish to 
employ Buber’s account as both an experiential starting point (albeit once 
removed) for the second half of the paper and the basis of a general model of 
hum an-nonhum an, I-Thou relations around which to gather up and explicate 
several of the main themes of the first half of the paper.
I contemplate a tree.
I can accept it as a picture: a rigid pillar in a flood of light, or splash 
of green traversed by the gentleness of the blue silver ground.
I can feel it as movement: the flowing veins around the sturdy, 
striving core, the sucking of the roots, the breathing of the leaves, 
the infinite commerce with earth and air - and the growing itself in 
its darkness.
I can assign it to a species and observe it as an instance, w ith an eye 
to its construction and its way of life.
I can overcome its uniqueness and form so rigorously that I 
recognize it only as an expression of the law - those laws according 
to which a constant opposition of forces is continually adjusted, or 
those laws according to which the elements mix and separate.
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I can dissolve it into a number, into a pure relation between 
num bers, and eternalize it.
Throughout all of this the tree remains my object and has its place 
and its time span, its kind and condition.
But it can also happen, if will and grace are joined, that as I 
contemplate the tree I am drawn into a relation, and the tree ceases 
to be an It. The power of exclusiveness has seized me.
This does not require me to forego any of the modes of 
contemplation. There is nothing that I m ust not see in order to see, 
and there is no knowledge that I must forget. Rather is everything, 
picture and movement, species and instance, law and num ber 
included and inseparably fused.
W hatever belongs to the tree is included: its form and its 
mechanics, its colors and its chemistry, its conversation with the 
elements and its conversation with the stars - all this in its entirety.
The tree is no impression, no play of my imagination, no aspect of a 
mood; it confronts me bodily and has to deal with me as I m ust 
deal with it - only differently.
One should not try to dilute the meaning of the relation: relation is 
reciprocity.
Does the tree then have consciousness, similar to our own? I have 
no experience of that. But thinking that you have brought this off 
in your own case, must you again divide the indivisible? W hat I 
encounter is neither the soul of a tree nor a dryad, but the tree itself 
(57-59).
In this account, Buber testifies to, and describes, the twofold way in which we 
m ay relate to nonhum an creatures such as trees. According to Buber, we m ay 
experience the tree as an It - the object of artistic appreciation a n d /o r  scientific 
investigation. We can observe it in terms of color and light, and we can also 
analyze it within the frameworks of biology and chemistry, studying its various 
biochemical and physiological processes, examining its anatomy and taxonomy, 
or determ ining its niche within an ecological community. Or, m oving to 
increasingly higher levels of abstraction, we may submit the tree to study under 
the laws and principles of physics and mathematics. Through all of this, the tree
122
rem ains an It - an object of experience, something to observe and study, represent 
and classify, analyze and dissect.
However, Buber also says that we can relate to this same tree in an entirely 
different way - as a Thou, a partner in dialogue. In the I-Thou encounter we 
m eet the tree in its wholeness and integrity, without the fragm entation of 
analysis and dissection. Likewise, the encounter is imm ediate and present; no 
conceptual fram ework intervenes, and no re-presentational placem ent within 
interpretive or experiential grids relegates the encounter to the past. Lastly, and 
perhaps most importantly, the I-Thou meeting with the tree is reciprocal; both I 
and Thou are actively involved. And although this reciprocity occurs at an 
other-than-conscious level and contains an element of inescapable and ineffable 
m ystery, Buber is adam ant in his conviction that the tree does, in fact, 
reciprocate.
But how?. In what sense do we meet with reciprocity in our encounters 
w ith trees - or buzzards or creeks, for that matter? To answer this question we 
need to re-examine the fundamental nature of the I-Thou dialogue. For Buber, I- 
Thou relations are not mental acts that necessitate conscious awareness. They 
occur at the primal level of our very being. According to Maurice Friedman, "We 
address others not by conscious m ind or will but by w hat w e are. We address 
them  with more than we know, and they respond - if they really respond - w ith 
m ore than they know. Address and response can never be identified merely 
w ith conscious intent or even with 'intentionality'" (Touchstones 324). In a 
similar vein, Robert Wood writes, "[I-Thou] relation, [Buber] insists, is not
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psychological so much as it is ontological, i.e., a relation to the being of the 
Other" (41). Since dialogue does not occur at the level of (human) consciousness, 
bu t at the more fundam ental level of being, its manifestation does not depend on 
both partners' conscious awareness, or even that both partners have a 
consciousness at all.1
Therefore, reciprocity should not be understood as some kind of conscious 
act or posture; it, too, is something ontic. And while, theoretically speaking, this 
position is consistent enough, it is a notion that, admittedly, contains an element 
of mystery. Acknowledging the potential for confusion and m isunderstanding, 
Buber directly confronts the question posed at the beginning of the previous 
paragraph when, in his "Afterword" to I and Thou, he asks himself,
[I]f the I-You relation entails a reciprocity that embraces both the I 
and the You, how can the relationship to something in nature be 
understood in this fashion? Still more exactly: if we are to suppose 
that the beings and things in nature that we encounter as our You 
also grant us some sort of reciprocity, w hat is the character of this 
reciprocity, and what gives us the right to apply to it this basic 
concept (172)?
And since Buber asks himself the exact question I have raised, we m ight as well 
let him answer it in his own words. After discussing the matter-of-fact 
differences between our relations with plants and our relations w ith animals, he 
writes, "It is part of our concept of the plant that it cannot react to our actions 
upon it, that it cannot 'reply.' Yet this does not m ean that we m eet w ith no 
reciprocity at all in this sphere. We find here not the deed of posture of an 
individual being but a reciprocity of being itself - a reciprocity that has nothing 
except being" (173). Admittedly, this answer is not terribly satisfying. Aside
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from the questionable science (which has no real bearing on the basic issue here), 
Buber's response is, to put it mildly, vague. To be sure, the reciprocity we 
encounter in our meetings with trees and other nonhum an things carries an 
element of m ystery and ineffability, and I believe Buber’s insistence on its 
presence in such relations, despite his relative inability to articulate it, testifies, 
above all, to his immediate apprehension of its experiential reality. That is, 
Buber maintains his position that trees and the like reciprocate, despite the fact 
that it m ight have been easier for him to equivocate on this point, because he had 
m et with and known the force of their reciprocity as a fact of experience.
In our meetings with trees and the like, as we attend to them, we find 
ourselves attended; as we make ourselves available, they avail themselves to us; 
and, as we become present, they reveal to us their gracious presence. And while 
I rem ain som ewhat uncertain about what I could possibly give a tree that w ould 
be of any real value to it, I have no doubt concerning the richness of the 
unw arranted gifts I receive from my arboreal partners in dialogue. The tree that 
I meet as Thou meets me as an active co-participant in the I-Thou relation, 
addressing me with its presence and responding to my address with the gifts of 
its being - and our m utual being-together. Although speechless, even 
'thoughtless,' such m utual address and response is, most fundam entally, a form 
of reciprocity.
So, for Buber, trees, like our fellow hum an beings, m ay be either 
experienced as Its or encountered as Thous. And not just trees. In I and Thou, 
Buber also bears witness to the reality of I-Thou encounters occurring between
125
himself and a cat (144-146) and between himself and a "fragment of mica" (146- 
147). Also, in his essay entitled "Dialogue," Buber recounts an I-Thou encounter 
from his childhood occurring between himself and a horse (Between 22-23).
Rather than being exceptional or aberrant, the experiential reality of these 
I-Thou relations with creatures like trees, cats, rocks and horses is wholly 
consistent with Buber's understanding of the fundam entally dialogical character 
of existence. If, as I quoted Buber earlier, "[L]iving means being addressed" 
(Between 10), then it follows that, "Nature 'says' something to man" (Wood 116). 
I-Thou dialogue with the nonhum an beings and things of nature is possible, first 
and foremost, because, at the most primal level, these creatures address us; they 
speak to us out of the very depths of their being - in all their unrepeatable 
uniqueness, indivisible integrity, irreducible otherness and co-creaturely 
independence. More simply, they 'speak' themselves.
In turn, insofar as we hear and respond to this self-spoken, self-speaking 
address, received as such, we may meet these beings and things as Thous, 
m utually participating partners in meaningful and decisive dialogue. As such, 
the possibility of I-Thou dialogue occurring between a hum an being and a tree, 
depends - from the hum an side, at least - upon the recognition of our existential 
situation as one of being-called-upon and our capacity to open ourselves to the 
voice of such creatures as they address us in the particular and concrete 
relational events of our lives with them. As I discussed in Chapter One, Buber 
describes this recognition and readiness - this disposition or posture of the life of 
dialogue - as "becoming aware". And, according to Buber, we cannot draw
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artificial boundaries or arbitrary limits upon this awareness. In "Dialogue" he 
writes,
But in each instance a word dem anding an answer has happened to 
me.
We m ay term this way of perception becoming aware.
It by no means needs to be a man of whom  I become aware. It can 
be an animal, a plant, a stone. No kind of appearance or event is 
fundam entally excluded from the series of the things through 
which from time to time something is said to m e .... The limits of 
the possibility of dialogue are the limits of awareness (Between 10).
A lthough dialogue is always a matter of will and grace, unless we become aware 
of ourselves as addressed by trees and the like, how can we hear them  speak to 
us? And, in turn, how can we truly respond? A necessary pre-condition of I- 
Thou dialogue is hearing the address of the other as Thou, and this hearing 
seems potentiated in our readiness and capacity to listen - to whom ever may, 
perchance, speak to us.2
And yet, for the most part, we lack this awareness of ourselves as called 
upon. Oftentimes, we do not - cannot - hear the address of our fellow beings, 
including our fellow hum an beings. They seem to have nothing meaningful or 
compelling to say to us, and we, in turn, take up with them as speechless and 
inert objects - things to experience or scrutinize, contend with or avoid, 
m anipulate or use. In such a silent 'society,' monologue, rather than dialogue, 
seems to be the dom inant pattern of speech. Consequently, speaking of things 
like trees addressing us and engaging us in reciprocal, I-Thou dialogue sounds 
rather far-fetched, perhaps even ludicrous (after all, as my m ore literal-minded 
readers will quickly point out, I'm coming perilously close to talking about
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talking trees here). Clearly, within the exclusive framework of the It-world, a 
tree has nothing to say to us; it exists as a silent object, which we m ay 
subjectively experience according to the interpretive grids we project upon it, 
a n d /o r  a resource, a maleable thing that we may use according to our purposes 
and intentions. As an It, the evocative self-speaking voice of the tree, arising 
from the depths of its otherness, uniqueness and integrity, is silenced or ignored; 
w hatever voice it has, it receives from the I of the I-It relation, according to the I's 
categories of experience and use. As such, the entire relational event occurs as a 
m onologue within the m ind of the I. Concerning our monologue w ith nature, 
Buber writes,
He who is living the life of monologue is never aware of the other 
as something that is absolutely not himself and at the same time 
something with which he nevertheless communicates. N ature for 
him is either an c'tnt d ' nine, hence a "living through" in himself, or 
it is a passive object of knowledge, either idealistically brought 
within the soul or realistically alienated. It does not become for 
him  a word apprehended with senses of beholding and feeling 
(Between 20).
According to Buber, it makes little difference whether we appropriatively 
identify with nature (The Deep Ecology approach), subjectively romanticize 
nature, or 'objectively' reduce nature to simple, lifeless "matter in motion." Each 
approach bears the mark of the I-It monologue, where we fail to acknowledge, 
respect and honor the non-negotiable, irreducible otherness of nature 's creatures, 
who, despite - and because of - their otherness, we may encounter as partners in 
I-Thou dialogue.
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Given the impoverished state of our relational lives, I would be the last 
person to suggest that I-Thou encounters with nonhum an beings and things are 
commonplace occurrences, although I do believe we often fail to recognize such 
encounters because of their fleeting, often unspectacular, nature and lack of 
consciously perceived content. Or, if we acknowledge them at all, oftentimes we 
dismiss them as superfluous, inconsequential or romantic, overly sentimental or 
subjective responses to seemingly ordinary events.3 But, just because they may 
be infrequent, ignored or explained away, that doesn't mean that they can't or 
don 't happen - or that they aren't important.
W hat I wish to suggest concerning the possibility, actuality and m eaning 
of our I-Thou relations with nonhum an beings and things can be broken down 
into three basic premises. First, despite the onerous obstacles and conceptual 
baggage that may rise up and prevent the actuality of I-Thou dialogue between 
hum an and nonhum an creatures, such encounters are, indeed, possible. Emil 
Fackenheim articulates this first premise very clearly when he writes,
I-Thou. relations are possible not only with other hum an beings, but 
with anything whatever. This is not to say that such relations are 
easy or possible to anyone, or possible at any time. It is merely to 
say that there are no a priori limitations to the possible partners I 
m ay have in an 1-Thou relationship (279).
Secondly, not only are such I-Thou encounters a theoretical possibility but, on 
occasion, they may also become actual, and it is wholly legitimate to speak of our 
engaging and compelling encounters with martens, mountains, bears and trees as 
I-Thou relations and attempt to interpret their sense and meaning according to 
the tenets of a philosophy of dialogue. As these creatures address us in their
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own right, as they 'speak' themselves from the depths of their being, their speech 
m ay resonate within the available (disponible ) and responsive soul, and the 
possibility of dialogue may, in such miraculous instances, become incarnate 
am ong us.4 And thirdly, as the possibility of dialogue w ith nonhum an creatures 
becomes, on occasion, actual for us, we find our lives graced beyond all m easure 
or possible merit. We receive the gift of the present other as we come to know it 
- this stretch of seashore, that stand of forest - in an altogether fresh and intimate 
way, and, at the same time, we receive the gift - and consequent responsibility - 
of our own existence, recognized as meaningful, even vocational. Through our 
sacramental co-participation in such dialogue, we find the capacity to affirm both 
these nonhum an others and ourselves as well as the strength and direction to 
em body this meaning and m utual affirmation in respectful and compassionate - 
genuinely responsible - action.
III. CRITICAL SCRUTINY: THE CHALLENGE OF THE NOEMATIC 
PREJUDICE AND THE CHALLENGE OF TECHNOLOGY
And yet, I cannot simply state these three premises and then naively move 
on to a discussion of their ethical import for our relations with nonhum an 
creatures w ithout first acknowledging and responding to several challenges that 
these premises may prompt. Two challenges, in particular, come to m ind, and, 
while I’m sure there are others, I will limit my discussion here to these two: the 
challenge of the noematic prejudice as presented in - and articulated in the very 
title of - John Kultgen's article entitled "Saving You for Real People" and,
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secondly, the challenge of technology. In very different ways, both of these 
challenges question the veracity of the first premise I presented above, regarding 
the very possibility of I-Thou dialogue occurring between hum ans and 
nonhum ans. Similarly, I have chosen to respond to these two challenges for very 
different reasons. Technology, as the widely and deeply instantiated paradigm  
that informs and defines the way we take up w ith reality at the m ost prim ary 
level, seems to present the most serious challenge to the possibility of hum an- 
nonhum an dialogue. On the other hand, Kultgen’s argum ent, while not terribly 
compelling or persuasive, offers an exemplary illustration of the noematic 
prejudice discussed throughout this paper.
To set the context a bit, Kultgen's article comes as a critical response to an 
earlier essay by John Tallmadge entitled "Saying You to the Land." In his article, 
Tallmadge "use[s] Martin Buber's philosophy of dialogue, as expounded in I and 
Thou, to shed light on the spiritual roots of our environmental crisis and show 
how  we can appreciate beings in nature if we encounter them as persons rather 
than things" (Tallmadge 351). He suggests that this appreciation can instill 
w ithin us - each of us - the enlarged understanding of comm unity prerequisite 
for practicing Aldo Leopold's "land ethic." And finally, Tallmadge offers 
som ething like a dialogical tao of backpacking as a method by which 
"individuals develop habits of mind conducive to 1-You relations, thereby 
enhancing our life with other people as well as our natural environment" (351). 
A lthough I find his analysis lacking in a num ber of ways, I am, quite obviously, 
sym pathetic to the spirit and sensibility of Tallmadge's article. However, my 
purpose here is not to defend his essay against Kultgen's criticisms, a few of
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which I even find justified. Rather, I want to address the basic presuppositions 
underlying Kultgen's critique and illustrate how these presuppositions distort 
and prejudice his understanding of relationality and dialogue.
In the short abstract preceding his article, Kultgen describes the general 
purpose and intent of his article as follows: "I critique John Tallmadge's attem pt 
to derive an environmental ethic from Buber's suggestion that we can enter into 
I-Thou relations with nature. 1-Thou relations flourish only w ith beings who 
enter into dialogue with us, viz. human beings, and we can value other natural 
kinds w ithout anthropom orphizing them" (59). According to Kultgen, Martin 
Buber is simply wrong to say that I-Thou relations can "flourish" between 
hum ans and nonhum ans. Upon even slight reflection, this seems to be a rather 
odd accusation to make. After all, it was Buber who first articulated the 
understanding of I-Thou dialogue under discussion here and who described and 
defined such relations to include our immediate, present, integrated and 
reciprocal encounters with nonhum an creatures. It’s sort of like telling the home 
plate um pire - or even the head of the official rules committee - that he /sh e  
doesn't understand the strike zone because she/he  insists that a waste high pitch 
dow n the m iddle falls within the category of a strike. Given the terms agreed 
upon to determine what constitutes a strike (an I-Thou relation), one cannot fault 
the umpire for reasoning that such a 'pitch-event' (an I-Thou relation occurring 
between hum ans and nonhum ans) falls into the class of things we call strikes. 
One can argue that the strike zone be redefined to exclude waist high, dow n the 
m iddle pitches from being called strikes, but to continue playing by the current
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rules while insisting, ’’Those aren't strikes,” seems to be an odd position to 
maintain.
Of course, what Kultgen is really doing is, in fact, redefining the rules 
under which he chooses to play the game. Kultgen, while still employing the 
language of dialogue and I-Thou relationality, simply redefines w hat constitutes 
an I-Thou dialogue in accordance with the noematic prejudice he brings w ith him 
to the ballpark. By saying that "I-Thou relations flourish only w ith beings who 
enter dialogue with us, viz. hum an beings," Kultgen chooses to predicate his 
definition of I-Thou relations upon the type of relata involved; for him, I-Thou 
dialogue can occur if and only if the participants are hum an beings. Here, the 
possibility of dialogical relations depends, not upon the nature of the relations 
themselves, but upon the nature (species) of the participants. As such, any 
relations with nonhum ans, regardless of the nature of these relations, are a priori 
excluded from consideration as I-Thou dialogues. Phenomenologically speaking, 
Kultgen interprets our relationality strictly in terms of the noema involved in the 
relation and, because of this, falls prey to the noematic prejudice this entire paper 
is intended to overcome - or at least thoughtfully and actively bracket.
In addition, because this prejudice is so deeply entrenched, Kultgen makes 
several other groundless accusations. First, in the passage from his abstract 
quoted above, he suggests that by calling nonhuman creatures Thou, we - Buber, 
Tallmadge and I - are somehow anthropom orphizing them. This is a gross 
m isunderstanding. For Buber, as I have plainly shown, all sorts of beings - trees, 
horses, hum ans, divinities - may become a Thou for us. And furtherm ore, this
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potential has nothing to do with their nature, so to speak; it has to do with the 
nature of the relations in which we encounter them. Again, I-Thou is a noetic 
description of a certain form of relational event. To call som eone/som ething a 
Thou means that we have encountered - or may yet encounter - that being in 
such a relationship. Clearly, there is nothing inherently anthropom orphic about 
such relational descriptions - not until the I-Thou relationship is redefined in 
noematic terms, where humanness has become the necessary condition of 
participation in these relationships. Only when "Thou" is read and understood 
exclusively as "human-Thou" does a philosophy of dialogue become 
anthropom orphic.
Similarly, Kultgen's noematic prejudice fosters great confusion in his 
understanding of personhood. For Kultgen, person can only m ean one thing: 
hum an person. Therefore, he argues that, "His [Tallmadge’s] central proposal, 
that we treat beings of 'wild nature' (and eventually of 'hum anized nature,' too) 
as persons, is a theoretical and ethical disaster" (59), and he concludes his essay 
by stating that, ”[I]t is a blind alley to misrepresent things as persons and deny 
the precious difference between the two. This is an injustice to the things as 
m uch as to the persons" (67). Here, Kultgen sets up a firm noematic duality 
between two kinds of beings: persons (human) and things (nonhuman). But 
w hat if we look at personhood and thinghood noetically, as Buber and Kohak 
w ould have us do? From a noetic perspective, a person is a being w hom  we 
encounter as a Thou, while a thing is an object experienced as an It. The terms 
depend upon the nature of the relational event in which the relata are 
apprehended, and all finite creatures - hum an as well as, say, feline or m ineral -
134
can be encountered as Thous or experienced as Its. According to Kohak, "A 
person is a being who meets you as a T hou .... Hum ans are beings capable of 
being persons. The category of Person, though, is both higher and deeper - and 
broader" (Embers and Stars 122). Here, Kohak defines personhood noetically, in 
term s of the I-Thou relations in which we come to know our fellow beings - not 
just hum an beings - as persons, Thous. And clearly, by saying this Kohak does 
not "deny the precious difference[s]" between hum an beings and cats and rocks 
(let alone the very real differences between my nephew and the born-again Bible 
thum pers at my door earlier today). Rather, he simply acknowledges the rich 
diversity and illimitably wide scope of our relational lives. Further down the 
same page, in fact, Kohak details the textured plurality of our 'interpersonal' lives 
w hen he concludes, "I would not apologize for my distinctiveness: I cherish the 
millenia of humnnitns whose heir I am. There are, though, the cellar holes; there 
are the raccoons and the birches, there is the moon and the spirit of God, ever 
present amid the hum  of the sun-warm forest and the ageless boulders" (122- 
123). Cellar holes, raccoons, birch trees, the moon and God are, obviously 
enough, radically other than, and different from, hum an beings; who w ould 
w ant to argue otherwise? And yet, like hum an beings, they, too, can be 
encountered as persons. Only when "person" is equated with "human person" - 
as it is within the framework of Kultgen's noematic prejudice - does this shared 
personhood cause misunderstanding.
Rather than creating a "theoretical and ethical disaster," as Kultgen would 
have us believe, our experiential knowledge and reflective recognition of the 
actual a n d /o r  potential personhood of our nonhum an fellow creatures provides
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a fertile ground in which our respect and compassion for such creatures m ay be 
sown a n d /o r  cultivated. To know our fellow beings as persons, and not merely 
things, opens up the possibility of treating them in a respectful and 
compassionate - ethically responsible - manner. According to Kohak,
In the encounter of persons, categories of respect - moral categories 
- are in order. Not simply categories of purpose: purpose can also 
be mechanical and pointless. Nor categories of causality. Rather it 
is the categories of respect, of good and evil, of right and wrong, 
that govern the encounters of persons.... That is the fundam ental 
sense of speaking of reality as personal: recognizing it as Thou, and 
our relation to it as profoundly and fundamentally a moral relation, 
governed by the rule of respect.
It is in that sense that any consistent ethic m ust needs be 
personalis tic, and doubly so - according to all beings the respect 
due to persons and recognizing the model of a community of 
persons which Kant described as the "kingdom of ends" as the root 
m etaphor for understanding the moral sense of reality. For a 
person, ultimately, is not just a being who possesses a psyche or 
manifests certain personality traits as much as a being who stands 
in a moral relation to us, a being we encounter as a Thou (Embers 
and Stars 122 & 128-129).
Our respect - and compassion - for our fellow beings is rooted in our encounters 
w ith them as persons recognized as such; ethical responsibility involves, above 
all, treating our fellows as persons, respectfully and compassionately. Rather 
than an ethical disaster, this seems to provide a promising, although necessarily 
contextual and ambiguous, framework within which to pose our moral questions 
and enact our ethical responses.
However, such a personalistic understanding of ethical responsibility is 
incompatible with Kultgen's moral vision; and it is here, as he outlines his own 
moral agenda, that Kultgen reveals the source of his stubborn adherence to the
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noematic prejudice and his consistent m isreading of Buber’s ideas. In Kultgen's 
own words,
The core of morality in my view consists in respect for persons as 
persons and the consideration of their interests on a par with one’s 
own. The moral person also cares in a lesser way for the interests 
of creatures other than persons when they have interests. And 
lastly he or she accepts responsibility for the environm ent insofar as 
his or her actions affect it and it in turn affects the interests of 
persons and other creatures with interest (63).
Two m utually informing engines drive Kultgen's ethical vision: an implicit 
definition of personhood and an acknowledgment of, and respect for, the 
interests of persons - and, to a lesser degree, of other interest-holders. Both 
engines are fueled by a noematic and atomistic understanding of relationality - 
and thus, reality - in which certain beings are (or are not) persons and certain 
beings have (or do not have) interests. With these categories in place, Kultgen’s 
next step involves setting up criteria to distinguish the persons from nonpersons 
and the interest-holders from those who lack interests. And this he does with 
am azing ease and confidence. "As far as we can tell with any certainty, only 
hum ans are true persons and perhaps not all of them" (64). While Kultgen insists 
that his "conception of ethics makes it fundamentally dependent on science, 
technology, and social engineering" (63), the scientific bases for such claims 
escape me. One criterion for evaluating personhood, however, seems to be the 
ability to articulate one's interests. Later on he writes,
The most distinctive thing about persons is that they speak when 
spoken to. They tell us things about the world and especially about 
themselves which we could not otherwise know. Most relevant to 
ethics is that they tell us that they have interests which we should 
take into consideration in interacting with them. Contrapositively, 
a being who does not speak about its interests is, taking it for w hat 
it presents itself to be, a nonperson (68).
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However, Kultgen admits that some "nonpersons" also have interests even 
though they can't articulate them. "Higher animals are not persons, bu t they 
have interests that deserve our consideration. Other organisms m ay have 
interests, though personally I find it impossible to feel moral obligations toward 
microbes, mildew and the like. I can see no reason at all to attribute interests to 
inorganic objects or obligations toward them to ourselves" (64). In sum, it seems 
that in order to w arrant ethical consideration a being m ust have interests (a 
determination which we presumably make through rigorous scientific 
investigation), and in order to be a person, that being m ust be able to 
communicate those interests. More simply, person = hum an person. And since 
the communication of interests assumes that one has an understandable and 
acknowledged voice among the arbiters of personhood, it will rem ain an issue 
open to debate whether or not the very young, the comatose and those with 
severe developmental disabilities/challenges, as well as blacks, women, Jews, 
Catholics, Native Americans, homosexuals, the homeless and very poor - name 
any group of hum an beings that is or has been denied full personhood within the 
dom inant discourse of the times - qualify as persons.
And while I find absolutely nothing "scientific" about Kultgen's analysis, 
the narrow  scope and rigid inflexibility of his moral agenda do, in fact, allow him 
to meet his other primary criterion for a viable ethic: efficacy. On page 64 he 
writes,
Furthermore, the moral person not only wants to be moral, but he 
or she also wants morality to work - that is, for moral attitudes and 
practices to be widely shared and effective in prom oting the 
interests of beings that have interests. But for morality to work,
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then, we m ust distinguish persons rigorously from subpersons, and 
both from nonpersons. Saying "You" to everything, far from 
nourishing You-saying to those who really count, trivializes it and 
m ay even in the end sap our appreciation for the distinctive nature 
of nonpersons.
Indeed, once we know who the interest-holding persons are (and who they are 
not), our ethical decisions become much simpler, less ambiguous, and their 
legislating and administering become fairly straightforward affairs. Of course, 
w hether or not such a 'morality' rings true to experience, is at all just, or can even 
be called moral in any real sense, are questions left unanswered by Kultgen's 
search for efficacy; campaigns of genocide and wholesale extermination - not to 
mention the countless individual cases of brutality, violation and victimization - 
are often carried out with extreme efficiency once the perpetrators have 
effectively denied the potential personhood of their victims and relegated them 
to the exclusive status of nonpersons or subpersons (I have no idea to what this 
latter designation refers; Kultgen never defines it. From the context in which he 
uses it, it appears to be another category of beings who aren’t full-fledged 
interest-bearers able to tell us about their interests.). A workable ’ethic,’ 
purchased at the price of narrow definitions, limited scope and the wholesale 
exclusion of so m any beings from ethical consideration, is, at best, a fanciful pipe 
dream  and, at worst, a license for brutality. Despite our desire to simplify the 
complexities attendant to our moral decisions and actions, ambiguity and risk - 
and the uncertainty and doubt that (fortunately, at times) accompany them - 
m ust remain. This seems especially so when we recognize the potentially 
universal scope of our ethical responsibility, where any creature may address us 
as a Thou - a person - and call forth our ethical response. And yet, to deny
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categorically this possibility and the claims it may make upon us, simply for the 
sake of efficacy, is nothing less than a failure of moral courage.
Kultgen, then, in his desire to articulate a workable, interest-based 
environm ental ethic, has defined personhood in such a narrow  and noematic 
way that his entire understanding of relationality - and, consequently, I-Thou 
relations - is skewed by the noematic prejudice through which his analysis is 
filtered. Given his definitions, where Thou = person = hum an, and his 
exclusively noematic understanding of dialogue, Kultgen is quite correct to say 
that hum an beings cannot encounter nonhum ans in I-Thou relations. And, in 
truth, we cannot - as long as such a vision impairs our capacity to see things 
otherwise. For if we insist that nonhum an beings are exclusively Its, then this 
insistence will define our relations with them, and Its they will be - objects to 
experience and use, resources to develop (or perhaps even m anage and conserve) 
for the good of hum an persons of intelligible voice. However, once the noematic 
prejudice is bracketed and we once again define personhood in noetic terms, 
where a person is a being whom we may encounter as a Thou, a very different 
conclusion emerges - one that is not only phenomenologically correct bu t also 
true to our experience of nonhum an creatures as Thous. Liberated from arbitrary 
definitions and prejudicial projections, we are free not only to entertain the 
possibility of I-Thou relations between hum ans and nonhum ans, but we are also 
free to testify to their actuality in our lives as well as their compelling imperative 
pow er as they inform and guide our ethical decision-making and action.
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W hat about the more formidable and fundamental questions posed by 
m odern technology? Understood as the deeply entrenched and widely pervasive 
pattern that informs and shapes the way we live in, and take up w ith, our world, 
technology presents a serious challenge to the very possibility of I-Thou dialogue 
occurring between hum an and nonhum an beings.5 Within the fram ework of 
m odern technology, our relational life w ith nature and nonhum an creatures loses 
its vocative character. These creatures do not speak to us of themselves; we do 
not hear or acknowledge - let alone respond to - their self-speaking address. In 
such a silent world, any talk of dialogue with nonhum an beings sounds absurd 
or, at best, nostalgic, primitivist. Consequently, ethical responsibility, as outlined 
in the previous chapter, becomes impossible with regards to such creatures. As 
such, I believe the challenge of technology poses a fundam ental threat to the 
relevance of my essay and requires both a serious examination and a thoughtful 
response.
According to Martin Heidegger, our relations with nature - indeed, reality 
- are set w ithin the framework of m odern technology, the essence of which 
Heidegger calls "Enframing"(Ge-steJ/) (The Question 19). In his essay entitled 
"The Question Concerning Technology," Heidegger defines Enframing as "the 
gathering together that belongs to that setting-upon which sets upon m an and 
puts him  in position to reveal the real, in the mode of ordering, as standing 
reserve" (The Question 24). From this definition of Enframing it is clear that, for 
Heidegger, technology, in its essence, is no mere hum an instrum ent or tool. 
Instead, Enframing comes to us as a "destining" (Geschick) out of Being that 
challenges us to take up with reality as standing reserve. As challenged out of
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Being, we, in turn, challenge reality - probing it, ordering it, securing it for our 
own use.
Experienced within the framework of the dual challenge of Enframing, 
nature, too, is revealed to us as a standing reserve or resource (Bestand ). 
According to Heidegger, "Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be 
immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just so that it m ay be on call for a 
further ordering" (The Question 17). We, in turn, respond to nature-as-standing 
reserve by ordering it, making it available, procuring it for our use; in other 
words, we respond to nature-as-resource by developing it. Here, the challenge 
and the response go hand in hand. As Henry Bugbee observes, "Why, the very 
category of resource commits one by implication to developm ent of it" 
("Wilderness" 8). As a resource, nature is revealed - and has its being - only in 
terms of its ordered and secured function. According to Heidegger, nature-as- 
resource is no longer even an object standing over-against us, but rather, 
"completely unautonom ous, for it has its standing only from the ordering of the 
orderable" (The Question 17).
W ithin the mode of Enframing, then, the relations between hum an beings 
and nonhum an, natural resources can never approach the character of a 
dialogue. Challenged out of Being, we cannot meet or attend to nature's beings; 
we can only challenge them. And nature, as a wholly unautonom ous resource, 
has nothing to say in its own right. Given this silent commerce, nature receives 
its 'voice' according to the way it is revealed to hum an beings within the 
framework of technology. This projected voice says "standing reserve" or
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"resource," and we respond to it by ordering, securing, developing. But such 
commerce is not a dialogue and carries none of the intimacy, m eaning and 
knowledge that dialogue so graciously bestows. Instead, under the rule of 
technological Enframing, only truthless Being is revealed, and nothing is left 
"free to be as it genuinely is" (Lovitt, Ed. note 13 in Heidegger, The Question 45).
A similar form of technological commerce between hum an and nonhum an 
beings occurs when, according to Albert Borgmann, we take up w ith reality 
within the framework of the device paradigm. For Borgmann, the mechanical 
device best illustrates the dominant pattern modern technology stam ps upon our 
lives. "Positively speaking, the paradigm  of the contemporary world is the 
technological dev ice .... The technological device is the radical and increasingly 
sharp separation of means from ends" ("The Explanation" 110). In the 
technological device, means and ends are clearly determined according to the 
function of a particular device. For example, a "moving sidewalk" is a device 
designed to move a person from point A to point B effortlessly. This is the 
device's function - its end. All of the machinery and energy required to make 
such effortless movement possible are merely the means to procure that end. 
Furtherm ore, the desired end is a very clearly defined and highly isolated 
function of a far more complex event - walking. In this example, one function of 
walking is highlighted while others are neglected or dismissed, and the means by 
which this is accomplished - in effect, a giant conveyor belt for hum ans - is 
hidden a n d /o r  made as unencroaching as possible. According to Borgmann, "In 
the progress of technology, the function increases in prominence and purity 
whereas the machinery shrinks and recedes" ("The Explanation" 111). Ideally, the
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goal of technology is the deliverance of the pure function unencum bered from 
the means by which it is procured.
While this pattern of separating means from ends and isolating functions 
m anifests itself m ost clearly in mechanical devices such as m oving sidewalks, 
television sets and microwave ovens, our relations w ith nature are similarly 
m arked by the stam p of the device paradigm. In Technology and the Character 
of Contem porary Life Borgmann writes, "When we look at a tree accordingly, we 
see so m uch lumber or cellulose fiber; the needles, branches, the bark, and the 
roots are waste. Rock is 5 percent metal and the rest is spoils. An animal is a 
machine that produces so much meat. Whichever of its functions fails to serve 
that purpose is indifferent or burdensom e” (192). In these examples, Borgmann 
illustrates how we take up with nature's creatures within the device paradigm, 
where means and ends are strictly separated. Here, the desired ends - lumber, 
metal, m eat - are singled out as the sole (important) functions of the tree, rock 
and animal resources. Borgmann calls these isolated functions commodities 
(Technology 43). Lumber is the commodity desired from the timber resource; 
metal is the commodity desired from the mineral resource; m eat is the 
commodity desired from the animal (either game or livestock) resource. As 
resources, nature’s creatures are perceived in terms of the commodities they 
deliver - the hum anly designated ends they serve; in turn, we study, manipulate, 
control, even conserve, these natural resources for the purpose of procuring the 
commodities they offer us.
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Of course, defining these creatures solely in terms of a single, isolated 
function is terribly reductive, and in so defining them, they become flat, one­
dimensional and fragmentary. Accordingly, they can no longer address us in 
their own right and speak to us of their richness, depth and integrity. U nder the 
com m odious functionalism and instrumentality of the device paradigm , the self­
speaking voices of the nonhum an beings and things of nature are silenced, and 
nature becomes nothing more than a mute and lifeless aggregate of natural 
resources. As Borgmann explains, "The rule of instrumentality, in Langdon 
W inner's expression, allows us to take possession of things and overpow er them. 
But in the process we extinguish the life of things and lose touch w ith them ” 
(Technology 59). In the language of dialogue, we can no longer m eet them  in I- 
Thou intercourse. Instead, our relations with the beings and things of nature are 
limited to those occurring between a developer or consumer and a resource or 
commodity. Unable to speak of itself, and existing solely in terms of hum an 
purposiveness and instrumentality, nature is revealed to us as an assemblage of 
resources whose function is to produce commodities for our consumption. In 
turn, we respond, as consumers - or developers, of manufacturers, or 
distributors, or salespersons along the path traveled by a resource on its way to 
becoming a commodity available for the final goal of hum an consum ption. But, 
as was the case within Heidegger’s technological Enframing, such commerce is 
not a dialogue, and any discussion of dialogical relations occurring w ithin this 
commercial setting sounds absurd.
Both Heidegger and Borgmann attempt to describe the dom inant pattern 
by which we take up with reality - including nature - under the rule of m odern
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technology. And while these patterns differ, certain similarities exist. In both 
cases, our relational life with nature is severely attenuated. W ithin the 
technological paradigm , the deep and engaging voice of nature is reduced to the 
flat, one-dimensional utterance of a resource to be set upon, ordered, secured and 
stockpiled, or whose function is to be isolated and procured as a commodity. In 
turn, the range of appropriate responses available to us involve the enactment of 
developm ent and consumption. Framed within these patterns and defined by 
our respective roles, dialogue - the reciprocal and meaningful encounter between 
an I and a Thou - seems unlikely, if not altogether impossible. Resources and 
commodities have no voice apart from that projected upon them according to our 
needs and desires, and any capacity for attentive listening in us, as developers or 
consumers, is shouted down by the mandates of instrumentality, purposiveness 
and commodious intentionality.
I agree with Heidegger and Borgmann that the pattern of m odern 
technology colors and informs every aspect of our relational lives - including our 
relations w ith nature. For me, however, the crucial question remains: does this 
pattern exclusively and exhaustively define our relations with nature's creatures, 
or can we also take up with them outside of the technological paradigm? If we 
can only experience nature within the framework of technology, then my entire 
project is doom ed from the very beginning. However, if we still have access to 
reality outside the rule of technology, then it remains possible for the nonhum an 
beings and tilings of nature to speak to us as other - both more and less - than 
standing reserve, resources, commodities; in other words, dialogue - I-Thou
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dialogue - between attentive hum anity and eloquent, self-speaking nature m ay 
indeed occur.
Neither Heidegger nor Borgmann understands the technological pattern 
he describes as exhaustively determining the possible ways hum an beings may 
take up w ith nature. According to Heidegger, at this point in hum an history we 
are "destined" out of Being to set upon nature as a resource under the challenge 
of Enframing, which is the essence of technology. This destining is neither a 
m atter of hum an choice nor human activity. As Heidegger puts it, "Always the 
destiny of revealing holds complete sway over man" (The Question 25). And yet, 
at the same time, this destiny is not simply fate but rather the potential birthplace 
of freedom. In the sentence following the one just quoted, Heidegger explains, 
"But that destining is never a fate that compels. For man becomes truly free only 
insofar as he belongs to the realm of destining and so becomes one who listens 
and hears, and not one who is simply constrained to obey" (25). Freedom, for the 
person living under the rule of technological Enframing, involves recognizing 
oneself as destined out of Being in the mode of Enframing and acknowledging 
this situation for what it is. In that recognition and acknowledgment, one 
becomes aware of that destining as a great danger - but a danger that, 
recognized, may also save. Enframing is the "supreme danger" because, "As a 
destining, it banishes man into that kind of revealing which is an ordering.
W here this order holds sway, it drives out every other possibility of revealing" 
(Heidegger, The Question 27). However, recognized as a danger, the danger is 
one that saves, for in our awareness of the danger, we allow for the possibility of 
the "turning" of Being and the replacing of Enframing with a new m ode of
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revealing. In this turning, the truth of Being flashes into the truthless Being 
revealed in the m ode of Enframing (Heidegger, The Question 45); through such 
an in-flashing, hum ans gain "insight into that which is" (Heidegger, The Question 
47).
In his essay "The Thing," Heidegger describes a new mode of revealing 
that this turning or in-flashing may usher in to replace technological Enframing. 
Here, reality reveals itself not as standing reserve to be aggressively set upon, 
ordered and stockpiled, but a place - a 'home' - of authentic hum an "dwelling," 
where we stand back and allow for the thinging of things in a worlding world.
As Albert Hofstadter explains,
There is a world of difference between man's present life as 
technological being under the aegis of Gestell, frame, framing - in 
which everything, including man himself, becomes m aterial for a 
process of self-assertive production, self-assertive imposition of 
hum an will on things regardless of their own essential natures - 
and a life in which we would genuinely dwell as a hum an being 
(Ed. Introduction to Heidegger, Poetry, Language. Thought xv).
As dwellers, we take up with and acknowledge things not according to the 
interpretive grids of intentionality we impose upon them as resources, but as the 
things they are.6 In letting things thing we let them speak of their being, and in 
turn, such speech resounds with the truth of Being. According to Heidegger, "If 
we let the thing be present in its thinging from out of the worlding world, then 
we are thinking of the thing as thing. Taking thought in this way, we let 
ourselves be concerned by the thing's worlding being. Thinking in this way, we 
are called by the thing as the thing" (Poetry, Language. Thought 181). In the 
m ode of dwelling, hum ans are capable of vocative relations w ith things
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(including the things of nature), where these things speak/enact themselves and 
we acknowledge their self-articulating address.
And, as I've suggested throughout this essay, such vocative relations 
im ply vocatio - a summons or call to vocation, vocational response. Address and 
acknowledgm ent - speaking and hearing - invite response, and in and through 
this dynamic the possibility of truth, meaning and authentic hum an existence, 
which involves, above all else, hum ane action, graciously opens up to us. 
According to Hofstadter, by authentic hum an dwelling - and thinking - 
Heidegger means
... to exist as a hum an being in an authentic relationship as mortal 
to other mortals, to earth and sky, to the divinities present or 
absent, to things and plants and animals; it means, to let each of 
these be - to let it presence in openness, in the full appropriateness 
of its nature - and to hold oneself open to its being, recognizing it 
and responding to it appropriately in one's own being, the way in 
which one oneself goes on, lives; and then, perhaps, in this ongoing 
life one may hear the call of the language that speaks of the being of 
all these beings and respond to it in a mortal language that speaks 
of w hat it hears (Ed. Introduction to Heidegger, Poetry, Language, 
Thought x).
Obviously, I find this picture of hum an being as dweller very attractive; it 
resonates deeply with the ideas of Buber and Bugbee that I have laid dow n as the 
hermeneutical foundation of this essay. To think and dwell, in Heidegger's 
sense, means to live among "the fourfold" and all that has being in something 
akin to a spirit of dialogue.
Despite these affinities, however, two related question remain 
unanswered. First, how do we move from being enframers to becoming
149
dwellers? Or, in other words, how can we take up with things as things and not 
resources? In "The Thing” Heidegger writes,
W hen and in what way do things appear as things? They do not 
appear b\j menus of hum an making. But neither do they appear 
w ithout the vigilance of mortals. The first step toward such 
vigilance is the step back from the thinking that merely represents - 
that is, explains - to the thinking that responds and recalls.
The step back from the one thinking to the other is no m ere shift of 
attitude. It can never be any such thing for this reason alone: that 
all attitudes, including the ways in which they shift, remain 
committed to precincts of representational thinking. The step back 
does, indeed, depart from the sphere of mere attitudes. The step 
back takes up its residence in a co-responding which, appealed to 
in the world's being by the world's being, answers within itself to 
that appeal. A mere shift of attitude is powerless to bring about the 
advent of the thing as thing, just as nothing that stands today as an 
object in the distanceless can ever be simply switched over into a 
thing (Poetry, Language, Thought 181-182).
/
For Heidegger, the fundamental way in which we take up with reality is not 
exclusively - or even primarily - dependent upon hum an consciousness or 
volition. To suppose that reality is so plastic that by a conscious shift of attitude 
we can alter the nature of our relations with things is merely another variation on 
the theme of that setting upon characteristic of Enframing - another ordering, re­
ordering of the order, another manipulation of the m anipulanda. To say, for 
example, "I will shift the way I think in order to replace Enframing with 
Dwelling," only mires us deeper within technology and distances us further from 
any new  m ode of revealing. For Heidegger, the way we take up w ith things is 
informed at the level of Being. And just as we have been challenged out of Being 
to set upon reality as standing reserve, so, too, the turning by which a new mode 
of revealing - characterized by dwelling, for example - comes to pass also occurs 
within Being.
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And yet, it also seems clear that in order for the turning to happen, hum an 
beings do play a role. In the quote cited above, Heidegger talks about the 
importance of hum an "vigilance," which involves a "stepping back" (an image 
that contrasts strikingly with the setting upon of Enframing) from 
representational thinking and its coincident ordering, m anipulating and 
controlling. In fact, for Heidegger, vigilance seems to define the proper essence 
of the hum an being living under the rule of technology and recognizing the 
dangers therein. As he explains in "The Turning," "Man is indeed needed and 
used for the restorative surm ounting of the essence of technology. But m an is 
used here in his essence that corresponds to tht surm ounting .... [M]odern man 
m ust first and above all find his way back into the full breath of the space proper 
to his essence" (The Question 39). Several pages later H eidegger describes that 
essence as "the one who waits, the one who attends upon the coming to presence 
of B eing ,... the shepherd of Being" (42). To recognize our role in the turning 
within Being to involve vigilant waiting, attending and shepherding (and 
perhaps, above all, poetical thinking) is no easy task under the rule of 
technology, where a host of aggressive, purpose-laden activities like setting 
upon, ordering, manipulating and developing hold sway. So it appears that the 
proper essence of the person living within the technological fram ework involves 
a subtle and patient subversion of the essence of technology - a subversion we 
practice as we await the "granted gift" of the turning within Being and the 
replacem ent of Enframing with a new mode of revealing (Lovitt, Ed.
Introduction in Heidegger, The Question, xxxvi).
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But as we vigilantly await this gift, what can we say about our relations 
w ith nature's creatures? Until the advent of the turning within Being, can these 
creatures speak to us as something other than natural resources? According to 
Heidegger, nature may, potentially, be revealed (indeed, has been so revealed at 
other times in hum an history) as other than a resource, but still held in the 
destining of Enframing, we cannot actually know nature as other than a resource. 
Until Enframing is replaced by a new, more truthful m ode of revealing, our 
commerce w ith nature remains just that: the commercial interaction between a 
resource and a developer. Technological Enframing does not completely and 
exhaustively define all potential relations with nature in the future (so, in this 
sense, Heidegger is not a determinist), but it does appear to inform and 
determ ine all relations occurring under its present, all-encompassing rule. As 
long as Enframing holds sway, things cannot thing; they cannot articulate 
themselves independently of our imposed representations and projected 
purposes.
And it is this seemingly inescapable conclusion of Heidegger's description 
and interpretation of the m odern technological paradigm  with which I m ust take 
issue. The basis of my disagreement with Heidegger is not theoretical, per se; for 
the most part, I find his treatment of technology remarkably compelling, 
insightful and on the mark. And yet, for me, it fails the ultimate 
phenomenological test - the test that all paradigmatic explanations m ust pass if 
they are to be truly illuminating and elucidating: the test of experience.7 And 
here, instead of ringing true, it clanks sharply against my own experiences and 
those witnessed to by others. Despite the pervasive im print of the pattern of
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m odern technology upon every facet of our lives, I cannot agree with Heidegger 
that this pattern exclusively and comprehensively determines our present 
relational life with our fellow beings - hum an or otherwise. Experience suggests, 
and I 'faith' ('believe' sounds too hollow and arbitrary here), that the things and 
beings with whom  we share our existence can and do speak themselves to us, 
and we, in all our habituated, technologically-conditioned deafness, still retain 
the capacity, however truncated, to hear their self-speaking address apart form 
our purposes and intentions; and what's more, we can respond in a m anner 
commensurate with their eloquent evocation. In other words, we can not only 
experience our fellow creatures as resources - Its - but also, on occasion, meet 
them as something more, less and other than resources - Thous; dialogue remains 
a possibility that may be graciously actualized - here and now. For me, any 
satisfactory account of technology, if it is not to mis-speak or betray the bedrock 
"reality" of such encounters, m ust allow for their possibility and attem pt to 
interpret their significance for the way we live our lives.
So now, let's return to Albert Borgmann's treatment of technology, where 
we find a present and actual counterpart to the technological commerce 
instantiated under the device paradigm. Clearly, for Borgmann, the pattern of 
technology dominates; nature speaks to us (is given 'voice') prim arily as an 
assemblage of resources and commodities, and we respond prim arily as 
developers and consumers. But nature can also speak to us as a "focal thing," "a 
unique and eloquent thing that addresses us in its own right" (Borgmann, 
Technology 181). In fact, according to Borgmann, "On this continent nature in its 
pristine state is the focal power which is most clearly eloquent in its own right
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since it has, through definition as it were, escaped the rule of technology" 
(Technology 182). For Borgmann, wild nature can speak to us as something 
other than a resource; it can speak in its own right, and, presumably, we can 
receive and acknowledge its self-speaking address. W ithin Borgmann’s 
understanding of technology, dialogue with nature's creatures rem ains a 
possibility that may be realized, not at some unspecified future time, when a 
rather abstract and mysterious turning within Being ushers in a new  m ode of 
revealing, but here and now.
But how can we encounter the beings and things of nature outside the 
device paradigm ? How is it that nature may also speak to us as a focal thing and 
not merely a collection of resources and commodities? Obviously, we cannot 
hear the self-speaking voice of nature as long as we take up w ith nature's 
creatures exclusively as developers and consumers. For Borgmann, the 
counterpart of these 'commerical' activities is active engagement and 
participation in a focal practice commensurate with a focal thing. According to 
Borgmann, "Such a practice is required to counter technology in its patterned 
pervasiveness and to guard focal things in their depth and integrity" (Technology 
209-210). If such practices are truly to "counter technology" and "guard focal 
things," they m ust be practiced in a way that challenges the modus operandi of the 
technological pattern. For example, walking or backpacking is a focal practice 
that corresponds to the focal thing of wild nature. But, wilderness walking is 
not, of necessity, a focal practice that challenges the basic agenda of the device 
paradigm. I may walk in a wilderness area (for an afternoon or two weeks) fully 
entrenched within a thoroughly technological framework - setting out in order to
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"bag a peak," get some exercise, find some solitude, or even have a wilderness 
experience, meet God, engage in a focal practice or just have a few I-Thou 
dialogues with the critters. In all this, the procurative intentionality and 
instrum entality of technology remain firmly in place; I remain a consumer 
shopping about the wilderness for commodities, regardless of the sublime or 
’spiritual’ nature of the goods I seek. And despite - and maybe just because of - 
the near-comic loftiness of my intentions, encountering nature as a truly focal 
thing will almost surely escape my 'grasp.' For by definition, focal things, 
experienced and acknowledged as such, cannot be reduced to commodities; they 
are unprocurable, and all our efforts to procure them only work to distance us 
further from their gracious and meaningful presence as focal things. As 
Borgmann explains,
Such [focal] experiences require openness on our part, but openness 
cannot produce or guarantee them. They are essentially 
unforeplanned and amazing. Even when they are preceded by 
calculation and preparation, when they truly come to pass, we 
acknowledge them as surpassing our shrewdness and merit. W hat 
is so experienced is the strict counterpart to the device. It is in 
principle unavailable and it is so procured on pain of destroying it 
as a truly focal thing or event ("The Explanation" 114).
We come into contact with focal things, not simply because we are well-disposed 
or open to such contact (although this does play a role), and surely not because 
we set out to make such encounters happen; rather, through participation in a 
focal practice we place ourselves in the presence of, and engage ourselves (body 
and m ind, heart and soul) with, focal things that are so staggeringly and 
shatteringly eloquent.
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More than anything else, it is this evocative pow er of eloquent, focal 
things to break through the silence of our technologically-conditioned deafness 
that offers us access to reality - and nature - outside the device paradigm. So, to 
return  to my earlier example of wilderness walking, in the process of 
accomplishing my realizable backcountry goals ("bagging" m y peaks, exhausting 
m y body, temporarily escaping the societal demons that haunt me), and even in 
m y counterproductive striving after those other, essentially unprocurable, goods 
(contact with wildness, intimations of divinity, integrated engagement, 
participation in dialogue), the eloquence of wild nature may still overwhelm me 
and bestow upon me a grace and fulfilment above and beyond any I so 
hopelessly sought. And, perhaps with time and regular enactment, my 
wilderness walking may become a focal practice truly com m ensurate w ith wild 
nature as a focal thing. As a genuine focal practice, I no longer walk in wild 
places in order to accomplish anything - although I may still do a n d /o r  discover 
all that I've listed above; focal practices are done for their own sake. So, I walk in 
wild places to walk in wild places, to immerse myself in the inexhaustible 
richness and abiding grace of this wild, focal thing - because, as John M uir so 
beautifully put it, it's "the time that will not be subtracted from the sum  of your 
life" (Quoted in Kittredge 105-106).
W hat I believe Muir testifies to in this phrase is the life-bestowing, life- 
affirming and life-directing contact with what is real and what really matters, 
contact w ith that which offers meaning for our lives, contact with that which 
orients and guides us and whose touch we abandon only at the risk of losing our 
way - contact with, in Borgmann's terminology, "focal reality." For Borgmann,
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The term "focal reality" in an essay such as this is simply a 
placeholder for the encounters each of us has with things that of 
themselves have engaged mind and body and centered our lives. 
Com manding presence, continuity with the world, and centering 
power are signs of focal things. They are not w arrants, however.
Focal things warrant themselves. To present them is never more 
than to recall them (Crossing 119-120).
To speak of focal reality and to testify to our participation in, or access to, that 
reality, is to accept neither the naive and no longer tenable realism of modernity, 
in which reality readily presents itself as a stable, block universe, a flat field of 
objects on hand to be experienced, named, understood and m anipulated, nor the 
anthropocentric hubris of so much postmodernism, where whatever we m ean by 
reality has no standing apart from that conferred upon it by hum an subjectivity 
and where w hat the philosopher really means by nature is "nature-construct" and 
w hat the theologian (or better still, the faithful devotee) really means by God is 
"god-construct." Instead, focal reality, as I understand it, seems to point to 
reality, not as a static field, but as an occurrence or event rising up between a 
thing as a presence - firm and 'thick' with its own being, its non-negotiable 
otherness - and a co-presence receptive and responsive to this other, beckoning 
presence. And it seems that the reality of focal things is not so m uch 'proven' by 
our ability to kick them, as Berkeley’s empiricism would have it, as it is by these 
things' self-articulating capacity to step up to us and, at times, stom p on our 
heads.
Of course, if we shut ourselves off from eloquent things or shout them 
dow n with our projections and conceptual representations, we may come to 
doubt or altogether deny the eloquence of anything and everything. As
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Borgmann points out, "When a postmodern theorist m akes that claim [that things 
lack eloquence] in a windpwless lecture hall containing hundreds of hum ans, 
speaking up on behalf of the voices silenced by the auditorium  walls requires 
more sensitivity and courage than most of us can muster" (Crossing 51). W ithin 
the confines of a world thoroughly dominated by hum an artifice and fabrication, 
such a postm odern perspective often seems incontrovertibly true. But step 
outside the lecture halls and haute espresso bars, and walk in Muir's - or 
Thoreau's - footsteps awhile.8 W hat had seemed so undeniably correct in that 
sterile and unengaging world will, I believe, be exposed as arrogantly false by a 
deeper truth as one picks one's way carefully across a steep and crumbly scree 
slope, or keeps vigil in an alpine meadow on a fullmoon night, or as one just sits 
to watch a pika gather hay among the rocks on a sunny October day at 9,000 feet. 
Focal realism, as I read Borgmann, seems to allow for the eloquence of things like 
scree slopes, alpine meadows and pikas, while at the same time, it also 
acknowledges the significance and meaning - the reality - of our encounters with 
them. And while this reality cannot come to fruition apart from, or outside of, 
our engaged participation in it, neither can it be reduced to a mere reality- 
construct, the product of our conjuring and willful imposition. Focal reality 
occurs between us and those things that we come to know as non-negotiably and 
irreducibly other than us and our constructs - as focal things that engage us, 
speak to us and meet us.
In sum, then, Borgmann's treatment of technology, unlike Heidegger’s, 
seems to allow for the present possibility of taking up with nature outside of 
technology’s rule. Although the device paradigm  is widely and deeply
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instantiated, it is not exhaustive. Nature is not only an assemblage of resources 
and commodities, the passive recipient of our purposive and consum ptive 
projections; it can also be an eloquent and self-speaking focal thing. In turn, we 
are not only developers and consumers whose commerce w ith nature is limited 
by our procurative and commodious intentions; we also have the capacity, 
particularly through our active participation in focal practices where we become 
fully engaged with, or immersed in, the things of nature, to hear and 
acknowledge nature’s voice as it speaks of itself and in its own right. Through 
the resonance of this eloquent speech within the engaged - 'attuned,' perhaps - 
respondent, focal reality emerges: a reality where we find ourselves face to face 
with som ething real, some "dense and opaque" (Bugbee, Inw ard M orning 163) 
other whose non-negotiable otherness confounds all attempts to explain it away 
as one more product of hum an intent an d /o r making; a reality where we 
recognize and affirm the meaning and value of these others as well as our being- 
together-with-them; and, finally, a reality where we may find a center of 
m eaning from which we can venture forth to live and act - meaningfully and 
responsibly.
For me, it is the twofoldness of Borgmann's account of technology that 
rings true. Obviously, even overwhelmingly, technology informs, and usually 
dictates, the terms of our relations with nature. But, there is also focal reality and 
our encounters with nature as a focal thing. Neither mode of taking up  with 
nature can be dismissed in any satisfactory account of technology - or experience, 
in general. And within this twofoldness, as Borgmann describes, acknowledges 
and interprets it, I see room for the relational twofoldness of which Buber speaks
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- both I-Thou and I-It. Put negatively, I find nothing in Borgmann's account of 
our life under the pattern,of modern technology that excludes the possibility of 
our m eeting nonhum an creatures in dialogue. So, while I fully recognize the 
indelible mark technology stamps on our relations with nature, I feel confident, 
despite this recognition, in maintaining that I-Thou dialogues w ith m artens and 
m ountains, canyons and ponderosa pines not only can occur, but, in all actuality, 
do occur, and that such occurences are important for the way we live with, and 
act toward, such creatures.
W ith the possibility and actuality of dialogue comes the possibility of 
ethical responsibility. Nature as a resource or a commodity makes no self­
speaking claims upon us; under technology's rule, we do all the claiming. 
Therefore, we cannot talk about our ethical responsibility to nature in any 
meaningful sense of the word. Of course, we may still speak of environmental 
ethics and employ the rhetoric of conservation - resource management, sustained 
yield, wise use, multiple use, etc. But to practice ethical responsibility to 
nonhum an nature, nature's creatures m ust speak to us, not as natural resources, 
bu t as and of themselves, independent of our categories of use and purpose. 
Practicing ethical responsibility requires the presence of an eloquent, self­
speaking other to whom one responds. Only as the beings and things of nature 
address us in their own right, and we receive their address, can they call forth the 
respect and compassion upon which we may ground our ethical response.
IV. ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITY TO NONHUMAN CREATURES: A 
GENERAL OVERVIEW
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So now, having responded to both the challenge of the noematic prejudice 
and the challenge of technology, and having, I hope, m aintained the veracity and 
integrity of the three premises stated earlier, I would like to return to Buber's 
philosophy of dialogue and examine what the practice of ethical responsibility 
tow ard nonhum an creatures m ight look like - for him and for me. And while 
Buber makes it unmistakably clear that I-Thou relations can and do occur 
between hum an and nonhum an beings, he and his contemporary interpreters say 
very little about how the meaning and knowledge received in these encounters 
are embodied in ethical response. The account of his I-Thou relation with the 
tree, for example, does not proceed beyond the description of the encounter I 
quoted earlier; he does not move on to suggest how such a meeting claims us and 
calls us forth to actualize its meaning responsively - ethically. However, while 
discussing our relations with nonhum an beings (and, quite specifically, non- 
sentient beings in this particular instance) in his "Afterword" to I and Thou, 
Buber writes, "What matters in this sphere [our relations with non-sentient 
things] is that we should do justice with an open mind to the actuality that opens 
up  before us" (173). While I suppose it is possible to read this passage in a less 
explicitly ethical way, I believe Buber means for us to "do justice" in our relations 
w ith trees and rocks (a fairly radical notion for his day - for our day - no matter 
how one chooses to read the passage) not only by becoming aware of the self­
speaking address of such creatures, but also by practicing responsibility - ethical 
responsibility - as we move to actualize and incarnate the meaning and 
knowledge received in these encounters through our actions a n d /o r  non-actions.
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In addition, given the rhythm  of dialogue and responsibility outlined in 
Buber's work and in this paper, it is inconceivable that trees and the like could 
address us, and we could enter into dialogue with them, w ithout such events 
m aking claims upon us and informing our decisions and actions regarding these 
creatures. For, as stated in Chapter Two of this paper, the very m eaning of the 
address received in the moment of dialogue lies in its evocative force; it is a 
sum m oning address that calls for an answer, beckons for a response. The 
evocative voice of the other, heard and acknowledged as such, places us in a 
situation of responsibility, regardless of whether or not the particular other 
whom we meet is human, sentient or alive. As Emmanuel Levinas explains, 
"[A]nd the tree, too, instead of being of use to me or dissolving into a series of 
phenom enal appearances, can confront me in person, speak to me and elicit a 
response .... I am in a measure obligated by it" (145). And yet, the sum m oning 
address of the tree not only places us under obligation; through the knowledge 
and meaning received in such an encounter we may also find ourselves 
em pow ered and directed to act with decisiveness, commitment and integrity. In 
receiving the self-spoken address of the tree in the I-Thou relation, we come to 
know the tree in an intimate and meaningful, although decidely non-objective 
way, recognizing its otherness, independence, integrity and non-instrum ental 
value, while at the same time acknowledging the ties of our co-creaturely kinship 
- our fundam ental being-together. Here, the obligation and knowledge - the 
responsibility and meaning - received in the I-Thou dialogue come together. As 
we attem pt to respond to the exigencies present in the call of our fellow beings, 
we will, at the same time, seek to embody our dialogically-sponsored knowledge 
of these beings - as both other and kin - in respectful and caring, compassionate
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action. And, conversely, to know these beings in such an intimate way 
engenders a n d /o r  deepens our desire to affirm them in committed, responsible 
action. In such instances, we find ourselves obligated in a way that has nothing 
to do w ith the more compulsory or heteronomous connotations that so often 
distort our understanding of obligation; we are obliged to respond to the 
evocative claim of the other and from the depths of our concern and m utual 
affirmation. For Buber, such affirmation is critical in our relations with 
nonhum an beings such as trees. As Malcolm Diamond writes, "What is of central 
significance for Buber is our ability to affirm the tree as existing just as it is, in its 
own right, independently of our purposes" (30). Clearly, such affirmation, if it is 
truly genuine, will manifest itself in our decisions and actions concerning these 
creatures. Examined in this light, then, "doing justice" in our relations with trees 
- or bears or m ountain ranges - becomes, most fundamentally, a m atter of 
'affirmative action,' so to speak; it is an attem pt to "put to the proof in action" (as 
Buber says) our affirmation of the other - and, at the same time, ourselves - 
sponsored in the sacrament of dialogue.
As we come to recognize that not only human beings but also trees and 
wildflowers and mountains speak to us in ways that call forth our response, the 
fundam entally vocative and responsive character of our existence, w rit large, 
daw ns upon us with increasing clarity. That is, we become aware of ourselves as 
creatures who are called upon and who must venture to answer, not only to the 
call of the particular, finite beings whom we meet in the countless relational 
events of our daily lives, but also for the very meaning of our creaturely 
existence. According to the philosophical/theological anthropology outlined in
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the previous chapter, our creatureliness comes to us as a sum m ons or vocation- a 
task that we, in our uniqueness, are called upon to fulfill and for which we alone 
are responsible. Furthermore, we practice responsibility for this task - to become 
ever more fully the creatures we are created to be - in and through our 
participation in meaningful, dialogical relations - holy intercourse - w ith our 
fellow creatures in the ongoing process of creation. Therefore, as we step out to 
m eet our fellow creatures in dialogue and attem pt to actualize the m eaning and 
knowledge received in such encounters through our concrete actions, we come to 
recognize our existence as, at root, vocational and, at the same time, move 
tow ard fulfilling the very task for which we have been sum m oned.
For Buber, this existential vocation is all-encompassing and finds its 
fulfillment only insofar as all aspects of our relational life are informed by the 
spirit of dialogue, including our relations with creatures like trees and herons 
and waterfalls. We cannot practice responsibility for the creaturely task 
entrusted to us if we close ourselves off from, and fail to acknowledge, the 
address of our nonhum an fellow creatures as they speak to us in their own right. 
In his essay entitled "What is Man?” Buber explains,
In virtue of his nature and his situation man has a threefold living 
relation. He can bring his nature and situation to full reality in his 
life if all his living relations become essential. And he can let 
elements of his nature and situation remain in unreality by letting 
only single living relations become essential, while considering and 
treating the others as unessential.
Man's threefold living relation is, first, his relation to the world and 
to things, second, his relation to men - both to individuals and to 
the m any - third, his relation to the mystery of being - which the 
philosopher calls the Absolute and the believer calls God, and 
which cannot in fact be eliminated from the situation even by a 
m an who rejects both designations.
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The relation to things is lacking in Kierkegaard, he knows things 
only as similes. In Heidegger it can be found only as a technical, 
purposive relation. But a purely technical relation cannot be an 
essential one, since it is not the whole being and the whole reality of 
the thing one is related to which enter into the relation, but just its 
applicability to a definite aim, its technical suitability .... But 
besides, and in the m idst of this, there is a manifold relation to 
things in their wholeness, their independence, and their 
purposelessness. The m an who gazes w ithout purpose on a tree is 
no less "everyday" than the one who looks at a tree to learn which 
branch would make the best stick (Between 177 &178).
If we are to become more fully and authentically the hum an creatures we are 
created to be, our relations with nonhum an creatures m ust become, in Buber's 
words, "essential." Our creaturely task extends to our relations with animals, 
plants and rocks, as well as hum an beings, and approaches fulfillment as we take 
up  w ith these creatures in a spirit of dialogue, ready and available to m eet them 
as Thous who may speak to us of themselves from out of the depths of their 
otherness, integrity and non-instrumental value. Conversely, we fail to practice 
responsibility for this task - and deny ourselves that degree of authenticity 
available to us in our brokenness and finitude - if our relations w ith nonhum an 
beings are defined exclusively in terms of It, where we deny or silence the self­
speaking eloquence of the beings and things we meet and sum m arily reduce 
them to resources that exist solely for our appropriation, developm ent and use. 
For Buber, to become the creatures we are created to be we m ust rem ain open 
and alive to the voice of all creation (singing out in and through all its 
particularity) and the possibility - unlimited and, at the same time, always 
unprocurable and unforeseeable - of I-Thou dialogue, even w ith trees and 
m ountain streams.
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In and through our participation in dialogue w ith our fellow beings we 
practice responsibility for our creaturely task and come to know, albeit partially, 
a sense of authenticity and vocational integrity in our lives. We receive an 
intim ation - oftentimes perhaps no more than a hazy apparition - of who we are 
and w ho we are called to become, as well as the finally unbridgeable gap 
between the two, and this sensibility funds our conscience (in Buber's sense) and 
informs our decision-making and acting. It is from out of the depths of this 
personal awareness of who we are (and who we are not) and our sense of . 
creaturely vocation that we respond to the address of our fellow creature as we 
struggle to incarnate both the meaning of a particular relational event and the 
m eaning of our existential being-called-upon in ethical action. And if, as 
discussed above, the self-speaking call of our nonhum an fellow creatures, 
received as such, elicits our respect and compassion, then our awareness of the 
task entrusted to us to fulfill through our co-creaturely participation in the 
m utuality of creation may provide us with the personal strength and direction to 
em body that respect and compassion in non-arbitrary, committed action - ethical 
action. As we come to recognize ever more clearly who we may be - in all our 
creatureliness - we may find the capacity and knowledge to act as we m ust - with 
regards to our fellow creatures.
Finally, in and through the I-Thou dialogues with our fellow creatures 
shines the presence of the sponsoring and enduring Creator, who addresses us in 
and through the m ultitude of events that make up the ongoing process of 
creation. As we avail ourselves to the address of the tree and the m ountain goat 
and meet them in I-Thou dialogue, we meet, co-presently, the eternal Thou.
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According to Buber, "But what is greater for us than all enigmatic webs at the 
m argins of being is the central actuality of an everyday hour on earth, w ith a 
streak of sunshine on a maple twig and an intimation of the eternal You" (I and 
Thou 135-136). Certainly, neither the maple twig nor m ountain goat is the 
eternal Thou; like us, they are finite creatures - derivative beings sponsored and 
anim ated from a source outside themselves. And yet, as we m eet these fellow 
creatures, in all their - and our - creatureliness and finitude, we find our lives 
graced by the presence of the non-derivative and unconditioned, which Buber 
calls the eternal Thou. Illuminated by this holy - and wholly O ther - glow, our I- 
Thou relations with trees and goats become nothing less than sacrament and 
revelation, in and through which the divine presence becomes mainfest and, to a 
degree, even articulate as it dwells among us - between us.
And, as we participate in these sacramental, revelatory encounters, we 
find ourselves called upon - commanded - to incarnate the grace and meaning 
received in them through our actions and non-actions. That is, we receive not 
only the grace and guidance of the divine presence but also the concomitant 
responsibility of the divine imperative. For Buber, this is the core of the divine- 
hum an dialogue: God speaks to us - and summons us - in and through the 
particular events of our everyday lives, and we respond to this divine address - 
and claim - through our decisions and actions regarding these same events. 
Concerning the specifics of this "contentless" divine address and our attempts to 
respond to it in an ethically decisive manner, we can say nothing apart from the 
concrete particularity of the situations in which we find ourselves divinely called 
upon. In each moment, God calls upon us, in wholly new and unforeseeable
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ways, to decide and act, in equally new and spontaneous ways. And yet, as 
stated in the previous chapter, what God dem ands of us may be nothing other 
than the Ten Commandments or the divine injunction in Micah, which dem ands 
"justice," "love," and that we "walk humbly" with God. But we m ust remember 
that these are not prescriptions for ethical conduct that we may apply universally 
and abstractly to the unique events of decision and choice. Rather, they are 
com m ands that we m ust hear afresh and anew as they are spoken to us - equally 
afresh and anew - in the concrete, particular and altogether unforeseeable 
situations of our lives; as Friedman explains, we m ust "re-hear" these commands 
again and again, according to the unique exigencies of each situation 
(Touchstones 137).
W ith this in mind, then, let us return for a m oment to the tree and the 
m ountain goat, considering the fresh and radical ways we may re-hear these 
traditional imperatives within the context of our I-Thou relations w ith such 
creatures. W hat might "justice," "love,” and "humble walking" entail with regard 
to trees? W hat if, in our dealings with mountain goats we find ourselves obliged 
to curb, or refrain altogether from, those actions by which we "steal" from them, 
"covet" w hat seems to be rightfully theirs, "bear false witness" against them, and, 
m ore plainly perhaps, "do murder" against them?9 In suggesting that such 
considerations are relevant for our treatment of trees and m ountain goats, 
however, I am not arguing for yet another version of "moral extensionism," in 
which traditional norms or rights are stretched and applied to cover our relations 
w ith all creatures. That kind of universality and abstraction is antithetical to the 
practice of ethical responsibility. Rather, I wish to acknowledge the possibility
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that in our encounters with such creatures we may re-hear these guidelines, 
perhaps with a meaning and richness heretofore unconsidered, and find 
ourselves called upon to act in consonance with them. Furthermore, it seems that 
only in such instances, in which we are able to re-hear these comm ands anew (as 
they are revealed and re-revealed anew ), do we discover their relevance and 
m eaning in terms of our uniquely personal ethical responsibility. For, as 
suggested throughout this paper, responsibility means responding, which can 
never be separated from the claims which one hears and to which one responds.
Therefore, like our ethical responsibility in general, our capacity for 
responsible action with regards to nonhum an creatures like trees and buzzards is 
rooted in our actual participation in the sacrament of dialogue. As we meet our 
fellow creatures in dialogue we find ourselves addressed not only by a present, 
finite other - this very larch or that particular stand of aspens - but also by the 
m eaning of our creatureliness and by the ineffable meaning and m ystery that 
permeates and circumscribes our co-derivative, co-creaturely being- together- 
w ith creatures like larches and aspens. And, in the reception and 
acknowledgment of this threefold address, which comes to us as the call of the 
situation in toto , our lives are graced by a sense of what Bugbee calls finality - 
that deep and abiding awareness and affirmation of the primal meaning and 
fundam ental reality of our m utual co-existence. Moreover, for Bugbee, finality 
comes to us as the "spring" of responsible, necessary action (Inward Morning 
207). The knowledge and meaning received in the situation of dialogue cry out 
for incarnation and place us in a position of responsibility, while at the same time 
empowering us and guiding us to act with integrity and commitment - certainty.
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That is, as finality dawns upon us, we may find the strength and direction to act 
as we m ust, and, likewise, through the embodiment of necessary action our 
apperception of finality may come to us anew, renewed and deepened. For, it 
also seems that in acting as we must, we may gain access to integrity, meaning 
and that deep-seated capacity for affirmation which is called faith.
This, then, seems to be the rhythm at the heart of the relationship between 
dialogue and responsibility described generally, and in considerable detail, in the 
two previous chapters and briefly sketched out here within the narrow er scope 
of our relations with nonhuman creatures. Our I-Thou relations with trees and 
bears and rivers, no less than our I-Thou relations with hum an beings, are 
characterized by the animating and empowering dynamic of claim and 
responsibility. These creatures, too, address us in ways that dem and our 
response - our ethical response.
V. REFLECTIVE EXPLORATIONS ON THE PRACTICE OF ETHICAL
RESPONSIBILITY
But how, specifically, do we practice ethical responsibility towards 
trees and bears and rivers? How does this rhythm of dialogue and responsibility 
manifest itself in our real-life decisions and actions? Well, that all depends - 
upon the m eaning and knowledge received in those situations in which we find 
ourselves addressed. Although certain readers may want som ething a bit more 
tangible and substantive here, perhaps something bearing more resemblance to a 
comprehensive, widely-applicable theory of environmental ethics, I m ust insist
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on the experiential, non-prescriptive, non-verifiable and non-objective (m eta­
objective) nature of ethical responsibility. In a certain sense, such an ethic is not 
'applicable' to the questions and scenarios of environmental ethics as it is often 
understood. We cannot practice responsibility toward nonhum an creatures by 
applying universal norms and maxims to the concrete, particular situations in 
which we m ust decide and act with regards to them; responsibility always means 
responding from the depths of who we are and to that which addresses us - here 
and now.
However, just because ethical responsibility is non-applicable, that does 
not m ean that it is irrelevant or somehow limiting. In fact, I w ould suggest that it 
liberates our ethical discourse and frees us to speak plainly about those things 
that m atter to us most. No longer are we bound to formulate universal 
principles, such as, say, "Equal rights for all species," which, despite the residual 
afterglow of truth toward which it points, strikes us as somehow disingenuous, 
trivializes and reduces the richness and diversity of our co-creaturely being- 
together, and makes a farce of our actual practices. And yet, bound w ithin a 
universalist framework, to say less betrays our experience of certain things - 
especially non-sentient and non-living things - as deeply and irreducibly 
m eaningful, non-instrumentally valuable, and eminently respectworthy, while, 
a t the same time, potentially justifies all m anner of morally reprehensible and 
irresponsible actions. Here, it seems that our insistence on universally 
prescriptive norms has trapped us in an untenable and unsatisfying e ither/o r 
situation. W hat is called for here, however, is neither a pointless default to 
relativism and subjectivism nor frustrated and resigned silence; w hat is called
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for, perhaps, is a different way of speaking. We need to reflect honestly and 
articulate faithfully concerning those things which have spoken to us most 
forcefully and eloquently, and which have called upon us to act w ith respect and 
concern. O ur ethical discourse needs to take on a more reflective, descriptive 
and testimonial voice, rather than the prescriptive, normative, universalist one 
that seems to mis-speak or distort the fundam ental sources that ground and 
sponsor our actions. Within the framework of ethical responsibility, we are freed 
from these corrupting limitations and free to tell our ethical narratives - to bear 
witness to the eloquence of things that have spoken to us of themselves and in 
their own right And through the telling, insofar as we speak honestly and from 
the heart, we reveal the empowering experiential roots of our decisions and 
actions and, in a sense, validate them, while, at the same time, call others to a 
shared receptivity regarding like things and invite them to tell their own stories 
of concern and commitment.
So, for a moment, let's consider Buber's tree in the discourse of ethical 
responsibility. W ould the ethical response to such an I-Thou encounter involve 
chopping the tree down to make a parking lot or to clear a 'view'? Not likely.
But suppose the tree became infected with a terminal disease and posed a serious 
threat to the life and health of all the trees around it. Now our decision is not so 
easy; we m ay have to consider the option of chopping down the tree. W hat have 
we learned from this scenario? Very little, really - except that our I-Thou 
encounter does not exclude the possibility of chopping down the tree; our ethical 
responsibility cannot take place in a vacuum of exclusive concern.
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And yet, even in such a brief and superficial account, we learn how 
quickly the discourse of ethical responsibility can degenerate into precisely the 
kind of hypothetical arm-waving and conjecture we are trying to avoid. For 
really, Buber gives us absolutely no context for his encounter, and w hen we 
attem pt to 'fill in the blanks' with hypothetical scenarios and circumstances, the 
event and its consequent m eaning lose all sense of reality. Buber's encounter 
w ith the tree was em bedded in a rich contextual matrix; we have only the 
isolated event to interpret. But it is precisely this isolation that makes the event 
uninterpretable - in Albert Borgmann's words, "ambiguous." According to 
Borgmann, "Every term is ambiguous in isolation, but normally ambiguity is 
resolved in context" (Technology 54). Removed from its meaningful contextual 
milieu, this tree, which may have been so eloquent for Buber, says nothing - or at 
least nothing meaningful or intelligible - to us; we receive nothing of the strength 
or presence upon which we may ground an ethical response.10 Like the 
particular encounters that ground and sponsor them, our ethically responsible 
decisions and actions are always deeply situational, contextual affairs. It seems 
fair to say that the rhythm of dialogue and responsibility at work here can only 
be employed within the concurrent and encompassing song of "immersion and 
com m itm ent,” which Bugbee discusses in Inward M orning (and which, 
incidentally, he introduces by way of two narratives) (42-54). The gracious 
manifestation of dialogical encounters with our fellow creatures not only 
requires our engaged participation in the ongoing process of creation; it is 
precisely our immersion in this flow that allows us to hear the self-speaking 
address of things and to respond wholeheartedly within a larger framework of 
meaning.
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So, w hat about the ethical import of my encounter with the pine marten? 
Here, this event comes to me fully embedded within a rich and, to some degree, 
interpretable context; ambiguity, while not entirely lacking, is surely lessened. I 
encountered the m arten in late afternoon, on a summer day, in western M ontana, 
on the Flathead National Forest, the Mission M ountain W ilderness, Piper Creek 
drainage, etc. And, concurrent with this superficial account of the temporal and 
geographical context, I can also draw upon the recollection of the state of my 
spirit that day, my happy tirednesss, thirstiness, and carelessness, the memory of 
a companion and our happy banter, the loose-armed, gravity-driven bounce of 
my walk as we ambled along the gradually descending trail, and the angles of 
afternoon light and shadow, the warmth of splintered, diffused sunshine; all this, 
along with a million other stimuli - some remembered, others forgotten or never 
consciously acknowledged - surely inform this relational event and my 
response(s) at some level. Although far from exhaustive, I can place the event 
within this context of meaning and, likewise, place my attem pt to articulate a 
response.
And, as is often the case in such instances, my initial response was to do 
nothing, really, beyond lingering for a moment to bath in the halo of joy and 
grace circumscribing the event. And yet, clearly, the story doesn't end here; I 
carry something of that light - the strength and power of reciprocity, immediacy 
and presence - with me, and this illuminates and informs my subsequent 
decisions and actions. Of course, that particular m arten is most likely dead, and, 
if it were alive, it seems unlikely that I will ever see it again and even more
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unlikely - quite impossible, really - that, were I to see it again, I’d recognize it as 
that same m arten I encountered so many years ago. In this instance, then, it 
seems that the force of address received in that particular m eeting extends 
outw ard in concentric circles of inclusiveness.
On the wall of a certain roadhouse/lodge in central Idaho hangs a fairly 
recent photograph of a trapper proudly displaying the several hundred dead 
m artens that he caught that season - in, I would assume, steel leghold traps. O n 
the few occasions I visit that place each year, I find the picture unsettling and 
disturbing. No, I would not trap martens; I would not buy their fur or that of 
other "fur-bearing mammals" (a term that, in itself, betrays an exclusively 
instrum entalist orientation with regards to such creatures - now reduced to, and 
defined as, a fur resource, an It). Yes, I would support a ban on using leghold 
traps to capture and eventually kill such animals. And finally, and most 
importantly, I would place the highest priority on the preservation of relatively 
undisturbed m arten habitat, so that a healthy and thriving breeding population 
of m artens could evolve independently of heavy-handed hum an m anipulation 
and interference.
Having stated these few, and relatively tame, positions, I will most likely 
face a whole battery of charges to which I must respond. And that’s as it should 
be; in attem pting to articulate a response to these charges I am forced to return to 
the source(s) that engendered an d /o r informed the positions in question, while, 
at the same time, I am confronted with their possible repercussions and open 
myself to other, perhaps competing claims, to which I may also be, to a certain
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degree, responsible. In my defense of martens, for example, I may find myself 
being accused of denying someone their livelihood, of being a sentimentalist, and 
of being altogether too parochial in my vision.
W hat about those people whose livelihoods may be threatened by 
advocating and implementing measures born out of such positions - most 
obviously, the trapper, but also the logger, heavy equipm ent operator, m ining 
industry executive, corporate lawyer, and others whose access to income or 
profits from potential timber and mineral resources may be denied in certain 
forested areas by efforts to preserve sufficient marten habitat? On w hat ethical 
grounds might we attem pt to adjudicate between these competing claims? What 
about the Buddhist notion of Samma-ajivn , or Right Livelihood? N ot an ethical 
prescription, Right Livelihood is a basic tenet of the Noble Eightfold Path (one of 
three precepts dealing specifically with ethical conduct,siln ), the practice of 
which may lead us to a fully and properly human life. According to Walpola 
Rahula, "Right Livelihood means that one should abstain from m aking one's 
living through a profession that brings harm to others" (47). Surely, such a 
straightforward, common sense notion has relevance for those of us outside the 
Buddhist religious tradition. It suggests that how we earn our income or means 
of subsistence is subject to evaluation under superceding claims, such as those 
concerning the life and well-being of others; our livelihoods cannot be justified 
m orally if they involve the unwarranted endangering, injuring or killing of 
others. And so, weighed against my knowledge of martens, my experiential and 
reflective recognition of their non-instrumental value and respectworthiness, I 
am not swayed by the trappers' claims to their "right" to kill m artens so that they
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can get money for their fur, make a living or maintain a certain lifestyle. Like 
employm ent in the nuclear weapons industry, perhaps fur trapping is another 
profession that can no longer morally justify its continued existence in our 
society.11 As for the logger, road builder, exploration geologist or lawyer, the 
situation seems different. These livelihoods, in and of themselves, are not 
necessarily objectionable and may even be necessary within the present 
fram ework of our society. But the particular "how" and "where" and "what for" 
questions that attend each new plan to log trees or search for minerals m ust 
always be approached in a way that gives the non-instrumental values of a 
potential logging or mining site - and the creatures that call that site their home - 
are given their due. It seems altogether possible that while felling trees m ay be a 
m orally justifiable and "right" livelihood in one situation, it may border on 
criminal in the next.12 Here, the onus of juggling competing claims - and their 
consequent responsibilities - and minimizing the deleterious effects of their 
actions m ust rest with those who wish to alter the landscape for their specific 
purposes. That is, the burden of proof ought to rest with the developer, not the 
conserver/preserver - and while this may have been how environm ental 
regulatory processes were supposed to work, the situation, in practice, now 
seems to be reversed.
And w hat about the charges of sentimentalism and parochialism? "You 
only care about fuzzy little critters with inquisitive eyes and endearing faces. 
W hat about the majesty and beauty of that elk, now dead, whose giant hide 
hangs on the wall adjacent to your picture of the several hundred m arten pelts, 
and which, if you were honest with yourself, you'd have to adm it doesn’t really
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bother you at all? And what about your leather boots? Elk and cattle are also 
beings w ith whom  one can enter I-Thou relations (concerning elk, you even 
testified to the reality of such an encounter in your Introduction). W here's your 
responsibility regarding them?" Although at times it’s tem pting to follow the 
lead of those espousing a strictly communitarian or organismic approach to 
- environm ental philosophy and quickly dismiss such nagging questions as petty 
and narrow -m inded (unimportant from the ecological or even planetary 
perspective), I believe that such charges are valid and merit both serious 
reflection and thoughtful response. It's just too easy to gobble up elk burgers or 
beef kabobs and hold forth on the supreme good of habitat, while ignoring 
a n d /o r  denying the value of individual creatures or failing to consider what 
m ight make a notion as essentially abstract as habitat something to value in the 
first place. And yet, in responding to these questions, I m ust avoid being draw n 
in by the implicit universalism of such charges. Ethical responsibility, as 
presented in this paper, is always grounded upon and sponsored in the 
experiential reality of our dialogues with particular things, not in our abstract 
and universal notions of the "potential thouness" or "equality" of all things. Such 
a universalist egalitarianism not only betrays experience, it also paralyzes any 
possible response. This is not to say that such generalizations aren’t useful 
checks against exclusivism and prejudice. In fact, the guiding sensibility behind 
such generalizations, and the mental processes of perceiving and acknowledging 
identity and difference that foster them, play an im portant role in our ethical 
reflection and meditation. But an abstract awareness of the potential thouness of 
like things, while useful (like the Ten Commandments or a Kantian maxim or a 
Buddhist precept concerning ethical conduct), is a weak substitute for our actual
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knowledge of the other as Thou, a knowledge from which the preceding 
generalization is derived and from which it obtains its usefulness and efficacy.
But w hat about the elk hide? and hunting? and eating "game" (again, the 
purposive, instrumentalist nomenclature betrays the dom inance of I-It 
experience in our relations with nonhuman creatures)? I cannot imagine anyone 
arguing against the overwhelming eloquence of an elk encountered in the wild. 
As I reflect upon my own experience, even the haunting sound of their bugling 
conveys a presence so arresting and immediate that it may initiate dialogical 
'contact' with a creature one cannot even see.13 None of my visual encounters 
w ith elk have been so intensely engaging and awe-inspiring as that autum n 
m orning in the Pintlers, as I walked in a high bowl just below the Continental 
Divide accompanied by the seemingly sourceless, intermittent echoing of these 
bugling ghosts - the very song, it seemed, of the mountains themselves. And yet, 
that hide in the Idaho bar doesn't bother me, and, while I've never killed an elk, 
I've eaten of their bodies on several occasions. Surely, this is hypocritical and, 
w hat's worse in an ethical tradition so insistent on universal applicability, 
inconsistent. Perhaps. But I also believe there is a real difference between fur 
trapping and elk hunting, and so I cannot advocate a ban on the latter. Given 
their num bers and limited habitat, as well as the eradication of top level 
predators throughout much of their range, hunting elk for food seems justifiable. 
The real ethical question here lies in preserving and m aintaining enough critical 
elk habitat - and also elk predator habitat - to allow a region’s elk population to 
thrive - to live, reproduce and die in their 'elk-ly' way. Or, maybe I'm just trying 
to justify my callousness and, at root, unjustifiable behavior?
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And w hat about domestic cattle? Obviously, hum ans can and do enter I- 
Thou relations with cows. Stories abound of ranch and farm children devastated 
by the loss of a favorite cow - or pig or sheep - after the fair is over or the stock 
truck rolls away to the auction or stockyards. To deny the significance of such 
events, and the loving relationships that spawned them and give them  their 
tragic force, as 'childish' sentimentality not only denies the value of children's 
experience but implicitly denies the reality of experience in general. W hat's 
more, such a denial is nothing other than a subjectivist - albeit in the name of 
"objectivity" - projection of the kind so often associated with sentimental and 
rom antic excess, only now in reverse, so to speak. "It's only a cow. She's got to 
learn sometime," says the coolly detached, "realistic" parent. But w hat is this 
parental "realism" except an interpretive projection of a purpose-specific vision 
(in which, perhaps, cow=beef=$) that would dismiss and displace the reality and 
m eaning of the intimate encounter between the child and a cow? Or, to interpret 
this situation in phenomenological terms, we might follow Kohak and say that,
Until we consciously "remind" ourselves that what we are dealing 
w ith is "only an object,” we frequently do experience and treat the 
things of this world as fellow beings, as thoii's .... It is questionable 
whether it [phenomenology] can ever legitimately resort to a 
herm eneutic analysis which applies an external criterion of reality 
to experience - in this case, the doctrine of transparent 
consciousness - and claims that while things may "appear" as thou 
they really are objects of manipulation or speculation. If the word 
"really" does not mean "in actual experience as it in fact presents 
itself to consciousness," it loses all univocity.... Only on the level of 
imm ediate experience, prior to the introduction of any special 
purpose and perspective, can the term "real" be used univocally: 
imm ediate experience is what it is. On any other level, primacy or 
"reality" of this or that aspect becomes contingent on the purpose, 
on the needs of the activity from which we derive our criterion ("I,
Thou, and It" 51).
180
If anyone can claim access to "reality" in my example, it is the child, and not the 
parent; the child meets the cow in all its unmediated, integrated actuality, 
independent of categories of use and purpose.14 The cow is, really and actually, 
Thou for the child, and the reality and meaning of this encounter cannot be 
explained away by invoking some transcendent or objective - really real - reality 
independent of that encounter.
And yet, examined honestly, it seems that in my experience not all things 
are equally eloquent; cows simply do not speak to me with the same evocative 
pow er as martens or elk. Undoubtedly, this has something to do w ith m y 
deafness regarding cows (how does one regain a child's receptivity and freshness 
of vision?), but it also seems that their domestication and reduction to resources 
defined in terms of their function as milk or beef producers has m uted some of 
their eloquence. However, even my impoverished relational life with cows does 
not lead me to exclude them from ethical consideration. Here, I m ust pause to 
reflect and tread lightly in the silence of dialogue's absence. For clearly, cows 
suffer and feel pain. I cannot dismiss the all-too-obvious m anifestations of their 
sentiency. As such, it is difficult for me to eat cows, and I find their treatm ent 
under the machinations of the cattle industry, for the most part, appalling. And 
while the stock pens and processing practices of this industry strike me as 
unnecessarily cruel, I also find the wanton and careless destruction of Western 
rangelands and riparian zones by grazing cattle no less unconscionable. How 
can we continue to 'permit' our public rangelands to be tram pled under hoof - 
and at ridiculously and artificially low prices, no less?15 And w hat about the
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untenable waste, in terms of biomass and energy production, of some people 
eating cows while others starve from w ant of basic grains, or the insensitivity 
and injustice of the social and political milieu that prevents such foodstuffs from 
being distributed equitably and among those who most desperately need them? 
Can we really still justify eating beef - or tacitly complying with politics as usual?
All of which is a long way from my encounter with a pine m arten in the 
Mission M ountains one late summer afternoon. And, lest my readers think I've 
lost all sense of organization and coherent, sustained developm ent over the past 
couple pages, I must confide that the tangential route of this journey and my 
cursory treatment of complex issues is, to a large degree, intentional. I had 
intended to sketch out an ethical exploration - an uncharted venture into 
unknow n territory - and find out where these reflections would take me. 
Hopefully, I have also illustrated that ethical responsibility is a messy, open- 
ended and far-flung business, one usually fraught with ambiguity and, 
sometimes, even apparent contradiction. This seems excruciatingly so in the case 
of an environmental ethic of responsibility, where the field of ethical 
consideration is all-encompassing and where we are not allowed the reductionist 
luxury of draw ing a priori boundaries on the limits of our ethical concern. As we 
bracket the noematic prejudice, our ethical responsibility becomes potentially 
universal, while, at the same time, it remains inextricably em bedded and rooted 
in the actual, concrete particularities of our existence. Ready to respond to all 
things, we m ust nonetheless decide and act in response to particular things, 
events and occasions.
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And so, I set out on the preceding ethical exploration from the experiential 
reality of my actual encounter with a pine marten. However, the choice of this 
starting point, while certainly very specific and personal, is not arbitrary. 
Ethically responsible reflection and action need to be grounded upon those 
decisive meetings in which we may come to know a particular being, such as a 
m arten - and, concurrently, ourselves, and the trees and m ountains and creeks 
and birds and bugs around us and co-existent with us - as meaningful, apart 
from any instrumentalist and purpose-laden reductionism. Graced by such 
experientially funded meaning - finality - we find the capacity for that deep 
affirmation - faith - that engenders respect, compassion and integrity in our 
thoughts and actions. Inspirited and empowered by my sacramental encounter 
w ith the m arten - and with that measure of knowledge, meaning and faith 
sponsored a n d /o r  renewed therein - 1 set out to reflect upon what it m ay m ean to 
act responsibly with regard to my fellow beings - not only with regard to that 
m arten or m artens in general, but also with regard to creeks, cows and hum an 
beings just to name a few. And as the implications of this single event radiate 
outw ard in concentric circles, intersected, at the same time, by a host of m utually 
informing waves from other events (so that the mental image here is not so m uch 
of a single rock tossed into a pond but rather, perhaps, the ploppings of big, 
sum m er raindrops on what had been only a m oment ago a still and motionless 
pool), and as these waves wash upon the shores of divergent, but related, issues 
(habitat preservation, hunting and dietary issues, grazing practices, the politics of 
injustice and starvation), I struggle to respond to the manifold, and perhaps 
competing, claims that confront me in a spirit born of dialogue. If this seems a 
messy and ambiguous way to do ethics, open to abuse and dishonesty from
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every side, so be it. Ethics, understood in terms of responsibility, dem ands that 
sincerity, honesty and humility inform our ethical reflections as well as our 
ethical actions. Admittedly, this is a serious and challenging dem and. But to 
dem and less of either our thoughts or our actions strikes me as escapist, a failure 
of m oral courage, and a concession to our impulse to shrink from sustained 
reflection upon, and committed response to, the often overwhelming 
complexities and contradictions of our existence. Ethics cannot be modeled on a 
computer; we cannot simply buy the ethical software package, learn the system, 
plug in a few variables, and then receive a comprehensive program  that tells us 
w hat to do under a given set of circumstances. Obviously, ethical responsibility 
is a great deal more messy and ambiguous than such a computer-age fantasy. 
And while it requires courage in the face of inescapable uncertainty, it also seems 
to offer the possibility that through our acknowledgment of, and reflection upon, 
the meaning of experience we may find the capacity and direction to act with 
commitment and, ironically, certainty; we may be em powered to act as we must. 
In other words, I believe that an ethic of responsibility is relevant to a sincere 
examination of how we, in fact, decide and act concerning those things that 
m atter most to us.
And yet, there is something about my previous example that I don't like. 
Perhaps it's the far flung nature of my associations, or the gross superficiality 
w ith which I take up with serious and complex matters, or maybe it's the 
lingering presence of the hypothetical that taints the questions I've raised - 
whatever it is, something disturbs me. In traveling so far and wide - in 
attem pting to illustrate the interconnectedness of our ethical concerns and point
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to a few of the issues that w arrant our careful moral consideration - I've lost 
touch with m any of the actual events that, along with the encounter w ith the 
m arten, co-sponsor my thoughts and actions in regard to these matters. To 
return  to the previous paragraph’s image, I've focused on a single 'raindrop' 
while briefly noting one or two more and completely neglecting the rest; and, in 
doing so, my illustration strikes me not so much as inaccurate, but rather 
lopsided, distorted. The pool seems so large, and the deluge so steady, that I 
can't even begin to do it justice here.
So, let's test the waters of a smaller and, hopefully, more focused pool for 
our reflections. W hat might this environmental ethic of responsibility look like 
w ith regards to Lolo Peak, the Missoula Valley's most unambiguously eloquent 
m ountain? W hat might it mean to practice responsibility to this particular 
m ountain? W ould I propose or support the development of a destination 
downhill ski resort on its slopes? No. W ould I actively oppose such plans? Yes. 
On w hat grounds? To make an informed decision on such an issue, we are told, 
environmental assessments m ust be performed, environmental impact 
statements prepared and feasability studies undertaken. Then, if it is decided 
that such development will not degrade water and soil quality below acceptable 
standards, and that the wildlife and fisheries resources of the area will not be 
negatively impacted, and that all the potential social and environmental threats 
can be mitigated, and that there is enough snow (or if there isn’t, we'll make more 
w ith our machines), and that people will com e, and it will make m oney and 
create jobs, who are we to oppose such well planned, economically salvific and 
eco-friendly development? And why? Because the m ountain has spoken to us
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and told us "NO!"?16 Might this not be, at root, our most honest and 
fundam entally truthful response? EAs, EISs and feasability studies are all fine 
and good; this kind of scientific data is useful, important and never to be ignored. 
But w hat if all our stated scientific and legal concerns are found unw arranted 
and all our scientific and legal appeals exhausted? Do we then, in the face of 
good science, hard facts and incontrovertible evidence, give our full support and 
stam p of approval to the development of "Ski Lolo" or some such desecration?
Of course not - because the halls of science and the courts of law have only 
addressed the derivative reasons (our most efficacious strategies, were we 
honestly to adm it it) for our opposition; they have not - and cannot - address 
that opposition's fundamental origins. For our position, finally, is an ethical one, 
and ethical responsibility, as presented in this paper, is funded by a m eta­
objective knowledge that dawns on us through our immediate and engaging 
encounters with things as self-speaking presences. Don’t we oppose the idea of a 
ski hill on Lolo Peak because it seems a terribly inappropriate, disrespectful 
response to the eloquent and enduring presence of that m ountain in whose 
shadow  the residents of this valley live out their lives - that beautiful, though 
deceptive, dual sum m it that measures the seasons, orients our lives, and speaks 
to us of a realm beyond and other than (and yet increasingly at the mercy of) the 
hum an fabrication and artifice of our city and our city ways; in sum, that 
ultim ate temporal and spatial reference point for our locale? In the course of 
living w ith and under this peak, a relationship evolves. And it is the meaning 
and knowledge sponsored in this relationship - to be sure, a composite of 
countless I-It and I-Thou relations - that anchor and ground our opposition to 
such developm ent schemes. In all its seasons and moods the m ountain has, at
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times, spoken to us immediately and compellingly, and we, in all our seasons of 
the spirit and shifting moods, have received this address, heard in the fullness of 
its grace and meaning. These occasions of dialogical intercourse w ith this 
eloquent m ountain elicit our respect and obligate us to act respectfully toward it.
A nd yet, I cannot move from such experientially grounded respect and 
say, by way of general prescription, that everyone else ought to respect the 
m ountain in the same way. Aside from any theoretical objections to such 
prescriptions, what good would it do? Here, my insistence on the non- 
prescriptive nature of ethical responsibility, which, up until now, m ay have 
seemed derived and clung to as the necessary conceptual conclusion of a cogent 
theoretical argum ent, takes on matter-of-fact, experiential force. My respect for 
Lolo Peak does not grow out of my conscious and willful obedience to some 
prescriptive m andate, and it seems impossible that anything approaching 
genuine respect could. Upon my arrival in Missoula I was not told by the 
Chamber of Commerce or the City Council, or even the faculty of the 
Environmental Studies Department, that I ought to respect Lolo Peak; my respect 
w as born out of daily interaction and, occasionally, incandescent m oments of 
holy intercourse, in and through which I came to know Lolo Peak as deeply and 
em inently respectworthy. And while I cannot prescribe such knowledge, I can 
testify to it - attem pt to articulate and share the ways this m ountain's presence 
has graced and informed my life - and invite others to examine their own life 
w ith the m ountain and offer their own testimony to its eloquence - or silence, as 
the case may be.
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Does this mean that I am universally, unilaterally opposed to all downhill 
ski resorts? Not at all. So, perhaps I've simply fallen prey to the 'NIMBY' (Not In 
My Back Yard) syndrome? Perhaps. And yet, our truest and m ost compelling 
testimonials and enduring commitments will bear witness to the beauty and 
m eaning of those things we know most intimately and importantly. Like the 
non-prescriptive quality of ethical responsibility, its non-universal character 
arises not so much from theoretical conclusions as from the dem ands of everyday 
existence. Yes, Lolo Peak is particularly meaningful to me. I have looked up to 
it, from below, in full winter's moonlight, in dawn's first sun, noon's full glare, 
and evening's shadowing and silohuetting, in joy and misery and paralyzing 
confusion; with a glance toward its cool summit, I have sought a summertime 
refuge in the midst of yet another day of stiflingly alienating and dehumanizing 
work; I've checked it daily to gauge weather, snowfall, air quality; upon 
returning from an extended absence, I've anticipated its appearance with an 
insatiable thirst, craning my neck to find its massive presence and begin the 
process of reorientation. And I've stood atop both summits, looking back toward 
my suddenly small and insignificant - although, now, somehow 'placed' - town 
and beyond into the unbroken beauty of the Selvvay-Bitterroot W ilderness as well 
as the indescriminant clearcuts on the Lolo and Clearwater National Forests.
Yes, Lolo Peak is particularly meaningful to me, but this does not necessarily 
mean that my efforts to protect it against the development of a ski resort are 
myopic or somehow selfish. I have come to know it, respect it, even care about it 
- not abstractly, but actually, deeply; as such, this experientially grounded 
knowledge, respect and concern will foster the strongest commitments and most 
enduring vigilance.
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However, this inescapable particularity does not m ean that my respect 
and concern, commitment and vigilance are exclusive. My relationship with 
Lolo Peak leads me to question the need for additional ski resorts anywhere. Do 
we need to carve up any more mountainsides with our recreational clearcuts, 
tu rn  any more mountains into winter recreation resources? Maybe we have 
enough already - in this particular region of the country we certainly seem to. 
Intimacy with, and respect for, particular things also sponsors reflection on the 
possible eloquence of like things. And while such reflection can never substitute 
for that sponsoring intimacy, I would be the last one to suggest that abstract, 
associative and analogical thinking should be dismissed from the ethical 
decision-making process; rather, w hat we need to remember is that, as 
abstractions from, associations with and analogies to, they are necessarily 
derivative, secondary. Experiential engagement must be the primary, animating 
source of ethical reflection. So, while I'm not ready to outlaw new  ski resorts 
universally, I would be extremely doubtful and hesitant regarding any such 
proposals. Again, it seems the burden of proof in such cases m ust rest squarely 
upon the prospective developer to find a suitable place (perhaps like Silver 
M ountain outside Kellogg, Idaho) where such development w ould not only be 
socially and environmentally benign, but also where it would not silence or 
compromise the still self-speaking eloquence and integrity of a mountain.
Are these scattered remarks, and those concerning the m arten that 
proceeded them, my idea of an ethical argument? Not really, but then it seems to 
me that ethical arguments may be part of the problem and our attem pts to
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construct them the cause of so much counterproductive frustration. Perhaps it’s 
time to start telling each other our ethical stories, and it is this which I have tried 
to do over the last few pages. Of course, our stories, no matter how insightfully 
and skillfully told, will never be comprehensive, encyclopaedic or all-inclusive. 
Fortunately, such criteria are irrelevant within an ethic of responsibility. Rather 
than air-tight arguments, our stories will hopefully offer compelling testimonies, 
resonant invocations and open invitations. In their telling, we testify to the 
m eaning of those things that matter to us most, to their self-speaking eloquence 
and the experiential ground of our respect and concern for them. And, in 
testifying to their value, we may call forth, stir up and awaken in our audience 
shared feelings and concerns, perhaps inspiring within them a renewed 
commitment to resolute action. Finally, as we venture to tell Our stories, we 
invite others to respond, perhaps by enriching the stories we tell, or by telling 
their own unique stories, or by showing us our prejudices for what they are, or 
by objecting to the ways we seek to embody the meaning of our experience in 
action. Because our stories are partial, particular and personal, they invite 
enrichment, am m endation and challenge. "But what about...?", that seems to be 
the question our stories invite and to which we m ust respond honestly and 
w ithout defensiveness. So, tell me about your horror at my eating elk meat; 
perhaps you can clarify and help resolve my own ambivalence here. Suggest 
alternative materials for my "manly footwear" (Merle Haggard). State your case 
for supporting a ski resort at Lolo Peak or harvesting a particular stand of timber; 
I will try to remain open and receptive to what you have to say. But if we w ant 
to m ake an ethical decision, let’s keep our ethical concerns in plain view w ithout 
sounding self-righteous, parroting party lines and rhetoric, or getting bogged
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dow n in our efficacious stratagems and derivative justifications. To be sure, this 
will be a terribly messy, pluralistic affair; but business as usual seems just as 
messy and usually leaves us feeling misunderstood, frustrated and somehow 
disengenuous. We can make informed, scientifically sound decisions, but let's 
keep the fundam ental, experiential ground of our actions in the forefront of our 
discussions.
For in reality, it seems that the sponsoring sources of our concern are 
rarely mentioned. And, within the "environmental movement" this silence seems 
especially apparent and, I believe, debilitating.17 Most environm entalists, I 
think, believe they carry the banner of the morally good, true and right; their 
position, and not that of the greedy industry or the corrupted agency, is the 
ethical one. At the same time, however, many environmentalists seem 
discouraged with, or have given up on, abstract environmental philosophizing 
that does not speak to their experience or, in one way or another, reduces or 
betrays that experience. And yet, should they try to speak of that experience 
(even among those sympathetic to their concerns) and articulate its imperative 
pow er in a narrative, personal manner, they find that their testimonials fall on 
deaf ears in a society that finds stories and "nature writing," although 
entertaining, merely subjective and untranslatably relative, lacking in any 
illuminating, empowering or compelling force. So, m any environmentalists, to 
cham pion their causes, turn to the 'story' that our society finds m ost persuasive 
and compulsory: science. When asked why they do what they do, most 
environm ental activists will reply, "To preserve habitat and endangered species," 
"To m aintain biological diversity, ecosystem integrity or a viable gene pool," "To
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protect the quality of a watershed or aquifer/' etc. But these are scientific 
justifications and explanations, and by themselves they carry no anim ating or 
orienting power. Why are we concerned about habitat, endangered species, 
ecosystems, gene pools and such in the first place? W hat has focused our 
attention on these things and fostered our active commitments to preserve, 
protect and safeguard them? Surely not science; science, for all its explanatory 
power, cannot explain the events that sponsor our concern, attention and 
com m itm ent.18 Surely not abstract ethical theories, no matter how biocentric or 
egalitarian, which we find neither satisfying, practicable nor 'true.' And surely 
not the rather bankrupt (although, I believe, well-intended) bum per sticker 
alternatives of Deep Ecology, Gaia spirituality and the like.
W hat grounds our concern, calls forth our respect and fosters our deepest 
commitments? I believe our relations - our dialogues - with concrete, particular 
beings and things do - creatures like grizzly bears and m ountain ranges, orchids, 
tide pools, prickly pears and great horned owls. Abstractly considered, these 
creatures do not necessarily warrant our respect and compassion; if we m aintain 
enough objective distance, even a grizzly bear can still be perceived as nothing 
other than an object, an It. But as we come into the presence of such creatures, 
we m ay hear their self-speaking, evocative address and come to m eet and know 
(and recollect) them as Thous, eminently respectworthy and non-instrumentally 
valuable beings. Through participation in the sacrament of dialogue we become 
aware of our fundam ental being-together-with our fellow creatures - despite 
their non-negotiable, multiform otherness - and find the capacity to affirm -
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actively and respectfully - not only them and ourselves but also the holy, tragic 
flux of the creation in which we find ourselves placed - together.
Meaning and knowledge, grace and affirmation - these blessings (at once 
anim ating and obligating and empowering) come to us, if at all, through engaged 
participation in the particular events of the unique existence that has been lent 
us. And so, if we are to speak of these things, and the decisions and actions they 
engender, we m ust speak out of our particularity and uniqueness, of who we are 
and who we may yet become. That is, we need to tell our stories. H ow  else can 
we point to the bedrock meaning and reality things may come to hold in our 
being-together-with them? How else could we attem pt to speak of the 
sponsoring sources of the respect and compassion they call forth within us?
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- EXPLANATORY NOTES
1 - At the same time, I m ust remind my readers of the anthropological nature and 
limits of this account of dialogue. As for whether or not dialogue m ay occur 
between two non-conscious beings (two rocks, say), I cannot venture to say. 
Buber and Bugbee offer a description and interpretation of hum an relationality, 
and even where ontological questions are raised, the ontology offered is always a 
regional one, in which we speak about being from the perspective of being 
hum an.
2 - Furthermore, this readiness and capacity is, as discussed in Chapter One, 
inextricably bound up with the issue of faith, that fundam ental, non-verifiable, 
perhaps even non-referential, affirmation of our co-creaturely existence and, 
correlatively, our co-existents. To requote Bugbee's beautiful statement on the 
relation between faith and dialogue, "If we have looked upon the m ountains time 
and again, and they have called upon us, and we have responded, let us 
rem em ber that we have looked upon them with the eye of faith" (Inward 
Morning 116). For me, it is the issue of faith that seems to mark the crucial 
difference between Buber's meeting with the tree and another philosophically 
famous hum an-tree relation: Roquentin's mental wrestling-match w ith the 
chestnut tree in Sartre's Nausea (126-135). At first, I returned to Sartre's account 
of this meeting because I thought it would be an exemplary counterpoint to 
Buber’s I-Thou encounter with the tree - the perfect model of the I-It relation. 
However, as I re-read the passage several times, I was struck by how  m any 
characteristics the two human-tree relations have in common; both are exclusive, 
intensely engaging, immediate and fully present. For me, the telling difference 
between the two relations seems to lie in what is absent in Sartre's account: any 
recognition of reciprocity and any sign of faith. What Roquentin takes away 
from his meeting with the chestnut tree is the final conclusion that the tree, 
himself, indeed all existent things are "in the way," "absurd," "contingent" and 
"superfluous." It is this conclusion, which, at the same time, is also an underlying 
predisposition, an as-yet undefined premise, that is so antithetical to the spirit of 
both Buber and Bugbee. Again, Bugbee’s words seem especially relevant here 
w hen he says,
And the story seems something like this: as we take things, so we 
have them; and if we take them in faith, we have them in earnest; if 
w ishfully-then fantastically; if wilfully, then stubbornly; if merely 
objectively, with the trimmings of subjectivity-then emptily; and if 
in faith, though it be in suffering, yet we have them in earnest, and 
it is really them that we have. That is, the order of occurrent
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meaning in which we are placed with them is one in which we may 
find our place with them, and in so doing place ourselves 
(’’Sublime" 7).
According to Bugbee, rather than being "in the way," our lives hold the gracious 
possibility of meaningful participation with our fellow beings in, to use another 
phrase of Bugbee's, "the sacrament of co-existence." This is the voice of faith that 
is utterly lacking in Sartre's description and interpretation of his protagonist's 
'revelatory' run-in with the chestnut tree.
3 - A response driven, so this line of thinking runs, by a particular m ood or 
emotional condition that we can quickly and easily overcome by falling back on 
our objectivizing categories and interpretive grids. For example, regarding my 
so-called dialogical encounter with the pine marten, I may safely, passively - and 
w ith complete accuracy and correctness - report that a siting has occurred of a 
"semiarboreal slender-bodied mammal of the genus Martes" in the Mission 
M ountain W ilderness (on the Flathead National Forest). W hat we are then left 
w ith is but a dessicated, although perhaps useful, bit of information, w ith the 
richness and depth of the encounter going unrecognized and unheeded.
4 - Like Buber, I am convinced that the manifestation of such encounters in our 
lives is always a matter of "will and grace.” And yet, the 'proportion' of will and 
grace seems to vary from meeting to meeting. Especially evocative presences can 
at times overwhelm us even in the most unlikely places and when we are at our 
m ost unresponsive. On clear days in Seattle, for instance, I've heard even the 
m ost prosaic souls begin waxing poetic at the sight of Mt. Rainier's hulking mass 
in the seemingly-not-so-distant distance. Conversely, in m eeting certain people 
and reading certain books, I have come across individuals and authors who 
exude a sense of readiness - a predisposition - to step out and engage the world 
in dialogue, finding beauty, holiness and joy in the most seemingly unengaging 
events and circumstances. Let Us Now Praise Famous Men, by James Agee and 
W alker Evans, stands out as a text that bears witness to both men's intense desire 
and astounding capacity to meet the world - and, more specifically, the world of 
tenant farmers in central Alabama in the late 1930's - in all openness and 
earnestness and that represents their sincere attempt to articulate, through word 
and picture, w hat they encountered. In his Preamble to the written text, Agee 
describes with unshakeable faith the operative premise that informs and 
perm eates his 'phenomenological m ethod.’
For in the immediate world, everything is to be discerned, for him 
who can discern it, and centrally and simply, w ithout either 
dissection into science or digestion into art, but with the whole of 
consciousness seeking to perceive it as it stands: so that the aspect
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of a street in sunlight can roar in the heart of itself as a sym phony, 
perhaps as no symphony can: and all of consciousness is shifted 
from the imagined, the revisive, to the effort to perceive sim ply the 
cruel radiance of what is (11).
And if, as Bugbee maintains, "as we take things, so we have them," then Agee, 
not surprisingly, speaks frequently of receiving and celebrating things in the 
fullness of their actuality. For example, of sum m er nights spent sleeping - and 
lying awake - on the porch of his hosts' shack, he writes,
The dead oak and pine, the ground, the dew, the air, the whole 
realm of w hat our bodies lay in and our m inds in silence w andered, 
walked in, swam in, watched upon, was delicately fragrant as a 
paradise, and, like all that is best, was loose, light, casual, totally 
actual . There was, by our minds, our memories, our thoughts and 
feelings, some combination, some generalizing, some art, and 
science; but none of the close-kneed priggishness of science, and 
none of the formalism and straining and lily-gilding of art. All the 
length of the body and all its parts and functions were 
participating, and were being realized and rewarded, inseparable 
from the mind, identical with it: and all, everything that the m ind 
touched, was actuality, and all, everything, that the m ind touched 
turned immediately, yet without in the least losing the quality of its 
total individuality, into joy and truth, or rather, revealed, of its self, 
truth, which in its very nature was joy (225).
Despite the tragedy that surrounded so much of his life, Agee m aintained that 
such events of "joy" (which approaches the level of a philosophical or theological 
category in Agee's non-categorized thoughts) can happen anywhere and at any 
time, and that the circumstances of their occasioning are boundless. Several 
pages later he continues his discussion of joy, when he writes,
This lucky situation of joy, this at least illusion of personal 
wholeness and integrity, can overcome one suddenly by any one of 
any num ber of unpredictable chances: the fracture of sunlight on 
the facade and traffic of a street; the sleaving up of chimneysmoke; 
the rich lifting of the voice of a train along the darkness; the 
memory of a phrase of an inspired trum pet;... the stiffening of 
snow in a wool glove; ...walking sleepless in high industrial 
daybreak and needing coffee,... the taste of a m ountain sum m er 
night: ...the mulled and branny earth beneath the feet in fall; a 
memory of plainsong of the first half hour after receiving a 
childhood absolution;... aside from such sudden attacks from
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unforeseen directions, gifts which as a rule are as precarious and 
transient as the returns and illusions of love for a girl one no longer 
loves, there are few ways it can give itself to you. W andering alone; 
in sickness; on trains or busses; in the course of a bad hangover; in 
any rare situation which breaks down or lowers our habitual 
impatience, superficial vitality, overeagerness to clinch conclusions, 
and laziness (227-228).
The fact that I have cited Agee several times, and at some length here, does not 
m ean that w hat he speaks of is identical with the notion of dialogue outlined by 
Buber and Bugbee - although some of the parallels are striking. Rather, I am 
struck in reading Agee by his apparent readiness to take up  w ith the w orld anew 
everyday; his writing bespeaks an insatiable desire and unquenchable thirst to 
m eet things in their fullness and to receive the abundance of their gifts in earnest. 
All of which, to me, seems rooted in a deep faith that truth and beauty and 
holiness can be found through engaged intimacy with, and unreserved 
immersion in, the particularities of our existence.
5 - In speaking of the "pattern" of technology, I am following Albert Borgmann's 
suggestion that we use a "paradigmatic explanation" when trying to understand 
the im print of m odern technology upon our lives. For his treatm ent of other 
possible types of explanations - substantive, instrumental, pluralistic - see his 
Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life, p.9ff. Generally, the 
following discussion of technology and technological patterns is based upon a 
paper I wrote for Professor Borgmann several years ago entitled, "Technological 
Dialogue, Genuine Dialogue, and the Possibility of Environmental Ethics." 
Hopefully, this revised and expanded treatment will not only be more accurate 
but also nearer the mark of what I'm trying to do in this essay.
6 - Two notes on my treatment of Heidegger seem in order here. First, and quite 
obviously, Heidegger and Kultgen use the term "thing" in very different ways. 
For Heidegger, things may thing insofar as we let them presence themselves in a 
dynamic, vocative relational event. Kultgen's analysis merely treats 'thing' as a 
static, intrinsic label for nonpersons and subpersons.
And yet, while Heidegger talks of our letting things thing in a vocative 
relation, I doubt he would say that we could "meet" them, as I have used that 
term throughout my paper. Here again, 1 must refer back to Kohak's treatm ent 
of Heidegger in his article, "I, Thou, and It: A Contribution to the 
Phenomenology of Being-in-the-World." As Kohak reads Heidegger, our 
relations with things like jugs or bears can be described in terms of mitsein but 
not mitdasein , a term which designates our relations with fellow subjects, i.e., 
hum an beings. Therefore, according to Kohak, Heidegger's a priori limiting of
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possible partners in mitdasein to Dasein constitutes a form of noematic prejudice, 
albeit one a great deal more subtle and sophisticated than Kultgen's. In 
Heidegger's defense, however, Kultgen's prejudice manifests itself in an 
argum ent that he makes while uncritically employing Buber's language of I,
Thou and It, while Heidegger uses his own set of terms, which Kohak critiques 
and denounces as prejudicial according to Buber's terminology. This seems an 
im portant distinction to make, as both Heidegger and Buber speak in 
idiosyncratic ways that may not always directly translate into the other's 'dialect.' 
Still, Kohak, as a well-respected Husserl scholar and phenomenologist in his own 
right, offers a compelling argument, and I find his comparisons and critiques 
illum inating and insightful. So, while I agree with Kohak's analysis, I’ll tread 
lightly around Heidegger and try to stick closely to the texts of the few 
Heidegger essays I've read, sincerely attempting not to m isinterpret Heidegger 
and his highly poetical treatment of the issues under discussion.
7 - According to Borgmann, paradigmatic explanations m ust be both efficacious 
and clarifying. For his discussion of paradigmatic explanations, in general, as 
well as possible ways of evaluating them, see his Technology and the Character 
of Contem porary Life, pp.68-78. So, given that Heidegger's account of m odern 
life under the pattern of Enframing does not allow for a vital portion of my 
experience, in the end, I find it lacking both efficacy (it doesn't 'work' as a way of 
explaining part of the pattern of our lives) and clarifying power (by not allowing 
for these encounters it sheds no interpretive light on them and, in fact, casts a 
shadow  of doubt over them).
8 - This is, in a nutshell, Kohak's phenomenological m ethod in The Embers and 
the Stars. In a forest clearing in New Hampshire he finds the clarity of vision 
required for his phenomenology; away from the world exclusively defined in 
terms of hum an artifice and busy-ness, and schooled by what he can learn from 
darkness, solitude and pain, Kohak finds the capacity to re-affirm the personal 
and moral sense of reality. W hether or not one shares all his convictions, his 
m ethod, commanding intellect and keen insight produce a down-to-earth and 
beautiful book of philosophy.
9 - Both the slightly unorthodox rendering of the Fifth Com m andm ent as "Thou 
shalt do no m urder" and the whole idea of re-thinking the Ten Com m andm ents 
in terms of our relations with nonhumans have their source in Kohak's The 
Embers and the Stars, pages 79-81. For example, in speaking of the Fifth 
Com m andm ent, he writes,
"Thou shalt do no murder." Wanton killing, be it of a person, of an 
animal, a plant - or of a love or an idea - is an act of profound 
disrespect, of dehumanization so radical that it makes its
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perpretrator an outcast and shatters the peace of the land. Yes, 
there is a food chain. There are, too, the bitter works of love.
Killing a w ounded animal swiftly - the frog impaled on my scythe, 
the baby rabbit disemboweled by a cat - can be the most agonizing 
act of love, letting it suffer an act of moral cow ardice.... Still, an act 
of killing remains an act of deep horror. Perhaps we have learned 
to objectify our world so that we could kill w ithout remorse. 
Unquestionably, having objectified it, we do so kill, and easily.
Like Cain, we find ourselves outcasts, taking w hat is not our own 
(80).
A nd in discussing the N inth Commandment: "Thou shalt not covet," he writes,
This is not an injunction against the rightful striving of all beings 
whose being is projected into temporality. It is an urgent warning 
against turning the world from the place of our dwelling into an 
object of possession, rendered dead and soulless by greed. Of all 
the commandments governing the relationship of finite beings to 
each other, it is, perhaps, the most basic (79).
Here Kohak enriches our usual understandings of these two comm andm ents by 
bringing to the forefront of his interpretations the dangers of our objectifying and 
greed, which have been so pervasive in our dom inant way of taking up with 
nature as an assemblage of silent and lifeless resources or commodities. For me, 
the Eighth Com m andm ent - "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy 
neighbor" - also seems especially relevant here. In the particular instance under 
discussion, bearing false witness against a m ountain goat is, above all, a matter of 
denying its eloquence and capacity to speak to us in its own right. Judged 
against the truth of experience, nothing seems more outrageously false. In fact, 
my several encounters with goats in their m ountaintop habitat (here, the huge 
billy standing no more than ten feet below the sum m it of Alpine Peak in Idaho's 
Sawtooth M ountains or tire monstrous power of yet another big male making a 
bee-line straight up the 30 degree talus slope leading to the top of M ount Pinchot 
in Glacier Park stand out as especially strong memories of these animals' 
evocative powers) would lead me to suggest that perhaps no other animal is 
more undeniably and overwhelmingly eloquent - speaking not only of 
themselves but also of the wild and rocky alpine country they inhabit. And yet, 
how  easy has it become for us to take up with them as m ute creatures, objects?
To answ er this question one needs only to consider how strange it sounds in the 
context of our everyday speech to suggest that m ountain goats 'speak' to us at all.
10 - Animals in a zoo seem to be an especially good example of this. Removed 
from the natural context in which they may speak of their awe and beauty, even
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so awesome and beautiful an animal as a polar bear is rendered silent (or, at best, 
speaks tragically and brokenly, at worst, comically, of its now enslaved and 
castrated glory) within the artificial confines of a zoo.
11 - It is, at best, a marginal profession already. The few people I've met or heard 
about who still trap mammals in this part of the country are loggers, school 
teachers and others who do it as a seasonal supplem ent to their income. As for 
native Alaskans and others in very different cultural, economic and ecological 
settings, I respectfully refrain from drawing even these tentative conclusions. 
This is not to say that we m ay not, at times, have to decide and act in cases where 
cultural values, attitudes a n d /o r behaviors conflict; rather, I refrain from 
offering any such conclusions here because a serious and sensitive examination 
of the particulars of such situations is far beyond the scope of this essay.
12 - Building new roads in currently roadless areas is another story. At least in 
our region of the world, it appears that we have exceeded acceptable road 
densities, and any new roads will only increase erosion, stream sedimentation, 
habitat fragmentation, behavioral disruption caused by an increased hum an 
presence, and may exacerbate a host of other ecological problems.
13 - It seems unw arranted to suppose that vision is in any way privileged as the 
necessary sense through which we meet our fellows as Thous. In fact, given the 
strongly 'auditory' imagery used throughout this discussion of dialogue, hearing 
seems to be an especially potent and receptive sense through which we may 
encounter another being in dialogue. In addition, given the tactile and even 
sexual imagery employed in this essay, touch also seems to be a sense through 
which we can come into contact with another as Thou.
14 - The m inds and spirits of children seem to predispose them to regular and 
frequent participation in dialogical encounters. As an example of this, Kohak 
sites those occasions where our food too closely resembles the living animal that 
it was. In particular, he notes holiday feasts with Martinmas goose and 
Christmas carp, where a child's horror and outrage are appeased and the festive 
spirit restored "only by adult ability to re-objectify" ("I, Thou, and It" 55). This 
'childish' immediacy and purposelessness- "realism," even - is central to the 
whole notion of play that I will discuss in the following chapter.
15 - BLM and USFS grazing permits are artificially cheap - unless, of course, 
they're subleased from profiteering leaseholders. Here the hypocrisy behind the 
stereotyping of "welfare mothers" and welfare fraud reaches the alm ost comically 
sublime. "Although we feel entitled to sublease public lands to less fortunate 
ranchers (whose ties to the industry don't date back to the glory days of the 
Cattleman's Association) at ten times the price the federal governm ent charges us
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on the original lease, we better not catch you selling your food stam ps (at 50% of 
their face value!) or trying to peddle your commodity cheese for a little cash.
And no, we don't care if your wife (with whom you cannot legally co-habitat 
unless you're willing to forfeit or reduce certain entitlements) is lactose intolerant 
and can't eat the cheese without "luxury" medications she can't afford. We've got 
to start cracking down on you folks who are exploiting the system!"
16 - It's all too easy to imagine the general response to such a statem ent were it 
offered at a public hearing on the issue; to speak of talking m ountains borders on 
nonsense within the context of our society’s everyday speech. A nd yet, as Ron 
Erickson asks, how often do we let such imaginings keep us from saying what 
we know to be true - what we know needs to be said? And furtherm ore, how 
can such ways of speaking ever be taken seriously unless we venture to articulate 
them  in the public sphere? Coming from someone who has, in his own life, 
exhibited the courage to speak out from the heart on such m atters, I greatly 
appreciate and value Ron's insight on this point.
17 - This silence in regards to telling stories of concern, I believe, is a symptom of 
the heavily 'Protestant' leanings in most adherents of the "gospel of ecology" 
(Nash). To use distinctions most often applied to the differences between 
Protestants and Catholics, environmental devotees place a decided emphasis on 
the W ord (often the gospel of science) over Sacrament, and while they make 
excellent prophets, they lend to neglect their priestly calling. Of course, given 
the Nineveh-like proportions of this country’s environmental sins, this prophetic 
leaning is perfectly understandable. And yet, we need to celebrate the 
sacraments as well, and we do this, unavoidable, when we tell our stories. As we 
bear witness to our encounters with things as presences (in which the Divine 
Presence dwells among us) we acknowledge and celebrate our participation in 
the sacrament of dialogue. And, as discussed earlier, these sacramental events 
carry a commission to go forth and embody the meaning received in our actions. 
In the end, the two go together; through our priestly celebration of the sacrament 
of dialogue we are empowered to challenge and critique the status quo w ith all 
the pow er of the prophetic tradition. What gave Jeremiah his voice but the touch 
of G od’s hand on the prophet’s mouth? What power lies in Hosea's words apart 
from his intimate contact with the Divine, which the Bible describes in such 
straightforward sexual imagery? The voice of the prophet comes to h im /h e r 
through direct contact with the fundamental sources of meaning, and h is /h er 
challenges are issued out of such intercourse.
Forgetting these holy sources of our concern and commitment not only 
divorces us from our most potent animating powers, it also makes us fall prey to 
another distinctively Protestant vice. The personal pietism and self- 
righteousness of certain environmentalists can only be rivaled, at least in my
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experience, by a few tongue-clucking, blue-haired Scandinavians of the Lutheran 
persuasion [and specifically those who pledge allegiance to the Missouri Synod] 
and those sanctified, sealed-in-the-blood Southern Baptists or non- 
denominational fundamentalists. And unfortunately, and quite seriously, such 
self-righteousness has turned away potential adherents to the gospel of ecology 
much in the same way as holier-than-thou church-going folk keep so many 
others away from organized religion.
18 - For a discussion of the limits of scientific explanations, see Albert Borgmann's 
Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life. Particularly relevant here 
is his description of the differences between apodeictic, deictic and paradeictic 
(paradigmatic) explanantions (pp. 22-26 and pp. 68-78).
THE CASE OF WILDERNESS
"Wilderness: Land of No Use." Several years ago, back before "I Heart 
Spotted Owls - Fried!”, and even back before those little green signs touting the 
timber industry as our region's economic jockstrap, this anti-wilderness slogan 
could be seen on bum per stickers all across western Montana. In the m inds of 
those who printed, distributed and displayed them, the slogan offered a 
compelling argum ent against designating any more of M ontana's rem aining 
roadless lands as wilderness.
Of course, the phrase on the bum per sticker, in and of itself, is only part of 
an argum ent. In order to arrive at the intended conclusion, the reader m ust add 
an implied second premise, one that we find displayed on an embroidered nick- 
nack decorating the wall of Halverson's home outside Glacier Park, in William 
Kittredge's story "We Are Not In This Together." Attributed to Cotton Mather, 
the saying reads, "That which is not useful is vicious" (103).
Now we have an argument. Complete the syllogism, and you get the 
desired anti-wilderness conclusion:
W ilderness is not useful.
W hat is not useful is vicious.




The first time I saw jhe  "Land of No Use" bum per sticker it was displayed 
on the back of the pick-up truck I parked alongside at a gas station/convenience 
store in Thompson Falls. Two friends and I had stopped in to buy a few more 
items for our weekend trip into the Cabinet Mountains W ilderness - a weekend, 
as I rem ember it now, of swimming through steamy willow thickets by day and 
keeping a close watch on burnt out tree stum ps with ears at night. It was late 
spring, June I think, and I was nearing the end of my first year in the 
Environmental Studies Program, well informed on the "wilderness issue” (all 
year long I had attended wilderness seminars and lectures religiously and drank 
a lot of beer w ith very knowledgeable and committed Earth First!ers) and a 
strong (though "realistic,” "reasonable," "practical") wilderness supporter - or so I 
liked to fancy myself. And, having had a semester of logic in college, I knew that 
w hen you find yourself disagreeing with the conclusion of a cogent, well- 
form ulated, logical argument, you go back and examine the validity of the 
prem ises upon which the conclusion rests.
So, inspired by the wilderness weekend ahead and arm ed w ith my 
graduate school knowledge, I plunged into battle - mentally, anyway - w ith the 
im plied argum ent on the bum per sticker. In my head, I quickly rattled off a 
grocery list of reasons why wilderness is so valuable. Just consider the 
recreational, aesthetic, spiritual, economic and medicinal values of wilderness, or 
its importance for maintaining and preserving habitat, wildlife resources, 
fisheries, endangered species, genetic variation, biodiversity, water quality, etc., 
etc. See how "useful" wilderness is!
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At the time, though, it never occurred to me to take issue w ith the 
unstated second premise of this anti-wilderness argument. Sure, I was well 
aware of that whole 'intrinsic value' v. 'instrumental value' angle, but none of 
that seemed terribly concrete or persuasive here. Like m ost Americans, there's a 
lot m ore of Cotton M ather's spirit in me than I 'd  care to admit. The "bottom line" 
is that if wilderness is good, it better be good for something, useful. But w hat if 
use-lessness, rather than being vicious, is redemptive, healing, empowering? 
even necessary? W hat if, instead of trying to sell wilderness as a prudent 
investm ent, we celebrated the gifts and acknowledged the responsibilities that 
use-less wild places simultaneously bestow upon us and call forth from us?
N ow , half a dozen years and a lot of walking, reading, and reflection later, and 
w ith the wilderness debate still raging in this region of the country, I'd like to try 
to think through a very different response to that bum per sticker I saw in 
Thompson Falls; I'd like to affirm the radically subversive and potentially 
transform ative importance of use-lessness in a society dom inated by 
instrum entality and intentionality and, at the same time, affirm the potential 
significance and meaning of wilderness as a use-less anti-resource, a sabbath 
place of prayer and play. Finally, through our sacramental engagem ent with 
w ild places and wild creatures, I'd suggest we return from our wilderness 
sabbatical not so much re-created as re-attuned to our co-createdness, re-oriented 
and, above all re-commissioned to embody the respect and concern engendered 
in our holy intercourse with these places and creatures, even w ithin the all-too- 
profane busy-ness of our daily strivings. That is, through our intim ate contact 
w ith, and immersion in, wild places I believe we receive a knowledge and
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instruction that may inform and transform every facet of our work-a-day lives as 
well as the non-negotiable imperative to "Remember the sabbath place and keep 
it holy."
I realize that for some readers, speaking of wilderness as an anti-resource 
borders on sensationalism. And yet, to speak of wilderness as a resource only 
strikes me as terribly reductive and superficial. Even talking about w ilderness as 
a non-resource - although I believe it is this, too - says too little and trivializes the 
potentially transformative power and compelling imperative force that may 
come to us in and through intimate contact with wild places and wild creatures.
I believe wilderness offers not merely an alternative but a radical challenge to the 
technological patterns and objectifying, representational, and instrum entalist 
postures that dominate and distort our relational lives. For both conceptual and 
practical reasons, wilderness offers us a potential home of dialogue - a place 
where eloquent nature may speak to receptive humanity and elicit our most 
respectful response in thought, word and deed.
That, I am convinced, is the potential of wilderness as an anti-resource; the 
prevailing attitudes of the present situation, on the other hand, militate against it. 
Both the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land M anagement, the two 
governm ent agencies that manage the majority of public w ildlands (both de facto 
and designated wilderness), operate under the guiding principle of "multiple 
use." W ilderness recreation (sic), like timber harvesting, cattle grazing, wildlife 
and fisheries management, is just one among a host of uses. That's w hy the 
agencies, on their brochures, posters and educational publications, so often refer
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to it as "the enduring resource of wilderness." You've got the wilderness resource 
alongside the timber resource and the fisheries resource; they’re all there for our 
use. Each stands ready, according to Heidegger, to be set upon, secured, 
ordered, controlled and stockpiled for hum an developm ent and use. Or, in 
Borgmann's depiction of the pattern of modern technology, each provides the 
raw  materials - the means - from which we may isolate, extract and make 
available for consumption the commodities - the ends - we desire. Of course, the 
commodities we seek from wilderness are often less tangible than 2 x 4s and 
trout filets, but the technological paradigm  that informs such commerce rem ains 
the same. The wilderness resource offers the recreational, aesthetic and spiritual 
commodities - to name just a few - that we set out upon wilderness to procure 
and consume. And while this acquisitive agenda is usually doom ed to 
frustration and failure by the fact that what we often seek to procure from 
wilderness is fundam entally non-commodious and unprocurable, it rem ains that 
wilderness-as-resource is no exception to the rule of technology. It is defined - 
exists - in terms of hum an purposes, intentions and desires, and we develop, 
m anage and use it accordingly. As Henry Bugbee explains, "Why, the very 
category of resource commits one by implication to development of it, and to 
pose wilderness as a resource implying the contrary would carry contradiction to 
the point of perversity indeed" ("Wilderness" 8). 'Resource' is, unavoidably, a 
term of hum anly imposed instrumental meaning and value; w hat resources 
'mean' and what they’re worth are determined according to hum an desires and 
capacities to develop and use them. As such, to conceive of, and talk about, 
w ildlands under the auspices of "the enduring resource of wilderness," and  to 
develop, study, manage, and conserve them as such, frames these places squarely
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within the pattern of technology and relegates them to entities - objects - that 
exist in term s of, and for the gratification of, hum an wants, needs and desires.
And yet, there's something going on in our relations w ith w ild places and 
wild creatures that doesn't quite fit the pattern; the contradictions that Bugbee 
mentions above hover all about our experience of and attitudes toward 
wilderness. To speak about and treat wilderness exclusively as a resource seems 
to overstate the case a bit; it leaves too much unexplained. If wilderness is just 
another resource, how do we account for the life-affirming joy we so often 
receive in our travels in wild places? Or the deep and abiding respect and 
w onder these places elicit? Or the committed and passionate efforts of so many 
people to preserve the few wild places that remain on this continent? Surely no 
m ute and unautonom ous resource could call forth such heartfelt joy and faith, 
respect, wonder and commitment. There’s something about wilderness that’s 
evocative and compelling in a way that a resource is not. True, we m ay often 
reduce wilderness to a resource, but, at times, we also encounter it as something 
more and other than that; it's a resource, alright, but with a wrinkle.
For one thing, wilderness areas are set aside and protected from most of 
the 'industrial' forms of development that have historically defined our country's 
relations to forest and range lands. Although exceptions abound, in general, you 
can't build roads, harvest timber, drill for oil and gas or m ine coal in  a designated 
wilderness area. As the proponents of these industries so often remark, 
wilderness is a "lock-out;" it "locks up" the resources. And, in terms of our 
history of traditional natural resource development, extraction and exploitation,
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they’re right. Wilderness designation, for the most part, precludes developing 
and using forest and range resources the way we've always done it - no more 
bulldozers, chainsaws, skidders and drill rigs. That's why that bum per sticker 
was on the truck in Thompson Falls; to the owner, use of the wilderness resource 
seems so contrary to traditional notions of resource developm ent that it appears 
to involve no use at all. Or, at best, wilderness is a mis-use of the resources, 
inappropriate development, wasteful (again, Cotton M ather's puritanical ghost 
haunts our wilderness debate wherever we turn). Setting aside certain w ildlands 
from traditional, high-impact, aggressive, industrial developm ent and 
designating them as wilderness areas (even under the rubric of wilderness-as- 
resource) m arks a point of departure from business as usual w ith regards to 
nature. Even as another variety of natural resource, wilderness encourages us to 
pause and re-think the question "What is nature good for?" And while, at this 
level, we m ay still remain entrenched within a purely instrum entalist stance, 
"locked up" wilderness areas at least offer an experiential and reflective starting 
point for a deeper questioning of the technologically-informed instrum entality 
that has for so long defined our relations with most nonhum an creatures.
Secondly, wilderness is an atypical resource in the sense that, by 
definition, wilderness areas are places where human beings are visitors. And 
while it's written this way in the W ilderness Act, the word is, unfortunately, 
rarely m entioned by the managing agencies. For example, in the Forest Service 
the resource management ethos is so deeply engrained that w hen wilderness 
researchers w rite up their studies, they consistently speak in terms of "user 
impacts," "user days," "R.U.D.s" (recreational user days), "user groups” and the
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like. For a m anagem ent agency that has, for so long, functioned as an all-too- 
cooperative extension of resource development industries, to talk about visiting a 
resource just doesn't make sense; the words don't correspond. We use resources; 
we visit family, friends, and neighbors, shrines, m useums and cemeteries. 'To 
visit’ carries connotations and invokes images contrary to the rhetoric of 
resources. As visitors we don’t set out to assault and aggressively transform the 
people and places we visit. Instead, we come into their presence, in a place 
outside our jurisdiction of immediate control; we "pay our respects," and, after 
awhile, we return home. And even though the Forest Service continues to talk 
about wilderness "use," our actual travels within wilderness seem more 
accurately described as visits. In this sense, our practical, on-the-ground 
experience as wilderness visitors offers us a glimpse of an alternative model for 
our relations with wild nature that stands in contrast to the m odel of relations 
instantiated in our respective roles as developers or consumers and resources or 
commodities. As wilderness visitors we may venture forth into the presence and 
company of those whom we respect and care about, enter their homes with all 
due respect, avail ourselves to receive their gifts (graciously bestowed, gratefully 
accepted and acknowledged), tarry awhile, and then leave w ith their blessing 
upon us and our love for them and commitment to them renewed and deepened.
In addition, hum ans are visitors in wilderness areas in a second, im portant 
sense: we do not and cannot live in them. In a very practical, matter-of-fact way, 
you've got to check your proprietary claims and development schemes at the 
trailhead. I've never heard anyone in a wilderness area utter that 'appreciative' 
statement so often heard along seacoasts and lakeshores or am idst rolling hills
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and w ooded hollows: "Wouldn't this be a great spot to live? build a cabin? have a 
second (third?) home?" In designated wilderness, it's out of the question. Even 
the richest dude can't buy h is /h er own chunk of the Bob Marshall or Frank 
Church-River of No Return Wilderness. It's just not for sale - unless, of course, 
you’re a guide or outfitter with well-placed friends who can use their influence to 
m ake sure your airstrips, riverside resorts, hunting camps, stock pens, year- 
round caches and other "semi-permanent" structures rem ain above the law. In 
theory, however, wilderness is not intended to be a place where hum ans live, 
build structures or exert proprietary rights; and, for most of us, this holds true in 
practice as well. W ilderness is not a place to live or own property; in wilderness, 
we come into a place that is not our home nor our own, pay our respects, and 
leave.
Thirdly, our wilderness visits, examined within the context of our goal- 
oriented, technologically-conditioned society, can appear pretty pointless. At the 
ground level, the "Why?", "What for?", and "What's the point?" questions can be 
pretty disconerting as you walk along in a wilderness, especially when you're 
carrying a full pack, or being drenched by rain or plagued by insects, walking on 
blistered feet, or when you're just plain sore, tired, cold, hot, sunburned a n d /o r 
sick. That cynical question, "Are we having fun yet?", can take on a whole new 
m eaning in the backcountry. After all, if we're out using the recreational 
resource of wilderness, shouldn't we be having fun? Isn't that the point? Of 
course, even under ideal conditions, wilderness walking can appear, quite 
literally, pointless. Of the three main types of hiking routes available, the point 
of departure for two of them - the in and out trip and the loop - doubles as your
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intended destination. You walk in, do your wilderness thing, and arrive back at 
the same vehicle at the same trailhead you left only a few hours, days or even 
weeks ago. As for the point-to-point trip, you end up at a different trailhead 
where, most likely, a car you dropped off earlier will be waiting for you - to 
shuttle you back to pick up the vehicle left at the trailhead where you started 
your trip. In each case (and in any imaginable variation on these three 
alternatives), in accomplishing your goal you accomplish nothing at all, and you 
end up back where you started. N othing’s changed, except you're older than you 
were when you started your trip - that much closer to your death one could 
argue.
In addition, if you travel in wilderness to get some exercise, test your 
mettle, find beauty, meet God or accomplish some other specific task, you'll soon 
realize that there are better, safer, more convenient and time-saving ways to try 
to achieve these same goals (of course, you might also realize, in the process, that 
meaningful health, self-respect, beauty and holiness defy commodious 
procurem ent and elude our purposive grasp). Spend a couple of intense hours in 
the weight room or gym, m useum  or church, and you can say you've attended to 
your physical fitness, recreational, aesthetic and religious needs, and you'll still 
have time left over to ... watch TV or go to the mall or catch up on some work at 
the office. W alking in wild places, judged by the standards of our society, 
appears to be, at best, a rather impractical and inefficient way to accomplish our 
specific goals and tasks.
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The exaggeration and hyperbole of the two previous paragraphs are, to a 
large degree, intentional. Walking, and specifically walking where roads don't 
go, seems to encourage what Thoreau, in his essay "Walking," calls the "extreme 
statement" (93). W hat's more, I believe that not only Thoreau’s penchant for 
startling overstatement (awakening as the cry of the chanticleer atop his roost in 
W alden), but also his radical perspective and critical prophetic voice are rooted 
in  his "method" of taking up with and reflecting upon the world in which he 
found himself - a thinking on one's feet that Bugbee calls "peripatetic philosophy" 
(Inward M orning 139). Perhaps it is precisely the pointlessness and inefficiency 
of our wilderness travels, as well as that uniquely pedestrian pace that 
encourages face-to-face engagement with what we meet and reflective 
rum ination on the import of such meetings, that force us to confront the "What 
for?" question of our walking in circles (or some slight variation on that theme) 
and which, at the same time, push us to extend this same question to all aspects 
of our lives. And as we honestly examine our lives in this context, we m ay come 
to recognize that many of our strivings and purposive pursuits - our "busy-ness" 
dealings - are no more than so much diversion and idleness, a tail-chasing 
perform ed by animals without tails. It seems that walking in wild places and 
am ong wild things offers a critical perspective from which we may think more 
clearly about the meaning of the technological project of developing and using 
resources and procuring and consuming commodities that so often defines our 
lives and dictates our actions.
In these few paragraphs I've presented three of the practical, matter-of-fact 
ways in which wilderness is an atypical resource, ways in which it contradicts,
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suspends or calls into question the intentional representations and categories 
through which we usually, experience, develop and use nature as a resource. To 
be sure, wilderness is still a resource, but, just as surely, we encounter and 
perceive it as something other than a resource as well. By prohibiting m any 
forms of high-impact, industrial usury practices, wilderness designation flies in 
the face of our traditional understandings of resource developm ent on public 
forest and range lands. By defining hum ans as visitors in wilderness areas, 
wilderness designation offers us an alternative model for our relations with 
nonhum an nature; in wilderness we may take up with nature not just as 
developers and consumers or owners exerting proprietary claims, but as humble, 
respectful visitors, perhaps even pilgrims. And finally, by traveling along the 
circular (or dead end) path of wilderness we may find ourselves confronted w ith 
questions of purpose and meaning that challenge the acquisitive strivings and 
goal-oriented pursuits of our lives and sponsor reflection upon the very sources 
of ultimate meaning and purpose. These three anomalies - am ong others - seem 
to suggest that certain things about the wilderness resource don't quite fit with 
our usual understanding and use of resources in general; it's an odd resource that 
restricts the development of nature’s creatures according to our historical 
understandings of what they're 'good for,’ that defines us as visitors within its 
boundaries, and that offers no clearly defined goal or purpose for 'accessing' it at 
all. These oddities - these non-resource qualities - of wilderness seem to cause 
endless confusion and frustration in discussions among wilderness managers 
and users, proponents and opponents, adam ant in their insistence to fit the 
square peg of wilderness in the round, resource hole.
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W hat I've presented above, however, offers not so m uch a challenge to our 
technological patterns as a starting point for deeper reflection - a few 
incongruities to puzzle over. And while a certain am ount of confusion regarding 
the mis-fit resource of wilderness may lead to a re-thinking and enriching of the 
sense and m eaning of our relations with wild places and w ild creatures, I believe 
the potentially radical challenge of wilderness as an anti-resource comes from the 
instruction we may receive from wildlands themselves, despite all our efforts to 
shout down, ignore or m isunderstand what they have to teach us, as we come 
into their presence. Wild places and wild things, I believe, have a w ord to speak 
to us (to invert Thoreau's famous phrase), a word that, heeded, communicates a 
sense of m eaning and direction that may ground and orient our lives and inform 
our actions. Speaking of his time in the Canadian Rockies during the autum n of 
1941, Henry Bugbee writes, "And it was there in attending to this wilderness, 
w ith unrem itting alertness, yes, even as I slept, that I knew myself to have been 
instructed for life, though I was at a loss to say what instruction I had received" 
(Inward M orning 140). What I believe Bugbee so eloquently testifies to here is 
the deep and abiding knowledge we may receive through contact w ith, and 
immersion in, wild places. It comes to us - if at all- as an im m ediate and 
participatory knowledge (quite apart from our knowing about anything) of 
inexhaustible and, to some degree, ineffable meaning and potency - a knowledge 
that may take a lifetime of reflection to begin to understand, let alone articulate 
or enact. Arid yet, this much seems clear: in and through our knowing 
intercourse with wild places and wild things we touch som ething we are not, 
som ething that we did not make; we touch something non-negotiably other and 
densely real, something that is not the product of hum an handiw ork, artifice or
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fabrication but, like us, receives its existence from a source outside itself, 
something that we recognize as co-derivative, co-creaturely and m utually co­
existent. And, standing together in the presence of our fellow creatures, we 
acknowledge, with joy and affirmation, the goodness and respectworthiness of 
these beings as existing in their own right, apart from our objectifying 
representations and instrumentalist categories. Intimate contact w ith wild, 
nonhum an nature teaches us the arrogance at work in our reduction of nature to 
an aggregate of raw materials and resources as well as the sinfulness of what 
Buber calls "our lust for overrunning reality" (Origin and Meaning 65). 
According to Bugbee what we may learn from wilderness, what he refers to as a 
"wilderness ethos," stands in "dialectical contrariety" to the basic posture our 
culture assumes with regards to the nonhum an natural world: "the claimant's 
stance, speaking in terms of want and use, resources at our disposal, the exertion 
of control, the projection of goals, and the humanly conferred status of ’values'" 
("Wilderness" 6-7). As claimants, we cling to and assert "a vested interest, a 
proprietary dem and ... a kind of appropriative willing in which, however tacitly, 
a claim is staked to having what we w a n t.... 'Nature' then assumes the defining 
aspect of the exploitable resource; and no thing can be sacred" ("L' Exigence " 12). 
As we come into the presence of wild places and wild things, we may find 
ourselves positioned with respect to them in a way that counters and challenges 
the claim ant’s stance. Rather than staking a claim and dem anding w hatever we 
w ant and desire, in wilderness we find ourselves claimed by the self-speaking 
and evocative voice of wild nature and placed in a position of responsibility. 
Contact w ith wilderness may teach us the arrogance of our incessant efforts to 
’call the shots,’ as well as what it means to be called upon in a way that dem ands
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an answer. The overwhelmingly eloquent voice of wilderness, I am convinced, 
has the capacity to break through the silence and profanity of the claimant's 
w orld and re-awaken us to the vocative - and thus, vocational - and sacred 
character of our relations with not only wild places and creatures but w ith all 
creation.
Of course, in order to receive the instruction of these places and creatures 
we m ust let them speak and remain open and receptive to their address. As I 
explained in the previous chapter, resources have no voice apart from that 
projected upon them according to hum an purposes and desires; resources are, by 
definition, mute and speechless things, objects, Its. Therefore, if wild places and 
creatures are to speak to us and instruct us, we m ust meet them  as something 
other than resources; we m ust meet them as Thous - irreducibly other, yet 
intim ately co-existent, non-instrumentally valuable and eminently respectworthy 
beings whose existence cannot be reduced to or defined merely in terms of our 
representational constructs and purposive intentionality. We m ust meet them as 
fellow creatures - existing on their own terms and in their own right; only then 
can they instruct us or, as Bugbee says, "bless us": "But nothing can bless us apart 
from being acknowledged in its own right" ("Wilderness” 13). Earlier in the same 
essay he elaborates on this theme within the specific context of wilderness when 
he writes,
If wilderness may yet speak to us and place us as respondents in 
the ambience of respect for the wild - for N ature as prim ordial, it 
m ust be liberated from ultimate subsumption to hum an enterprise.
That is, its voice will be heard anew only as we come in decisive 
forbearance into its presence. Attentive listening, active receptivity, 
candor of spirit are the mood of the place. Or - as Kant m ight say: 
disinterested interest. I suggest wilderness is not to be understood
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as a place appropriated to hum an interests or to a special hum an 
interest. Its fundamental gift lies in the qualification of 
disinterestedness with which hum an interest requires to be 
informed (5).
For vocative relations - dialogue - to occur between us and wild nature, and for 
us to receive its instruction and the consequent summons to embody those 
lessons in respectful response, wilderness must speak not in terms of our goals 
and interests but of itself and in its own right. In turn, we m ust rem ain open and 
attentive to that self-speaking address. As stated throughout this paper, the 
manifestation of dialogue involves the resonance of eloquent speech within the 
heart of the receptive and attentive listener; always, it is a m atter of will and 
grace. And wilderness, it seems to me, may be a potential home of dialogue in 
that it offers a space - an opening - where wild nature may graciously speak of 
itself and where we may receive what Bugbee calls its "fundamental gift”: its 
pow er to render our interest disinterested, to bracket our intentionality and 
instrum entality, to re-attune our hearing to the voice of things apart from our 
representations and categories of manipulation and use.
Despite the administrative and managerial rhetoric that reduces wildlands 
to wilderness resources and the consequent practices employed in the 
development, management, use and conservation of them, the prim ary im petus 
or sponsorship behind wilderness designation - a sponsorship engendered and 
deepened, I believe, through intimate contact with wild places - is preservation. 
We w ork for legislative wilderness designation because it seems to be our best 
hope for preserving a few remaining places most nearly the way they've been, 
the way they are and the way they might yet evolve to become apart from heavy­
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handed hum an intervention. To preserve wildlands is an active attem pt to let 
them be - or leave them be, as Bugbee understands it. In Inward M orning he 
writes, "By 'leaving things be' I do not mean inaction; I mean respecting things, 
being still in the presence of things, letting them speak" (155). This active and 
participatory "leaving be" is of twofold significance. In leaving w ildlands be they 
are liberated from exclusive subservience as hum anly defined resources; in turn, 
as we leave wildlands be - in respectful engagement, responsive attentiveness, 
stillness and silence - we take up with nature (indeed, reality) outside the 
claimant's stance, in what Bugbee calls a wilderness ethos and Buber calls 
Hitidzvendung (the movement of dialogue) - a faith posture where we stand 
among our fellow beings ready and open to receive the address of whom ever 
may speak to us. Within this framework, leaving w ildlands be offers something 
of a m utual empowerm ent - a harmonizing of resounding, liberated speech and 
attentive, respectful hearing - and instantiates a unique home of dialogue 
between hum an beings and nonhuman, wild creatures.
And according to the rhythm outlined in this essay, participation in 
dialogue calls forth our active response. Our intimate contact w ith wildlands 
and wild creatures places us in a position of responsibility. We are called upon 
to offer an answer to their evocative address from out of the depths of who we 
are and who we may yet become. For me, this rhythmic interplay between 
dialogue and responsibility is nowhere more evident than in our relations with 
wild places. The origins of wilderness preservation in this country seem 
inexplicable except as a loving and respectful response to intimate intercourse 
with, and sustained immersion in, wild places and a deep, personal concern that
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they m ight be defiled, destroyed and abused. How can we explain the passion 
and commitment of John Muir, Aldo Leopold, Bob Marshall and David Brower, 
to name four of the most prom inent figures in the history of wilderness 
preservation, apart from their lifelong contact with wild places? W hat sponsors 
the continuing efforts of so many committed wilderness advocates to preserve 
the few undesignated wild areas that remain and to protect from abuse and 
degradation those areas already designated? I'd suggest that sustained and 
intim ate intercourse with wild places begets our deepest and m ost abiding love 
and repsect for them, and that we cannot help but work to embody that love and 
respect in responsible, non-arbitrary action on their behalf. To know wild places 
as such places us under obligation to preserve and protect them.
Furthermore, I'd suggest that the transformative and imperative force 
received in and through contact with wildlands and wild creatures radiates out 
to every aspect of our lives. W hat we learn from immersion in wild places 
challenges our entire way of experiencing reality within the fram ework of the 
technological paradigm  and our entrenchment in the claimant's stance. 
W ilderness, more than anything else in the nonhum an world, offers a 
counterpoint to the dom inant patterns and postures of our lives. As such, w hat it 
has to teach us may turn our lives upside down and re-orient us w ith respect to 
how we take up with our world. This, I am convinced, is the radical and 
prophetic anti-resource potential of wilderness - the subversive power of its use­
lessness.
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In the self-speaking presence of wild places and wild creatures, met and 
acknowledged in their own right, our reductionist drive to turn nature - all of 
reality - into an aggregate of resources and commodities is exposed for w hat it is: 
a reduction - not only of the irreducible meaning and non-instrum ental value of 
the other beings whom  we meet, but also of the meaning and value of our own 
lives as we stand together with them as fellow creatures. That is, the 
staggeringly eloquent, self-speaking voice of wild nature speaks to us of the 
potential fullness of our relational lives with nature’s creatures - a fullness we 
cannot know insofar as we experience the natural world exclusively according to 
our categories of use and purpose. To be sure, we will continue to develop and 
use natural resources and procure and consume their attendant commodities, but 
the touch of wild nature teaches us that nature’s creatures are not only, or even 
primarily, natural resources. Although we will also have to use and develop 
some creatures as resources, we will, I hope, do so with all hum ility and respect, 
knowing - immediately and intimately - that they are fundam entally and 
definitively something far more and other than that: they are actual and 
potential partners in dialogue, independent others whom we nonetheless may 
encounter in the fullness and integrity of their being - their being-together-with- 
us. Perhaps most basically of all, we learn that our existence and the meaning 
proferred us therein, comes to us as a gift, and that the world presents itself to us 
not, fundamentally, as so much stuff to use, procure, acquire and consume, but 
as a community of others, fellows creatures whom we may meet and know in 
sacramental intercourse. We learn that our vocation is not that of the inquisitor 
who presses, probes and makes demands, who contorts and tortures his (here, as 
in several other selected spots in this essay, it seems more accurate to let the
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gender-specific pronoun stand alone) subject - the object - until it subm its and 
says w hat he wants to hear and which speaks only according to the forceful 
imposition of the inquisitor's intentions and agenda. W ilderness placem ent 
shows us and helps us acknowledge our true calling as that of the respondent 
(perhaps even responsive lover), who, in respectfully and compassionately 
attending to the self-speaking presence of our fellows, may be received into their 
gracious presence and, in turn, receive their life-affirming gifts. For although the 
inquisitor usually gets the response he demands, the coerced answ er doesn't 
m ean much; it bespeaks only his projections, contains nothing true or 
m eaningful, and bestows no grace. But in attentively and actively stepping back 
and letting things speak without coercion, projection or m anipulation (a posture 
or orientation toward which wild places seem to predispose us), they m ay speak 
themselves and the meaning of their being - and ours together with them. And 
in the resonance of the meaningful and destinate speech of these independent, 
fellow creatures within the attendant and responsive soul, we m ay receive the 
use-less and holy gifts of dialogue - divine gifts that transcend reduction to 
instrum ental terms and whose meaning and value immanently inspire and 
inform our lives and actions. According to Erazim Kohak one such gift of 
dialogue is joy. In The Embers and the Stars he writes,
Joy or enjoyment is noninstrumental. The experience it describes 
serves no purpose beyond itself, it is not a function of the 
experiences which led up to it. It breaks out of the entire 
instrum ental chain as a m oment of encounter between a hum an 
and an Other, be it an entity, an act, a person, in cherishing, 
appreciation, enjoyment. It is precisely the experience of eternal 
reference (200).
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For Bugbee, another of these gifts is beauty, defined as something like a 
deliverance of the "sense".things make that defies reduction to their 
function or purpose.
Something may happen in relation with things themselves, in 
m utual address, that is the mode of sense they make, and it has 
nothing to do with explaining them. The m ode of sense in question 
im parts to life a purposiveness w ithout purpose. Purposes 
exfoliating and sustained out of that purposiveness, as they may 
well be, cannot explain it, nor do they explain things. A 
purposiveness prior to purposes, to which they remain 
subordinate, precludes reading the sense things make in terms of 
purposes.
Thus it may be that in a style of life governed by m utual address 
w ith things, one may stand to attune hearing to that language 
which things and events speak without metaphor, "which alone is 
copious and standard." (Thoreau) Perhaps that, precisely, is their 
beauty ("Job" 7-8).
As Kohak and Bugbee explain them, neither the joy nor beauty that m ay come to 
us in and through our participation in dialogue can be explained in terms of the 
purposes they serve, their usefulness or instrumental worth. However, this is not 
because events of joy and beauty are trivial and unim portant for our lives.
Rather, it is because they do not submit to service on behalf of our particular 
purposive agendas and instrumentalist reductions; that is, they are of ultimate 
importance, informing our lives with a "purposiveness prior to purpose" and 
offering us a glimpse of the "eternal," non-derivative, unconditioned and Holy.
Joy and beauty are but two of the many fundam entally meaningful gifts 
that wilderness may bestow upon us; we may count them among the use-less, 
non-com m odious gifts of wilderness encountered not as a resource or even a 
non-resource, but as an anti-resource - a place that instills a n d /o r  deepens our
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capacity to suspend the instrumentalist reduction of nature to natural resources 
that defines and impoverishes our relational lives with nature’s creatures; a place 
that encourages us to step back, be still and listen to the eloquent voice of our 
nonhum an fellow creatures as they speak to us of themselves and in their own 
right; in sum, a place where dialogue between hum an and nonhum an creatures 
m ay flourish - a home of dialogue. And, as a home of dialogue, wilderness is, 
indeed, a "land of no use;" its ultimate gift lies in its potential to predispose us to, 
and foster participation in, relations of "no use:" I-Thou relations. For, as I 
explained in Chapter One of this essay, I-Thou dialogue serves no purpose; its 
m eaning cannot be reduced to an explanation of the purposes it serves or what 
it's 'good for.' "The purpose of the relation is the relation itself - touching the 
You. For as we touch a You, we are touched by a breath of eternal life" (Buber, I 
and Thou 112). I-Thou dialogue serves no purpose; it is an event of ultimate 
purport. It imparts to our life with our fellow beings a fundam ental meaning 
and non-derivative value whereby we may affirm our co-existents and ourselves 
as we stand together with them in co-creatitrely kinship; it may offer, along with 
joy and beauty, the gifts of faith, love, compassion and respect as well as the 
guiding directive - the imperative - to incarnate these gifts in faithful, loving, 
compassionate and respectful action towards our fellow creatures.
But does wilderness really offer us all of this? As a wilderness resource - 
no; as a home of dialogue - absolutely; as a mix of the two - potentially and on 
occasion. I am convinced - 1 know - that through our immersion in wilderness 
(whether designated or not) we may, and sometimes do, find ourselves graced by 
the pow er of these places to attune our ears to the self-speaking voices of
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w ildlands and wild creatures and to ready our hearts to meet them  in the 
sacrament of dialogue, through which we may receive an intimation of the
j
m eaning and value of our m utual co-existence and the capacity to incarnate the 
sense of that meaning and value in non-arbitrary, decisive action. In concluding 
m y discussion of wilderness as a potential home of dialogue, a use-less place of 
ultim ate purport and meaning for our lives, I’d like to present this rather lengthy 
quote from Henry Bugbee's "Wilderness in America" as a beautiful and 
illum inating articulation of so many of the things I'd like to suggest here.
Yet, how could it be that a place might hold such force? Only, it 
w ould seem, in some radical way; positioning us, as it were, with 
respect to our involvement in reality, as a matter to be resolved. No 
doubt our situation is always implicitly a metaphysical affair. But 
wilderness, to the extent that it will not perm it one to take one's 
surroundings for granted, is a place which will not let one off the 
metaphysical hook. At the same time it establishes us in such 
decisively lived relationship with our surroundings that it 
precludes subsum ption of the lived relationship to any depictive 
representation of how we are situated in relation to our 
surroundings, for example in ecological terms. We are not there as 
seen by ourselves, as parts within a whole. No, we are there as on 
the spot with respect to the meaning of what we behold. How does 
nature speak to our concern? That is the question. And the 
relationship is one of participation in what occurs, the presencing of 
heaven-and-earth and of all that abounds therein. One is brought 
to realize one is held within the embrace of w hat is proferred in its 
being proferred. No behind or beyond the things themselves.
Therefore no understanding of their presencing in the m ode of 
comprehension of it. From within the lived relationship in which 
the presencing occurs m ust arise the sense of the occurrent, if at all.
The givens of life are laid down. The foundations of the world are 
laid. Things are in place and stand firm. Beings stand forth on 
their own. They do not ask our leave. They invite mutuality. That 
m easure of trust. If one agrees to live with them, rather than 
sum m arily reduce them to the service of intention. In contrast w ith 
the subordination of attention to intention, to be intent in attending 
is to give heed, and therein the perceived may work evocatively, to 
cumulative effect. Together, the perceived and the perceiver enter
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into the working of the world: things in their meaning as 
responded to, taking shape (10-11).
In wilderness we enter a place and are, consequently, placed - oriented - in such a 
way that things - wildlands and wild creatures - may present themselves to us 
and we may receive them as such - that is, receive them as presences. And in 
that m utual contact we come to know these things, ourselves and our co- 
creaturely co-existence as meaningful. Indeed, reality dawns upon us as 
meaningful - a world of meaning, where our participation not only affords but is 
also, in itself, cause for affirmation and sacramental celebration, and where our 
co-participants are not taken for granted but, instead, are granted the abiding 
respect and heartfelt concern they deserve. Wilderness, I believe, is a place 
where meaningful reality may, to varying degrees, be m ade manifest and where 
meaningful existence may find sponsorship. What could be of greater ultimate 
import?
II.
An older friend of mine recently told me that when he lived in Missoula 
back in the m id 70s, he didn’t go up into the m ountains m uch because most of 
the social justice advocates, socialists and Marxists in his circle, including 
himself, considered it "escapist" - time spent away from the 'real work' of social 
change and transformation, an idle distraction, a dodge. At first this notion 
struck me as, alternately, unbelievable and absurd. And yet, as I thought about it 
a bit, his recollection seemed to point towards a very matter-of-fact truth
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regarding the place of wilderness in our lives and our society: wilderness is, by 
definition and for almost all of us, a place apart, a place of w ithdrawal and 
retreat from the patterns and activities of our everyday lives. However, to equate 
w ithdraw al and retreat (of the two competing images this latter term conjures, I 
intend the religious over the military one) with escape seems to me a 
fundam ental misunderstanding, perhaps one symptomatic of a society that can 
no longer recognize or acknowledge anything meaningful or compelling outside 
an exclusively hum an frame of reference - a society in which all nonhum an 
otherness, be it 'natural' or divine, has been done away with or explained away, 
reduced to a humanly fabricated construct. It seems to suggest that if we're not 
actively engaged in the interhuman world, we're not in the world at all, at least in 
any meaningful sense. Throughout the history of homo rdigiousus, on the other 
hand, the periodic retreat from, or suspension of, our day-to-day lives and 
practices, w hat Bugbee calls "sabbatical placement" in "Wilderness in America" 
(6), has played a central role - an inspiring, animating, orienting and empowering 
role - in hum an beings' struggles to live meaningful and active - ever more fully 
hum an - lives.
W ilderness, rather than a place of escape, may offer us a place of sabbath, 
where we step back from the busy-ness of our lives and, from that distance, gain 
a fresh perspective on the meaning - or meaningless folly - of w hat we do; where 
we may meet our fellow beings - wild places and wild creatures - in all their 
irreducible otherness and non-instrumental value (and where this otherness and 
value cannot so easily be subsumed under the rubric of hum an projection, 
imposition, fabrication or conveyance), and where through such holy intercourse
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- sacramental participation in our m utual co-existence - we re-touch the 
fundam ental sources of faith and meaning and receive the capacity and 
commission to embody that faith and meaning in affirmative, meaningful action. 
W ilderness sabbatical offers us the possibility of a radical re-orientation with 
respect to our entire lives as well as renewing and sponsoring contact with the 
holy ground of our being. Rather than being an escape from the ’real work,' 
regular and engaged wilderness sabbath observance may grant us the capacity 
and strength to do the work at hand with knowledge, respect and compassion, 
hum ility and certainty, commitment and enduring vigilance. And finally, it 
seems that only through sabbath participation in wilderness can we re-hear that 
obligating divine imperative to "Remember the sabbath place and keep it holy;" 
out of the respect born of our holy and healing contact with wildlands and wild 
creatures we can do no less.
Of course, if I remember my Luther's Small Catechism correctly, the 
command reads, "Remember the sabbath day and keep it holy." W ithin the 
Christian tradition, and the Jewish tradition from which the Christian sabbath 
observance was immediately derived, the sabbath is understood primarily in 
temporal, not spatial, terms. For Jews, the sabbath is something that begins at 
sunset on Friday evening and ends with sunrise on Sunday morning. It is a holy 
time, a 'holiday,' when work is set aside and business is pu t away, a time for 
ritual, reflection, respite and prayer. It is, fundamentally, not hum an time, but 
G od’s time; the primary referent is other-than-human and ultimate, eternal.
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Wilderness, understood as a sabbath place, seems to share m any of these 
same general characteristics. It is a place apart from the daily pursuits of human 
life. A nd while this has not always been the case over the course of hum an 
history, it is a fact of experience in the m odern United States. And in my life. I 
was one year old when the Wilderness Act finally passed after years of debate 
and amendation; the Act's very existence and passage reflects our nation’s 
recognition of the scarcity of wildlands left on this continent and the urgent need 
to protect from eventual destruction a few of the wild places that yet remain. 
After centuries of exploration, settlement, development and transformation, the 
United States is a land where what few wildlands remain are a rem nant, 
vestigial. We may eulogize our deep alienation from nature and m ourn our 
eviction from the garden, and we may eagerly await the daw n of the messianic 
age when lions lie down with lambs (or some other, perhaps less extreme, 
apocalyptic/utopian vision), but if we want to understand the potential 
significance and place of wilderness in our lives, then we would do well to 
describe and interpret our relations to wildlands as they, in fact, present 
themselves to us in experience. And one fact seems fairly clear: m ost of us no 
longer reside or work in wild places. In fact, designated wilderness is defined as 
a place apart from human habitation; it is a place we visit, usually during our 
'free time' and days off, on weekends, holidays and vacations, and then return 
hom e - not unlike visiting a church or synogogue, temple or mosque. And upon 
returning home, we go back to business as usual; we do our work, earn our 
income, carry out our commercial transactions. Aside from guides and outfitters, 
trail crews, researchers and various others, wilderness is a place where business 
and work are set aside.
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Of course, for most of us in our secular society (including those fast-food 
style churchgoers who get their sabbath's dose of something called "religion" in 
45 m inutes or less), the alternative to work and business isn't ritual, reflection 
and prayer but recreation; that's what weekends are for! Unfortunately, while 
recreation m ay connote the possibility of re-creation, as folks who w ould like to 
rescue the w ord from its bankruptcy often point out, m ost of w hat we describe as 
recreation are usually things that, according to Webster, "provide diversions and 
amusements." In my mind, the word evokes images of recreation rooms - "rec 
rooms" - filled with pool tables and ping pong tables, pinball machines, TVs and 
VCRs, where adolescents while away time in idleness and the yearning for 
som ething worth doing (I adm it that these images may be a bit parochial, of 
course; geographically, economically and spiritually, I grew  up right around the 
corner from "Wayne’s World."). Within the framework of our dom inant cultural 
patterns, business and recreation (business and pleasure?) are two sides of the 
same coin of instrumentality and intentionality. If we work in order to make 
money, we recreate in order to be diverted, amused, entertained - have fun. Like 
recreational drug use, recreational wilderness use offers no exception to the rule 
of technology; that's why the terms wilderness resource and recreational resource 
(non-motorized recreational resource, to be more precise) are so often used 
synonym ously by management agencies and wilderness visitors alike. Perceived 
as a recreational resource, however, wilderness offers no alternative to, or place 
apart from, our busy-ness at all; both are thoroughly enveloped w ithin the same 
practical and theoretical framework - the rigorous subordination of means to 
ends (and the latter’s subsequent subordination to higher, greater and bigger
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ends) and the purposive and acquisitive striving for more of w hatever 
som ething/anything is 'good for.'
The sabbath time or place, on the other hand, calls for a suspension of 
such pursuits and offers a radical departure from so m any of our purpose- 
specific practices. Wilderness sabbatical offers us a place for engaged and 
regular practice (given its current bastardization, I won't say ritual), sustained 
reflection, prayer and, perhaps ironically, play (which, as I will describe it 
shortly, is the polar opposite of recreation as outlined above). It is a place in 
which our participation involves setting aside our purposive endeavors and 
claims of m astery and control and availing ourselves to meet others - nonhuman 
others - on their own terms, as they may speak of themselves w ithout reduction 
to hum anly conferred interests; and, finally, it is a place where the voices of these 
self-speaking others may resonate within us and sponsor recognition of our co- 
creaturely kinship and reflection on the meaning and ground of our m utual 
being-together. As a sabbath observance, the primary referent in wilderness is 
nonhum an, the meaning foundational, the commission non-arbitrary. As such, 
like the religious devotee for whom the sabbath marks, not the weekend but the 
week's beginning, our wilderness sabbatical is anything but peripheral or tacked 
on; it is a central, centering event that animates and orients us as we move 
through our days carrying the wilderness ethos - the sabbath spirit - with us 
throughout the week(s) ahead.
And if, as I'm suggesting, wilderness is a place of sabbath, then it is, above 
all, a place of prayer. Within the Jewish tradition, more so than in the Christian
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tradition it seems, prayer has played a central role in sabbath observance. I read 
w ith awe the legends of those prayerful Hasidic rabbis spending hour after hour 
of sabbath and holy days wrapped in their prayer shawls, rapt in ecstasy. And 
even in our time, the brilliant Jewish thinker Abraham Heschel was renow ned as 
a legendary pray-er. For the Jew, the sabbath was - and is - a time of prayer, a 
time when, according to Buber, we "step 'before the countenance,'" "say You and 
listen" (I and Thou 131). Prayer, above all, is active attentiveness (Bugbee’s 
"intent attending") and listening. In The Eclipse of God, Buber defines prayer 
this way:
We call prayer in the pregnant sense of the term that speech of m an 
to God which, whatever else is asked, ultimately asks for the 
manifestation of the divine Presence, for this Presence’s becoming 
dialogically perceivable. The single presupposition of a genuine 
state of prayer is thus the readiness of the whole man for this 
Presence, simple turned-towardness, unreserved spontaneity (126).
In prayer we stand ready, in openness and presentness, for the advent of the 
divine Presence. And, as discussed in Chapter Two of this paper, the place of 
that advent and incarnation is the place where we stand, where, as we m eet our 
fellow creatures as Thous, the Creator, eternal Thou, manifests itself and becomes 
present. As such, prayer describes not an act or orientation toward an 
exclusively divine referent so much as a basic posture in which we stand ready to 
go out to meet the world in which we live in the fullness of dialogue. Maurice 
Friedman, draw ing on an 18th Century Hasidic saying, describes prayer as 
follows:
"Alas the world is full of enormous lights and mysteries,” says the 
Baal Shem, "but man hides them from him with one small hand."
Prayer is the removal of that hand.
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Prayer has to do with discovering each time anew w hat we can 
bring and what can be b rough t.... The life of prayer can only be 
sustained if we bring ourselves to each situation with all that we 
know and have been (Touchstones 340 & 341).
A nd if this prayerful disposition marks the way we comport ourselves - "bring 
ourselves" - towards our fellow beings as we encounter them in the manifold 
relational events of our lives, it also informs our reflective, reflexive 
com portm ent as well. Prayer, almost paradoxically, extends inw ard to that 
honest and open reflection upon the meaning of who we are and who we may 
yet become through our active participation and involvement in the process of 
creation. It is this reflexive openness - this "deepening of candour" with respect 
to oneself that leads Bugbee to link the idea of prayer with meditation. In Inward 
M orning he writes, "For years I have been impressed with the justice of 
connecting the ideas of m editation and prayer. In true m editation one is opening 
oneself, there is a deepening of candour without which nothing is revealed, but 
for which one's thought skims round and round on surfaces" (143). Prayer, then, 
describes not only that opening of ourselves to the divine Presence and to our 
fellow creatures as we meet them as presences, but also a reflexive opening, 
reflective candour, honest self-appraisal.
Obviously, prayer is much more than some formulaic recitation or even a 
variety of conscious activity. In fact, as Buber point out, our overly-conscious 
and willful intentionality may even preclude the possibility of true prayer and 
rob it of its spontaneity.
But in this our style of subjectivized reflection not only the 
concentration of the one who prays, but also his spontaneity is 
assailed. The assailant is consciousness, the over-consciousness of
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this man that he is praying, that he is praying, that he is praying.
The subjective knowledge of the one-turning-towards about his 
turning-towards, this holding back of an 1 which does not enter into 
the action with the rest of the person, an I to which the action is an 
object - all this depossesses the moment, takes away its spontaneity 
(Eclipse of God 126).
More than a particular volitional act, prayer is a faith posture, a basic stance of 
the entire person - the disposition of dialogue, sabbath and, I believe, wilderness. 
In prayer one stands ready and open to receive, and in that readiness and 
openness one may receive the touch of divinity, co-creaturely intimacy a n d /o r  
reflective in-sight. In prayer we do not arrogantly call the shots but present 
ourselves to hear and respond in all attentiveness and humility. In prayer, as in 
wilderness placement, we may recognize ourselves and our fundam ental 
vocation as respondents. And so, it seems, that wilderness may teach those of us 
w ho have lost the capacity to pray, something of the meaning and im port of 
prayer. The power of wilderness to suspend our claims and reveal the claimant's 
stance for the arrogant and impoverishing pose that it is may also em -power us 
to m eet the world in a more humble, attentive and spontaneous way, a more 
prayerful way, re-attune us to the evocative voice of the other-than-hum an, and 
lead us to a renewed awareness of what it may mean to live in a world that we 
did not make and where human beings are not the sole and absolute source and 
referent of meaning and value.
I find this prayerful disposition central to my experience of wilderness as a 
sabbath place; to speak of wilderness as a place of prayer conveys the meditative 
receptivity and keen - though casual - sensuality that wilderness placement 
engenders as well as the stillness, the cathedral quietness and amplitude, of the
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places themselves, especially during those high and holy hours of m atins and 
vespers. And yet, while I find these prayerful images true to my experience, the 
sense of solemnity they invoke only tells part of the story. Wilderness placement 
also kindles the sparks of what is most vital within us - a certain exuberance, 
verve or zest, an overflowing of intoxicating joy and lightness, plain old fun.
Wild places call out to us to scramble up that next ridge (and the next one after 
that), to follow game trails to see where they'll lead us, to explore waterfalls, to 
swim in deep pools, to laugh and howl in response to their beauty. In other 
words, the voice of wild places speaks to our sense of play. If wilderness is a 
place of prayer, it is, at least as much, also a place of play.
Of course, I adm it that play is not exactly a dom inant feature in traditional 
understandings of sabbath observance. At least not for adults. And yet, it strikes 
me that in growing up and giving up our "childish ways," as St. Paul admonishes 
us to do (I Cor. 13:11), we most often end up losing our capacity for both play 
and prayer. It seems that wonder, awe and reverence give way, if not to some 
'm ature' atheism, then to creed, dogma and religion at about the same time that 
our playfulness gets buried under, and its energies sapped by, our all-consuming 
(though, in a sense, futile) efforts to "make a living" (we are not the creators of 
our being) or "earn a living" (existence comes to us as a gift of grace; we cannot 
possibly earn it). Perhaps we need to re-hear the words of Jesus when he says, 
"Truly, I say to you, whoever does not receive the kingdom of God like a child 
shall not enter it" (Mark 10:15). Perhaps Jesus is exhorting us to regain our 
childish playfulness and spontaneity, our willingness to be awestruck and 
amazed. For it seems that the capacity for play in our all-too-adult w orld has
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great sacramental import for our lives. Play, as Erazim Kohak defines it, lies at 
the heart of the wilderness, sabbath ethos that stands as the strict counterpart and 
subversive challenge to the instrumentality that informs our technologically- 
conditioned patterns and drives our work-world lives and agendas. According 
to Kohak,
In play, the world and I stand in a relation of m utual freedom, of 
non-dem and. There is no task to be accomplished or result to be 
obtained. I do not engage in play even for the purpose of am using 
myself. That is an attem pt which invariably fails. Play is a t its 
purest when it is an expression of what for w ant of a better term  we 
could call vitality, when amusement is not its goal but rather its by­
product. Perhaps it would be more accurate to speak of playfulness 
as the pure expression of what Heidegger called overtness between 
world and the subject.... We shall establish a provisional criterion 
for play and say that to the extent to which an activity is 
subordinated to the achievement of a particular goal, it falls into the 
broad category of work, while to the extent to which it is its own 
justification, it constitutes play ("I, Thou, and It" 53).
From this definition of play, it should be obvious that play and recreation, as I 
described the latter term earlier in this chapter, are two very different things. In 
fact, given their respective definitions, they mark opposite poles along the 
spectrum  of intentional activities. Most basically, the goal of recreation is to 
"provide diversions and amusements," while play, as Kohak understands it, has 
no goal; it is the opposite of goal-oriented activity. The purposiveness of 
recreation is absent from play; play serves no purpose. Ask a young child why 
h e /sh e  is playing and she /he  will usually say, "I dunno," and give an almost 
disdainful, impatient shrug of the shoulders as a fitting response to this stupid, 
peculiarly adult question. And what's more, I'd guarantee that only some overly- 
m ature, brainwashed child would ever answer this question with, "To have some 
fun." Even as an adult equipped with a much larger vocabulary and more adept
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in the arts of deception and miscommunication, my own explanations as to why 
I'm going out to walk in wild places are rarely more articulate than a child’s: a 
kick at the ground and a quick study of my boots, followed by "Just ’cuz," or "It’s 
such a nice day," "I just wanna get out of town," "I wanna get up into the 
m ountains for awhile." Neither the child nor I are as dum b as we sound; it's just 
that the im plied instrumentality begs the question, and the only honest response 
takes on the form of a tautology. We play in order to play, walk in wilderness to 
walk in wilderness. In this general sense, then, wilderness is a sabbatical place of 
playfulness and play.
Of course, there's a lot of hard work involved in this play, and at times - 
lots of times - w e’re obviously not playing at all. It's physically dem anding and 
sometimes even exhausting to walk with a pack up steep inclines, over m ountain 
passes or through dense brush. And when I'm fording swift-moving, deep 
rivers, crossing streams on slick rocks or dead-fallen trees, or balancing on 
wobbly talus boulders, I'm quite sure that I'm not playing at all. In these 
narrow er contexts, I can answer your 'why' questions quickly and easily: "In 
order to get to the other side," or "In order to get dow n off this ridge or 
m ountaintop.” These particular tasks have very well-defined, specific goals.
And in addition to these, there are all the less taxing tasks around the camp to 
attend to: setting up  some form of shelter, cooking, cleaning up, securing food, 
m aintaining an adequate supply of drinkable water and countless other highly 
specific, goal-oriented pursuits. Even though our wilderness walking is framed 
within the overarching context of a play event, work and play intermingle in  the 
particular situations that arise in our actual wilderness travels. And, in fact, an
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activity that we may have experienced as play one day may be nothing more 
than dreary work the next. Like prayer, play involves the disposition or posture 
that we bring to w hat we do and whom we meet. Play is that disposition of 
vitality and non-instrumentality - a disposition that may w ithhold or manifest 
itself in both situations of work or play, broadly defined. As Kohak explains,
To be sure, play is again a broad and often indistinct concept, one 
we need to define further. There are elements of play in almost all 
my pursuits - without them, work becomes drudgery. Similarly, 
there are often elements of work in my play. ... As an instance, 
when I would enjoy sailing to leeward of an island but lay a course 
to w indward because letting the island mask my wind would cost 
me minutes in reaching my destination, sailing has, in that lim ited 
context, ceased to be play and has become (enjoyable) work.
Conversely, when I decide to decorate a board inside a cabinet I am 
making with delicate scrollwork for the sole reason that I enjoy 
carving scrollwork and in spite of the fact that it will prolong the 
job and serve no purpose, my work has become play ("I, Thou, and 
It” 53).
Play describes those things we do for their own sake, irrespective of the purposes 
they serve. More than a description of a particular class of play events, however, 
play - playfulness might be better - describes a disposition characterized, above 
all, by purposelessness and the suspension of purposive pursuits.
As such, playfulness is the human posture or spirit that corresponds most 
closely w ith pointless activities in use-less places. It is a posture both appropriate 
to and engendered through sabbatical wilderness placement. W ith our purposes 
and goal-oriented pursuits suspended in engaged and intent participation in 
wilderness play, nature no longer receives its definition and existence solely in 
terms of our categories of resource development and use. According to Kohak's 
definition, in play our relations with things are defined in terms of "mutual
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freedom" and "non-demand.” In play we encounter things as independent 
others, as ends in themselves and not just means to be used or m anipulated 
according to our purposes and ends. Play offers the immediacy that, along with 
the openness and attunem ent of prayer, may foster I-Thou dialogue with the 
beings whom  we meet in moments of playfulness.
And it seems that this is the point to which all the images I've used in my 
shotgun approach to the import of wilderness placement keep returning and at 
which they all converge. Wilderness is the place where I most often encounter 
the beings and things of nature as Thous and not Its. In speaking of wilderness 
as an anti-resource, a home of dialogue and a sabbath place of prayer and play, 
I'm trying to point to the way these places actively predispose us to, and foster 
our participation in, I-Thou encounters with nonhuman beings and things - 
encounters through which we receive the irreducibly meaningful and life- 
affirming gifts of dialogue, the immediate knowledge of these nonhum an others 
as non-instrumentally valuable and respectworthy, and the powerful imperative 
to em body that knowledge in respectful, compassionate action w ith regards to 
them.
Up to this point, what I have, presented in this section m ight best be 
described as a fairly general and exploratory reflection upon the sabbath 
potential of wilderness as a place of prayer and play. To show how  sabbatical 
placem ent in wildlands may actually inform and enrich our lives, I'd like to offer 
several of Wendell Berry's poems - in full or in part - from his collection entitled
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Sabbaths. Berry wrote these poems over the course of six years of Sundays 
am ong the wooded hillsides of Kentucky. And while the importance of his 
regular, weekly observance of sabbath time should not be overlooked, I have 
chosen these few selections to highlight the equally im portant role of the sabbath 
place - the place apart, the place of sanctuary and withdrawal, the place of 
sacramental celebration and renewal, healing and sustenance, sponsorship and 
commission. The poems address all these themes and a great deal more. They 
speak, above all, to the ultimate importance and necessity of both sabbath places 
and our sabbatical placement within them. The poems require no exegesis, and 
I'll give none. W hat few comments I will offer represent my personal responses 
to their powerful elicitations. I simply ask my audience to read Berry's w ords 
poetically and with an eye to their import and relevance for the themes discussed 
above.
The bell calls in the town 
W here forebears cleared the shaded land 
And brought high daylight down 
To shine on field and trodden road.
I hear, but understand 
Contrarily, and walk into the woods.
I leave labor and load,
Take up a different story.
I keep an inventory
Of wonders and of uncommercial goods.
I climb up through the field 
That my long labor has kept clear.
Projects, plans unfulfilled 
W aylay and snatch at me like briars,
For there is no rest here
W here ceaseless effort seems to be required,
Yet fails, and spirit tires
W ith flesh, because failure
And weariness are sure
In all that mortal wishing has inspired.
I go in pilgrimage 
Across an old fenced boundary 
To wildness without age 
W here, in their long dominion,
The trees have been left free.
They call the soil here "Eden"; slants and steeps 
H ard to stand straight upon 
Even w ithout a burden.
No m ore a perfect garden,
There's an immortal memory that it keeps.
I leave work's daily rule 
And come here to this restful place 
W here music stirs the pool 
And from high stations of the air 
Fall notes of wordless grace,
Strewn remnants of the primal Sabbath's hymn. 
And I remember here 
A tale of evil twined 
W ith good, serpent and vine,
And innocence as evil's stratagem.
I let that go a while,
For it is hopeless to correct 
By generations' toil,
And I let go my hopes and plans 
That no toil can perfect.
There is no vision here but what is seen:
White bloom nothing explains.
But a m ute blessedness 
Exceeding all distress,
The fresh light stained a hundred shades of green
Uproar of wheel and fire
That has contained us like a cell
Opens and lets us hear
A stillness longer than all time
Where leaf and song fulfill
The passing light, pass with the light, return,
Renewed, as in a rhyme.
This is no hum an vision
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Subject to our revision;
God's eye holds every leaf as light is worn.
Ruin is in place here:
The dead leaves rotting on the ground,
The live leaves in the air 
Are gathered in a single dance 
That turns them round and round.
The fox cub trots his almost pathless path 
As silent as his absence.
These passings resurrect 
A joy w ithout defect,
The life that steps and sings in ways of death (10-12).
W hat is the way to the woods, how do you go there?
By climbing up through the six days' field, 
kept in all the body's years, the body's 
sorrow, weariness, and joy. By passing through 
the narrow  gate on the far side of that field 
where the pasture grass of the body's life gives way 
to the high, original standing of the trees.
By coming into the shadow, the shadow 
of the grace of the strait w ay’s ending, 
the shadow of the mercy of light.
W hy m ust the gate be narrow?
Because you cannot pass beyond it burdened.
To come into the woods you must leave behind 
the six days' world, all of it, all of its plans and hopes.
You m ust come without weapon or tool, alone,
expecting nothing, remembering nothing,
into the ease of sight, the brotherhood of eye and leaf (88-89).
Here where the world is being made,
No hum an hand required,
A m an may come, somewhat afraid 
Always, and somewhat tired,
For he comes ignorant and alone 
From work and worry of 
A hum an place, in soul and bone
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The ache of hum an love;
He m ay come and be still, not go 
Toward any chosen aim 
Or stay for what he thinks is so.
Setting aside his claim
On all things fallen in his plight,
His m ind may move with leaves,
W ind-shaken, in and out of light,
A nd live as the light lives,
And live as the Creation sings 
In covert, two clear notes,
And waits; then two clear answerings 
Come from more distant throats -
May live a while with light, shaking 
In high leaves, or delayed 
In halts of song, submit to making,
The shape of what is made (39-40).
I think I love this last poem most of all; quite literally, it evokes a physical 
response in me. My stomach knows the fear and worry, the ache and lack of 
which Berry speaks; my shoulders have felt that debilitating weariness. How 
often have I entered my wilderness sabbath in such an empty and broke-down 
condition? But my body also knows the gift of that deep sigh the last four 
stanzas of this poem bespeak - the relinquishment (I’m at a loss to say who is the 
agent here; who does/gran ts this relinquishing?) of claims and the lightening of 
m ind, the freedom to wander in the companionship of light and leaves and 
sound, the grace of things arising, presencing and falling away as I stroll or sit, 
m iraculously enough, with no desire or attem pt to control them, m anipulate 
them or make them stay.
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Perhaps it is this gift of the sigh - our graciously bestowed acceptance and 
affirmation of stillness and non-interventionist participation, so to speak - that 
leads Berry to link our wilderness sabbaticals with death in the first two poems. 
Certainly our sabbath rest points to our final rest, the end of labors and cares, the 
ultim ate disburdenment. But that sounds awfully cliche; to be honest, it's been a 
long time since I found much comfort in any abstract notions, theories or ideas 
about death, whether it be eternal life ad infinitum (ad nauseum ?) or some 
ecological re-union with the organic building blocks of life (or, in a slightly 
different version, a re-mixing with the animating Energy that courses through 
the 'veins' of the cosmos). And yet I sense Berry means something very different 
than all of this; on occasion, death and resurrection may 'flash' in m y soul as 
accessible and potentially meaningful, usually when I'm dwelling in  places 
where the human project to arrest the former and force the latter aren't so 
evident. There's a place - a high meadow - up near the Bitterroot Divide that I 
visit w ith some regularity, and where, almost as regularly, the inevitability of my 
own death - and the deaths of those whom I love - loses m uch of its sting. 
W ithout explanation, this place imparts an unspoken, unspeakable 'sense' to our 
final sigh and offers the possibility of a meaningful death.
These first three poems speak of the way we come into the sabbath place; 
for the most part, they describe our movement from the work place and home 
place into the sabbath place. And they also describe the grace of w hat awaits us 
there as we are en-couraged and en-abled in our sabbatical placem ent to let go of 
our claims and pursuits, suspend our efforts to represent and explain, exert 
control and establish 'order,' and to stand among our fellow creatures in the
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"brotherhood (sic) of eye and leaf." As we step up - and step back - to meet these 
wild places and wild creatures in such a way, we find ourselves received by their 
welcoming presence and graced with their ultimate gifts: joy, beauty, silence, 
ease, and intimations of kinship, divinity, and life (and death) -affirming 
meaning.
The final two poems I'd like to present speak of a very different 
movement. Actually, this fourth poem speaks of no movement at all; instead, it 
offers a stark snapshot - a freeze frame - of the profane and sacred standing side 
by side.
Hail to the forest born again, 
that by neglect, the American benevolence, 
has returned to semi-virginity, graceful 
in the putrid air, the corrosive rain, 
the ash-fall of Heaven-invading fire - 
our time's genius to mine the light 
of the world s ancient buried days 
to make it poisonous in the air.
Light and greed together make a smudge 
that stifles and blinds. But here 
the light of Heaven's sun descends, 
stained and mingled with its forms, 
heavy trunk and limb, light life and wing, 
that we m ust pray for clarity to see, 
not raw  sources, symbols, worded powers, 
but fellow presences, independent, called 
out of nothing by no word of ours, 
blesse'd, here with us (57).
In a single verse, Berry counterposes the profane consequences of business as 
usual under the claimant's stance with the possibility of a clear vision (which, as 
Berry notes, comes to us through prayer, prayerful disposition) very m uch like 
the wilderness ethos and sabbath spirit described earlier. W hereas the first half
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of the poem bespeaks our sinful heritage, the second half suggests the potential 
source of healing and renewal - re-sacralizing. Like the Hasidim  and Buber and 
myself, Berry, in his writings, conveys that faith posture in which the profane is 
not understood as essentially and irrevocably so, but might instead be more 
meaningfully described as the not-yet-hallowed - a place of potential hallowing. 
And so, in this final poem Berry suggests the possibility of the complimentary 
and harm onious movement of return from the sabbath place, in which our 
sabbath renewal and commission m ay permeate and transform the rest of our 
lives - and our world.
W hat if, in the high, restful sanctuary 
That keeps the memory of Paradise,
We're followed by the drone of history
And greed's poisonous fumes still burn our eyes?
Disharmony recalls us to our work.
From Heavenly work of light and wind and leaf 
We m ust turn back into the peopled dark 
Of our unraveling century, the grief
Of waste, the agony of haste and noise.
It is a hard return from Sabbath rest 
To lifework of the fields, yet we rejoice,
Returning, less condemned in being blessed
By vision of what hum an work can make:
A harm ony between wood-land and field,
The world as it was given for love's sake,
The world by love and loving work revealed
As given to our children and our Maker.
In that healed harmony the world is used 
But not destroyed, the Giver and the taker 
Joined, the taker blessed, in the unabused
Gift that nurtures and protects. Then workday 
And Sabbath live together in one place.
Though mortal, incomplete, that harmony
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Is our one possibility of peace.
When fields and woods agree, they make a rhyme 
That stirs in distant memory the whole 
First Sabbath's song that no largess of time 
Or hope or sorrow wholly can recall.
But harm ony of earth is Heaven-made,
Heaven-making, is promise and is prayer,
A little song to keep us unafraid,
An earthly music magnified in air (15-16).
Reading this poem makes me a little uneasy - something to do w ith the messiness 
of juggling the two worlds and trying to affirm both. I admire Berry's courage 
here. He speaks of a balanced syncopation between address and response, 
dialogue and responsibility, withdrawal and return, sacrament and commission 
through which we are afforded the possibility of a world - neither an idyll nor a 
heaven - where the sponsorship of our wilderness sabbaths finds its incarnation 
in a more just and compassionate society. Wilderness, attended to, offers no 
escape, as my friend and his peers once thought; rather, it offers the blessings of 
renewal and re-orientation that potentiate active, transformative return  and the 
obligating imperative that demands it.
Berry's poems, Kohak's understanding of play, Buber's, Friedman's and 
Bugbee's reading of prayer, and Bugbee’s thoughts on wilderness [both in 
"Wilderness in America" and writ large in Inward Morning, where w ilderness 
takes on ontological significance as "reality experienced as call and explained in 
responding to it absolutely" (128), and "the home in which things other than 
ourselves m ay be welcomed as guests, where innocence is sacred, and 
helplessness moves us not to abandon the helpless, in spite of our not knowing
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how to help" (224).] - how many times have I re-read their words, and how  many 
miles have I walked with their ideas swirling through my head? And it all still 
seems so true, so apt and resonant with my personal experiences of wilderness as 
a place of sabbath. During the years reading, re-reading and thinking about 
these things, wilderness has, as a fact of my experience, been a sabbath place for 
me. It has stood as a place apart from the corrosive and erosive stupidity of most 
of m y employment, the suffocation, isolation and loss of so m uch hum an society. 
It has offered me a sanctuary and retreat, a place of w ithdrawal and, no doubt, at 
times, a place of escape. But despite the baggage and pre-occupations I bring 
w ith me, and no matter the m isguided and self-centered nature of m y motives, 
w ild lands and wild creatures have continued to bestow their blessings upon me. 
W ith their eloquent voices they have, at times, startled me out of my self­
absorption and re-attuned my hearing to the call and plaint of my fellow 
creatures. W rapped in the embrace of wild places, I've known - though always 
partially and ephemerally, that is, humanly - something of healing and renewal, 
joy, faith and meaning. And, finally, I've heard and known the pow erful claim of 
these places upon me. Cut off from regular and intimate contact with them, I 
can't quite seem to make sense of my life; I lack some basic sustenance and I wilt. 
This, too, is a fact of my experience; I've tried to leave before - twice now. And 
each time, I’ve found myself called back - beckoned - to return for another 
sum m er, another year, to walk among these mountains. And I believe that if my 
life will ever take on the character of a vocation, it will be to the degree that I can 
act w ith integrity and meaning in consonance with the instruction received, and 
the respect and love engendered, in walking in the gracious presence of 
wildlands. But to "put to the proof in action," to incarnate that respect and love
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in respectful and loving action, to keep these places holy in a w orld so 
antithetically opposed to holinesis, how does one venture to respond? W hat 
answ er can I - can we - make?
III.
Responsibility means responding. If we have found ourselves called upon 
and claimed by the presence of wild places and wild creatures, encountered in 
the reciprocal co-presence of dialogue, we cannot but respond. We are, 
inescapably, responsible. The rhythmic alternation between call and answer, 
claim and response, dialogue and responsibility - the rhythm  this entire paper is 
an attem pt to articulate - attains completion and fulfillment only insofar as we 
actively work to incarnate the meaning and knowledge received in dialogue in 
respectful and committed response.
A t the most basic level, then, wilderness preservation is a m atter of ethical 
responsibility. It is grounded upon and rooted in our reception and 
acknowledgment of the address of wild places and wild creatures heard, not as 
resources defined according to our objectifying representations and categories of 
manipulation, use and control, but as eloquent, self-speaking others - Thous.
And in meeting these places and creatures as such, we come to know them as 
eminently respectworthy beings with an integrity, independence and value that 
defy reduction to terms of function, purpose or instrumentality. That is, the 
evocative voice of self-speaking, wild nature, heard in the m om ent of dialogue, 
elicits our respect and concern, and we find ourselves placed in a position of
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irrevocable responsibility, called forth - both by these fellow creatures and from 
out of the depths of our creaturely being and vocation - to em body our respect 
and concern for them in respectful and concerned response. In sacramental 
intercourse with the beings of wild nature we come into their holy presence, 
intim ate the potential holiness of our lives, and receive nothing short of a non- 
arbitrary - fully binding, ultimately liberating - divine imperative to rem ember 
these places and creatures for what and who they are in their own right and keep 
them  holy.
But, after talking at length about wilderness as a sabbath place, I think it's 
im portant to note that that's not why we ought to preserve wilderness. In other 
words, we don't preserve wildlands because they are sabbath places that offer 
grace and meaning for our lives (although they are, indeed, that); the prim ary 
sponsorship of wilderness preservation cannot and should not be reduced to a 
causal, functional explanation carried out in terms of hum an self-interest - even 
religio-philosophical or onto-theological ones. Again, wilderness preservation is 
a m atter of ethical responsibility. We preserve wilderness because in and 
through our sabbatical placement in wildlands and among wild creatures we 
have heard their self-speaking address, met them in dialogue, and come to know 
them as fellow creatures worthy of respect and concern. We are enjoined to 
rem em ber and keep these sabbath places holy not out of self-interest but out of 
respect and reverence - even love.
The words of John Muir and David Brower, when they equate the 
flooding of Hetch Hetchy or Glen Canyon with the flooding of a great cathedral,
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seem relevant and illuminating here. They're not suggesting that we shouldn't 
flood a cathedral because we need beautiful places to worship (although it's also 
true that we do need them and that our worship may be especially meaningful 
and noum enal in such places). Rather, we preserve the cathedral because we 
know it as something warranting preservation, something beautiful (that is, 
som ething whose "sense," according to Bugbee, cannot be explained strictly in 
terms of its purpose) and holy, the "house of God" - irreducibly meaningful, 
unqualifiably valuable, sacred. And while this latter implication of the analogy 
between flooding these valleys and canyons and flooding cathedrals is rarely 
discussed explicitly, as deeply religious a man as Ed Abbey knew the sacrilege of 
such desecration when he eulogized the lost red rock country of Glen Canyon as 
a place where "God lived" (movie soundtrack to "Abbey's World"). To speak of 
w ildlands as cathedrals or sabbath places is an attem pt to invoke the power of 
these rich religious images and call upon their attendant meanings. W hen we try 
to testify to the irreducible and indescribable value of the things we love and try 
to speak of the love and respect we hold for them, our ordinary, daily speech 
sounds so prosaic - says so little. We strain against and stretch the limits of our 
language and find ourselves drawn to the more evocative images of poetry and 
religion, where we can at least point toward and bear witness to the fundam ental 
and fundam entally ineffable meaning these things may hold. And this seems 
fitting. For respect, concern, love and compassion are born of our experience of 
things encountered apart from our representations and objectifying constructs, 
and so, consequently, the meaning, knowledge and value im parted in those 
meetings elude representational thought and speech. And yet, while the 
conceptualization and articulation so often escape us, one thing remains sure: we
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know  these things as claiming our respect and concern, and we know we are 
obliged to incarnate that respect and concern in respectful, compassionate 
response.
W ilderness preservation, then, is not an act of self-interest but one of 
respect and concern - an act of ethical responsibility. Unfortunately, most 
w ilderness advocates rarely offer ethical grounds for their position; that's why 
we've become just another competing user group (and an "elitist" and "selfish" 
one at that) haggling with timber interests, petrochemical executives and 
snowmobilers over who gets how  much of the remaining roadless resource to 
use according to our respective needs and desires. W ilderness preservation may 
m ake good scientific, economic, social, recreational, aesthetic and religious sense, 
but to sell wilderness strictly in terms of its usefulness and instrum entality - its 
benefits and gifts - mis-speaks the ethical foundations of our concern and ignores 
the fundam ental meaning of preservation. As I suggested earlier, wilderness 
preservation is our (last chance) attem pt at "leaving (wild) things be" - that active 
response to things that involves, according to Bugbee, "respecting things, being 
still in the presence of things, letting them speak" (Inward M orning 155). In 
preserving wilderness we acknowledge the respectworthiness of these wild 
places and wild creatures; we curb our hyperactive instrum entality and lust for 
overrunning (and transforming) our nonhum an fellow creatures and summarily 
reducing them to non-presences (Its); we recognize the self-speaking eloquence 
of these beings and things and allow them to speak in their own terms and in 
their own right. In sum, leaving wild things be is our response to their eloquent 
address as they speak not to our interests but to our capacity for respect and
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concern and, in doing so, elicit both. In the case of wild places, leaving them  be 
means preserving what integrity and independence from hum an artifice they still 
possess; for w ild creatures, it means preserving sufficient and appropriate space 
for healthy populations of the most far-ranging and habitat-specific species to 
evolve and reproduce, live and die in their own ways, independently of heavy- 
handed hum an interference. These are the things we find ourselves obliged to 
do out of the respect and concern engendered in and elicited through our 
intimate, knowing contact with wild places and wild creatures.
So, how much wilderness are we obligated to preserve? Given the time 
and place, this becomes the basic ethical question that we m ust answer in 
deciding the fate of the remaining roadless lands - de facto wilderness - in 
Montana and the northern Rockies. This is the ethical question to which any 
political solution to the wilderness issue in our region - be it a wilderness bill or a 
timber release bill - must be held accountable, answerable, responsible. And, 
generally speaking, the answer to this question is, I believe, fairly 
straightforward: all that's respectworthy, all that speaks to our concern. And for 
me, that means all of it - all that remains relatively intact and undefiled. As a 
nation, we face our final opportunity to leave a few small pieces of w hat's left of 
wild nature be. In recognition of, and out of respect for, the independence and 
otherness, the irreducible meaning and non-instrumental value of the other-than- 
hum an and that which we did not alter, fabricate or make over in our own 
image, we need to - we m ust - set aside and protect the few tracts of w ild land 
that remain on this continent.
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Of course, if I'm going to advocate wilderness preservation within the 
fram ework of ethical responsibility, such general, abstract and prescriptive 
statem ents cannot furnish the proper experiential starting point for my 
argum ents; instead, they are conclusions based upon our im m ediate and 
participatory knowledge of these wild places and wild creatures as non- 
instrum entally valuable and respectworthy and our reflective recognition of the 
m eaning and purport of our being-together-with them as co-participants in the 
process of creation. And so, if I want to talk about wilderness preservation in 
terms of ethical responsibility, I must begin at the beginning; I m ust begin w ith 
the actual, concrete encounters with wild places and wild creatures that have 
engendered and nurtured my respect and concern for them and through which I 
have found myself claimed by the non-arbitrary, obligating imperative to 
embody my respect for these beings and things by leaving them be. In other 
words, I m ust begin by looking to my own experience of the rem aining de facto 
wilderness in Montana and the northern Rockies and bearing witness to those 
events through which I have come to know these places and their inhabitants as 
respectworthy and through which I have received the command to enact my 
respect for them and keep them holy. And while my experiences here m ay be 
fairly limited, they furnish the necessary experiential starting point from which 
to begin my reflective exploration of what it may mean to act responsibly - 
ethically - with respect to wildlands in general.
Usually, I don't venture too far from the mountains around Missoula, so, 
of all the undesignated, unprotected wildlands in question, I only visit two of 
these areas with any regularity: the Great Burn and the Quigg Peak-Rock Creek
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roadless area. In addition to my visits to these places, however, I've also had the 
opportunity to go to several other de facto wilderness areas in the region, and of 
those infrequent visits, my trips to the Rocky M ountain Front, H um bug Spires 
and Lost River Range stand out as especially memorable and meaningful. In an 
infinite m ultitude of voices, each of these places has, in very unique and different 
ways, called to me and claimed me. In the smell of w et sage a t daw n, in the 
enveloping coolness of a grove of ancient cedars, in the sights and sounds 
(especially the sounds!) of a moose cow and calf casually foraging along the 
banks of a lazy creek (the alternate sucking of hooves in the m ud or clacking 
against rocks, the slosh of water, the tear of plants from the ground - all so clearly 
audible in that evening's stillness), in the full moon's glare on chalky rock 
pinnacles w ith a chorus of coyotes howling nearby, in the calm of a July 
snowshower, the blast of autum n's first winds, in the matter-of-fact dynamism  of 
a devastating forest fire and the more subtle processes of renewal, in the eruption 
of massive m ountains out of a flat, grassy sea, in rushing streams and hellish 
aridity - in all these events, along with a hundred thousand others, these places 
have addressed me. They've spoken to me as so much more than cheap sources 
of fossil fuels or so m any million board feet of timber or potential m ining sites, 
more than a breeding ground for productive fisheries and abundant "game" 
populations, more than recreational backpacking or horsepacking resources.
W ith unsurpassable eloquence, they’ve spoken to me of themselves - of their 
irreplaceable uniqueness and wondrous beauty, their sense and worth and 
goodness, their integrity and independence apart from any hum an purpose, goal 
or intention. And in that graciously bestowed reception and acknowledgment of 
this self-speaking address, I’ve come to know these wild places and their
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inhabitants as irreducibly and indescribably meaningful and valuable, obviously 
and overwhelmingly respectworthy. And I know they cry out - alternately 
pleading and demanding, it seems - to be protected and preserved, let be, 
allowed to enact and articulate their existence on their own terms and in their 
own way. O ut of the respect and concern born of such dialogue, I feel we are 
called upon and obligated to do nothing less.
But, as I mentioned before, my experience here is fairly limited. What 
about all the roadless areas I've never visited? How do I know that each one is 
respectworthy and warrants preservation? Upon what do I base m y ethical 
responsibility for them? As I've mentioned throughout this paper, ethical 
responsibility is born in and sponsored by our encounters with others as we meet 
them as fellow beings, presences, Thous, partners in dialogue. Ethical 
responsibility "springs" from our concrete, actual participation in the reciprocity 
of dialogue, where we come to know our fellow creatures as respectworthy and 
irreducibly valuable, where our lives and actions may be informed by direction 
and meaning, and where we recognize the potential holiness of our being- 
together-with-them in what Bugbee calls the "sacrament of co-existence." And 
yet, while our participation in dialogue begets an d /o r nurtures our respect and 
calls forth our respectful response, ethical responsibility only comes to full 
fruition through our serious reflection upon the sense and m eaning of these 
encounters and our ability to incarnate that sense and meaning in thoughtful, 
committed action. And it seems, upon reflection, that the respect engendered 
and the m eaning imparted in my experiences of the Great Burn or Quigg Peak 
inform my responsibility to like things - say the Blue Joint area, the Tobacco
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Roots, Lemhis or Crazy Mountains, by way of analogy and association, my 
encounters w ith both designated wilderness and de facto w ildlands suggest that 
these roadless areas and their inhabitants are similarly evocative and 
respectworthy and w arrant preservation and protection. By way of 
generalization, I m ight say that I've never walked in a wilderness area - 
designated or not - that didn 't speak to my capacity for respect and elicit my 
respectful response, and, furthermore, I have trouble imagining any such place 
not evoking such a response. And although we can never lose sight of the 
experiential ground of our thoughts and actions or try to substitute abstractions 
and generalizations for the compelling and empowering immediacy of our 
encounters, neither can we limit our ethical responsibility to those relatively few 
beings and things we may come to know as intimate partneres in dialogue. 
Therefore, as an extension of my respect and concern for the wild places and 
creatures I've known, I’m lead to conclude that not only the Great Burn and 
Rocky M ountain Front warrant protection and preservation as wilderness, but 
that each one of the remaining de facto wilderness areas in the northern Rockies 
calls forth and compels the same ethical response.
Furthermore, in attem pting to bear witness to the reality and import of 
those imm ediate and engaging encounters with wild places and wild creatures 
that sponsor our ethical concern for them, and in attem pting to reflect upon and 
interpret the sense and meaning of these meetings as they inform our ethical 
responsibility toward wildlands in general, we are, in addition, aided and 
instructed in our ethical decision-making and action by our fellow hum an beings 
as they testify to and enact their concern on behalf of those wildlands they care
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about most. And so, as we seek to come to some general position of ethical 
responsibility with respect to wilderness preservation in the northern Rockies it 
seems especially relevant that, according to Regional Forester Dave Jolly,
”[T]here is a constituency for every one of these roadless a reas.... W hen we start 
analyzing the effects of entering any one of them, we hear from people" 
(Missoulian. Oct. 10,1992). And he's right. Consider this very brief and partial 
list of local environmental groups working to preserve and protect the rem aining 
roadless lands of their locale: Great Burn Study Group, Rock Creek Protective 
Association, Badger-Two Medicine Alliance, Save the Yaak Committee, Friends 
of the Bitterroot, Wild Allan Mountain, Friends of the Wild Swan, Swan View 
Coalition, Deer Lodge Forest Defense Fund, Beaverhead Forest Concerned 
Citizens, Friends of the Clearwater, Hells Canyon Preservation Council, and the 
list goes on and on. Through word and action these groups and their mem bers 
tell their stories of ethical concern and invite and encourage us to support a n d /o r  
join their efforts to act with respect toward the particular places they seek to 
protect and preserve. For the most part, the members of these groups are people 
who live near the areas in question; they visit these places regularly and, through 
years of intimate contact, have come to know them as irreducibly and 
irreplaceably valuable. And out of respect and love, they want to see these 
places allowed to maintain their integrity and independence; they w ant to see 
them protected from desecration, disrespectful use and abuse, and unnecessary 
and care-less sacrifice for the sake of short term hum an gain. I believe the efforts 
of these local groups testify, above all else, to the self-speaking eloquence, deep 
respectworthiness and non-instrumental value of the places they seek to 
preserve. So, while I’ve never been to the Yaak or hiked in the Tobacco Roots, I
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have witnessed the respect and compassionate commitment these places and 
others call forth in my fellow hum ans, and their testimony resonates with my 
own experience of wildlands and confirms my general conviction that, out of 
respect, we m ust leave these wild places - each of them - be.
But why should I trust the Badger-Two Medicine Alliance? It appears that
the oil and gas industry hears something very different along the Rocky 
M ountain Front. And how can I know that the Rock Creek Protective 
Association is any more attuned to the self-speaking voice of the m ountains in 
that drainage than the timber interests who want to log their slopes? Finally, 
how  do I know that all I’ve heard in my own encounters w ith wild places and 
creatures isn't simply a projection? These are the kinds of questions that will 
always hound any attem pt to advocate wilderness preservation in terms of 
ethical responsibility. In his article "Saving You for Real People," John Kultgen 
sum s up this critical position when he writes,
You-saying is a very dangerous foundation for an environm ental 
ethic. It and the ethic built on it will simply reflect the pre- 
philosophical prejudices which the You-sayer brings to the 
encounter with natural things. If he should happen to be a sadist, 
pillager or chauvinist pig, they will say to him "rape us, despoil us, 
enslave us - we are yours" (66).
Here Kultgen intends intends to discount an environmental ethic of 
responsibility, such as the one I've suggested, by reducing it to a your-word- 
against-mine relativism. He seems to say, "You hear one thing; I hear something 
else. H ow  do you hope to adjudicate between competing claims and discern 
who's right w ithout some 'objective' referent?"
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However, through the extreme overstatement of his critique, Kultgen 
inadvertently suggests a way of establishing a general criterion to evaluate w hat 
we say we hear nonhum an nature say to us. In meeting another being or thing as 
a Thou, we receive the address of that other as it speaks, not of its function, 
purpose, instrumentality or usefulness, but of itself - as a unique and 
independent partner in an immediate, present and reciprocal relation. As such, 
our consequent ethical response to our fellow creatures is not dictated by our 
needs and desires but by the respect and compassion born of those meetings, 
through which we come to know our fellows as eminently respectworthy and 
irreducibly valuable regardless of the human purposes or intentions they serve. 
And, as I've already suggested, wilderness preservation - our efforts to leave 
w ildlands be - is, at root, not a matter of self-interest or expediency but one of 
enacting our immediate and intimate knowledge of these places and creatures as 
respectworthy and honoring their claims to be granted the 'space' to articulate 
their existence in their own unique way.
On the other hand, hearing things ask to be raped, despoiled or enslaved 
seems rooted in a very different kind of relation: the I-It relation of experience 
and use. In this case, things speak, not of themselves, but according to the 
hearer’s understanding (or misunderstanding) of what they're 'good for,' the 
function he assigns to them, the purposes they may serve; they 'speak' as m ute 
and plastic resources, silent objects. And in actuality, they don't speak at all; 
w hat 'voice' they have is projected upon them by the subject according to his 
goals and agenda, his needs and desires, and their value - entirely instrumental - 
is determ ined accordingly. W hat Kultgen describes, in fact, is that all-too-
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common (il)logic of "blaming the victim" and can easily be identified for the 
obvious and distorted projection that it is. In the case of rape, for example, does 
any wom an ask to be assaulted, brutally violated, objectified, dehum anized, 
tortured, beaten, even murdered? No. And to say that a woman "asks for it" is 
nothing but a projection of the perpetrator's desires and intentions onto the 
victim in order to justify his own unjustifiable actions. It reflects the assailant's 
attem pts to absolve himself of responsibility and bears absolutely no 
resemblance to any act of ethical responsibility. Similarly, forests don’t ask to be 
clearcut; species don't ask to go extinct; intact ecosystems don't ask to be 
fragm ented or altogether destroyed. Anyone who says they hear a forest, species 
or ecosystem say such things is simply attem pting to justify his use and 
exploitation of them by projecting upon them his own representations and 
categories in which these beings and things have no standing except as natural 
resources to be manipulated, developed and used according to the hearer- 
projector's purposive agenda and intentionality. So, to anyone who w ould argue 
that the rem aining wildlands in the northern Rockies are begging to be roaded, 
drilled, logged and mined, I'd ask you to step back and reflect upon w hat you are 
hearing. Is it the voice of these places and creatures as they speak of themselves 
and their integrity, independence, otherness and non-instrumental value? Or 
does the voice you hear speak of these same places and creatures as objects to 
m anipulate, order and control, resources to exploit, develop and use, dead and 
speechless things without any meaning apart from the purposes they m ay serve? 
Is it the self-speaking voice of a Thou or the projected utterance of an It that you 
are responding to? Are your actions sponsored in respect and concern or self- 
interest? Insofar as we honestly ask ourselves such questions, I believe we can
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evaluate what we hear and how we respond, and, contra Kultgen, we can discern 
between the address of self-speaking fellow creatures and the purposive 
prejudices of our instrumentalist projections. It seems to me that ethical 
responsibility does not require some mythic objectivity as m uch as it requires 
reflective candour and philosophical honesty.
Ethical responsibility with respect to wildlands means responding to their 
address. As resources these places do not - cannot - address us; resources have 
no voice apart from that projected upon them according to our intentions and 
purposes. As such, we cannot practice responsibility toward a resource.
O ur ethical responsibility to wild places and wild creatures m ust be born 
in and funded by our relations with them, not as resources, but as independent 
others, fellow beings, partners in dialogue, Thous. Through the suspension or 
bracketing of our objectifying constructs and instrumental categories, we may 
hear the self-speaking address of these beings and things and find ourselves 
called upon to respond. In the immediacy of dialogue (where our projections do 
not intervene), these eloquent places and creatures speak to us of their otherness, 
independence and integrity, their non-instrumental goodness and value, and, in 
doing so, they elicit our respect and concern. Consequently, our response to their 
self-speaking address, if it is to be ethical, will not fail to embody that respect and 
concern. And our respectful and caring response to wildlands involves, most 
fundam entally, leaving them be (understood in the way Bugbee defines that 
posture/m ovem ent/action). Preserving the remaining w ildlands of this region 
is not just good science, smart economics or sound recreation management; it is
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our ethical responsibility. The rhythm  of dialogue and responsibility w ith 
respect to the wildlands of the northern Rockies culminates in our preservation 
of each - and consequently, all - of the remaining roadless lands in the region.
O ut of our respect and concern for these places and their inhabitants, w e are 
obligated to protect, preserve and keep them holy.
And so, I'd like to conclude this chapter, and this entire essay, by 
advocating and endorsing what I believe is the appropriate political enactm ent of 
our ethical responsibility to the wildlands of this region: the N orthern Rockies 
Ecosystem Protection Act (NREPA). Written by grassroots environmentalists 
from around the region, this bill would preserve about 20 million acres of public 
w ildlands in eastern Washington and Oregon, Idaho, Montana and W yoming 
through a variety of management designations, including wilderness areas, wild 
and scenic rivers, national park study areas, biological corridors and wildland 
recovery areas. In short, it would protect and preserve what remains of the 
wildlands of the northern Rockies as well as begin the process of rehabilitation 
and healing on certain public lands that have been degraded through prior 
developm ent and use. And while NREPA is almost always argued for on the 
basis of its biological and economic merits, to me, it stands as a testament to the 
dynam ic and compelling rhythm of dialogue and responsibility. It is an 
enactm ent of the respect and concern these wildlands and their inhabitants call 
forth from us and instill within us; it is, at root, a respectful and compassionate - 
ethical - response to the eloquent address of these places and creatures and an 
honoring of their claims to be allowed to exist and evolve in their own way and 
in their own right.
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